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When, If Ever, Should Trials Be Held Behind Closed
Doors?
The Honorable Justice Joseph A. Boyd, Jr.,*
and
Paul A. Lehrman**
"One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public should
know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens
there, to the end that the public may judge whether our system of justice
is fair and right."1 - Justice Felix Frankfurter
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale Justice Stewart framed the issue before
the United States Supreme Court as follows: "[W]hether members of
the public have an independent constitutional right [under the sixth
amendment] to insist upon access to a pretrial judicial proceeding, even
though the accused, the prosecutor and the trial judge all have agreed
to the closure of that proceeding in order to assure a fair trial."3
In its narrowest sense, Gannett dealt with the constitutionality of
the closure of a pretrial suppression hearing. While attempting to limit
its decision to the facts before it, the Court spoke no less than twelve
times of a general public right of access to criminal trials.4 For exam-
Justice Joseph A. Boyd, Jr., is a graduate of the University of Miami Law
School, J.D. 1948. He is currently a justice of the Florida Supreme Court.
** Paul A. Lehrman is a graduate from Florida State University, J.D. 1978. He
was a research assistant to Justice Joseph A. Boyd, Jr., at the Florida Supreme Court
from 1978-1979. Mr. Lehrman is currently engaged in private practice in Tallahassee.
The authors thank Whitney Strickland, who is a research assistant to the First
District Court of Appeal, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting from denial of cert.), cited in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, _
U.S. ., 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2826 n.9 (1980).
2. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
3. Id. at 370.
4. See Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, - U.S. at
100 S.Ct. at 2841.
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ple, at one point Justice Stewart wrote: "The Constitution nowhere
mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the part of the pub-
lic; [the sixth amendment] guarantee, like the others enumerated, is
personal to the accused." 5
The Court's frequent use of inconsistent language and Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence, stating that the first amendment provided no
enforceable right to open governmental proceedings,6 led to considera-
ble confusion among commentators and members of the media. One
headline appearing in a national legal newspaper summed up best the
ambiguity surrounding the Court's holding-"Gannett Means What It
Says; But Who Knows What It Says?" 8
Faced with this muddle, the Supreme Court recently decided to
reconsider Gannett. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,9 the
Court addressed the question of whether the first amendment, 10 as op-
posed to the sixth amendment, guaranteed the public and press the
right to attend a criminal trial."'
5. 443 U.S. at 380, quoting Justice Blackmun's dissent in Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 848 (1975).
6. "Despite the Court's seeming reservation of the question whether the First
Amendment guarantees the public a right of access to pretrial proceedings, it is clear
that this Court repeatedly has held that there is no First Amendment right of access in
the public or the press to judicial or other governmental proceedings." 443 U.S. at 404
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. The Birmingham Post-Herald, Aug. 14, 1979, at A-4, termed the decision
"cloudy." The Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 20, 1979, at 5 (cartoon), labeled the Gannett
decision "confused." See also Note, Freedom of Expression and the Media, 7 HAST.
CONsT. L.Q. 338 (Winter 1980).
8. Nat'l L. J., October 15, 1979, at 20.
9. - U.S. _, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
10. One distinguished litigator stated that Richmond Newspapers is "one of the
two or three most important decisions in the whole history of the First Amendment."
Richmond Decision Seen as Having Major Effect, 6 MED. L. REP. 11 (July 15, 1980),
quoting Dan Paul.
11. Compare Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, "This case would have been unnecessary had Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), construed the Sixth Amendment to forbid excluding the
public from criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined circumstances." - U.S. at
, 100 S. Ct. at 2830, with Mr. Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Gannett,
note 6 supra, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, "I do not believe that either the First or Sixth Amendments, as made applica-
5
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The facts of the Richmond Newspapers case are simple. Upon the
unopposed motion of defense counsel to close to the public the fourth
murder trial of the defendant, the judge barred the public and press
from the courtroom.12
Later that same day, appellants, two reporters for appellant Rich-
mond Newspapers, sought a hearing on a motion to vacate the closure
order. They maintained that the Constitution prohibited such an order
absent a finding that closure was the only way to preserve the fair trial
rights of the defendant. The court disagreed, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia, finding no reversible error, denied Richmond Newspapers' pe-
tition for appeal from the closure order.
In reviewing the case,13 the Supreme Court recognized that the
ble to the States by the Fourteenth, require that a State's reasons for denying public
access to a trial, where both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant have consented
to an order of closure approved by the judge, are subject to any additional constitu-
tional review at our hands." - U.S. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 2843. Justice Blackmun contin-
ues to maintain the right to a public trial is found in the sixth amendment. - U.S. at
, 100 S. Ct. at 2842. Nevertheless, he accepted the ultimate ruling in Richmond
Newspapers, although he pointed out the Court erred in its analysis of Gannett. - U.S.
at ., 100 S. Ct. at 2842 n. 3.
12. In March 11, 1976, the defendant, Mr. Stevenson, was indicted for murder.
Stevenson was subsequently found guilty. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction based upon the introduction of inadmissable evidence. Stevenson's
second and third trials ended in mistrials. In the second trial, a juror was excused after
trial had begun and no alternative juror was available. In the third trial, it was alleged
that a prospective juror had read newspaper accounts of Stevenson's previous trials and
had told other prospective jurors of the events surrounding the previous cases. Prior to
Stevenson's fourth trial in the same court, his counsel moved to close the courtroom to
the public. The prosecution offered no objection. The trial judge granted the motion,
citing to a Virginia statute (VA. CODE § 19.2-266) that a court "may, in its discretion,
exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair
trial, provided that the rights of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated." See
_ U.S. at _, 100 S.Ct. at 2818; Nat'l L. J., Sept. 26, 1980, at 26.
13. In deciding to hear the case, the Supreme Court determined that the ques-
tion of jurisdiction would be postponed until hearing the case on the merits. 444 U.S.
89 (1979). At oral argument, the State of Virginia contended that because the Virginia
statute authorizing closure had not been ruled on by the Virginia State Supreme Court,
the Supreme Court lacked appellate or certiorari jurisdiction. In opposition, Richmond
Newspapers, represented by constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe, asserted that
the Virginia closure statute was invalid "as construed and enforced, and this is enough
for jurisdiction." 48 U.S.L.W. 3550 (Feb. 26, 1980). From this, the Court treated the
6
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conflict between publicity and the due process guarantees of the defen-
dant is "almost as old as the Republic."' 4 The Court's analysis began
at once with the following treatment of Gannett:
In Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, the Court was not required to decide
whether a right of access to trials, as distinguished from hearings on pre
trial motions, was constitutionally guaranteed. The Court held that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the accused of a public trial gave
neither the public nor press an enforceable right of access to a pre trial
suppression hearing.15
After reviewing abundant historical evidence showing criminal tri-
als both here and in England were presumptively open and considering
the first amendment interest in the public's right to know, the Court
concluded: "Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."16
The majority based its conclusion on a number of persuasive rea-
sons, all interrelated with one central theme; that is, open justice
secures public confidence in the judicial system.
The decision in Richmond Newspapers is important for two rea-
sons. First, the Court's attempt to distinguish Gannett on its facts
should resolve some of the uncertainty clouding that opinion's true
meaning. Second, a natural extension of the underlying rationale enun-
ciated in Richmond Newspapers could and should persuade courts to
open the doors to pretrial activity to the press and public.
Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers offered an additional
explanation why public access to criminal proceedings deserves consti-
tutional 'protection. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan noted:
Publicity serves to advance several of the particular purposes of the trial
(and, indeed, the judicial) process. Open trials play a fundamental role
filed papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. - U.S. -, 100
S.Ct. 2814, 2820.
14. - U.S. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 2821, quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 547 (1976).
15. - U.S. at - 100 S. Ct. at 2821.
16. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 2830. Justice Burger's opinion, joined by Justices
White and Stevens, went on to observe the right of access is not absolute. Reasonable
time, place and manner restraints are permissible. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 2830 n.18.
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in furthering the efforts of our judicial system to assure the criminal
defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence.17
Publicity during pretrial activity in criminal cases also would pro-
mote these objectives.18 The same analysis should apply as well in civil
litigation. 19 A defendant's fate so often depends upon what goes on in-
side pi'eliminary hearings. The presence of the public at these proceed-
ings would insure that justice is administered from the day the judicial
process begins.20
Just how will Gannett and Richmond Newspapers influence the
judicial process in Florida? Decisions dealing with the subject long ago
17. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 2937 (Brennan, J., concurring).
18. "Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison to public-
ity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institu-
tions might present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to operate
rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance." J.
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827), cited in - U.S. at -, 100 S.
Ct. 2824 (Brennan, J., concurring).
19. One commentator cites well-respected N.Y. Times columnist Anthony Lewis
as suggesting that the Richmond Newspaper doctrine regarding open criminal trials
also applies to civil proceedings. Winter, Richmond Case Widens Access, Spawns
Doubts, 66 A.B.A. J. 946 (Aug. 1980). The Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers
did not directly address this issue. See - U.S. at ._, 100 S. Ct. at 2829 n. 17, 2830 n.
18. In contrast, Florida courts have dealt with the issue, determining that the nature of
the proceeding is immaterial. In State ex rel Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d
777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977), the
Fourth District Court of Appeal asserted in a civil proceeding that "there is no distinc-
tion between a criminal or a civil action insofar as it pertains to the exercise of the
court's inherent power to control the conduct of the proceeding before it; but, whether
it be a criminal or a civil proceeding this power must be exercised cautiously and only
for the most cogent reasons." 313 So. 2d at 783. See, e.g., English v. McCrary, 348 So.
2d 293, 300, 301 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., dissenting).
20. First, it is suggested that public access to criminal and civil proceedings imp-
proves the quality of evidence by promoting a disinclination for witnesses to falsify
their testimony. Furthermore, public attendance may encourage public officials, includ-
ing judges, lawyers, and police officers, to be more conscientious in the performance of
their respective duties. Finally, public access builds confidence in the fairness of the
judicial process. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 1834 (1976). Such public access, however,
could jeopardize a witness' personal safety. See, e.g., Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v.
State, 378 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), in which two convicts' fear of retalia-
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recognized that in our state the conduct of a trial is a public matter.21
And, as the United States Supreme Court has noted:
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public
property. . . . Those who see and hear what transpired may report it
with impunity. There is no special prerequisite of the judiciary which
enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic govern-
ment, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in pr6ceedings
before it.22
Even though jurisdictions agree on the general desirability of open
judicial proceedings, situations like that in Gannett create a "civil liber-
tarians' nightmare"23 of conflicting constitutional liberties.
But Florida case law, even pre-Gannett, has dealt in a logical man-
ner with the conflict. Courts in the state have developed a balancing of
interests test, applicable to both criminal and civil cases, that seeks a
satisfactory compromise between the two interests. Such treatment is
still valid today in a post-Gannett era and can provide a measure of
protection for both rights when they conflict.
State ex rel Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson24 provides an excellent
example of how one district court of appeal coped with the problem of
public access versus a fair trial of the defendant. In the majority opin-
ion, Judge Mager of the Fourth District Court of Appeal first reiter-
ated the basic proposition that a court has inherent power to control
the conduct of the proceedings before it.25 He then proposed that
before a judge be permitted to close a part of a trial, he must examine
the particular factual circumstances of each case and measure these
factors against the various interests affected. If "cogent reasons"26 exist
to suspect the right to a fair trial may be jeopardized, the press must
be excluded.
Judge Mager went on to list a number of situations which would
21. State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla.
1976).
22. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
23. United States v. Dickinson, 365 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1972).
24. 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 348 So.
2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
25. Id. at 781.
26. Id. at 782.
9
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justify a private trial. For example,
[w]here the testimony of the defendant or witnesses was of such a nature
that it could not be freely and completely presented to the public without
serious detrimental effects to the 'fair trial' concept. . . [or] where the
nature of the testimony was such as to be offensive to younger persons
• ..[or] where the lives and safety of the witnesses were involved...
,"2 a trial may be conducted behind closed doors.
Not content with mere abstractions, Judge Mager concluded by
defining the proper role of the court in and the appropriate tests for
weighing these competing interests. The following guidelines apply even
though the litigants, like those in Richmond Newspapers, prefer that
the proceedings be conducted in secret. Judge Mager wrote:28
1. A court's action in excluding access to the courts by the public and
press is subject to review by prohibition;
2. A newspaper corporation, a newspaper reporter or a member of the
public have the standing to maintain a prohibition proceeding for the
purpose of enforcing the right of public access to the courts;
3. The court has inherent power to control the conduct of its own
proceedings;
4. The court, under its inherent power, may for cogent reasons exclude
the public and press from any judicial proceeding to protect the rights of
the litigants and to otherwise further the administration of justice;
5. In determining the restrictions to be placed upon access to judicial
proceedings, the court must balance the rights and interests of the par-
ties to the litigation with those of the public and press;
6. The type of civil proceeding,29 the nature of the subject matter and
the status of the participants are factors to be considered when evaluat-
ing the cogent reasons for excluding the public and press from access to
the courts;
7. Persons involved in civil litigation are not entitled to exclude the
public and press merely because they request a closed hearing;
8. The public and press have a fundamental right of access to all judi-
cial proceedings;
9. The court's exclusion of the public and press (and the sealing of
27. Id.
28. Id. at 787.




Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss1/1
8 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
court records) based solely upon the wishes of the parties to the litiga-
tion, absent cogent reasons for conducting a private trial, constitutes an
act in excess of the power of the court.
While closing hearings from public scrutiny is not new in this
state,30 it is clear that a fair trial is preferred over an open hearing if
the two are incompatible: "We have always held that the atmosphere
essential to the preservation of a fair trial - the most fundamental of
all freedoms - must be maintained at all costs."31
Moreover, as the decisions in Gannett and Richmond Newspapers
make clear, constitutional considerations mandate closure in criminal
cases' where the right to a fair trial may be infringed. 2 But the limita-
tion on the public's right to know must go only so far as to protect the
right to a fair trial and no further. In many cases, the mere sequestra-
tion of a jury or change of venue may be sufficient to protect the defen-
dant. 3 As the Supreme Court of Florida stated in pre-Gannett days:
The inconvenience suffered by jurors who are sequestered to prevent
exposure to excluded evidence which may be published in the press is a
small price to pay for the public's right to timely knowledge of trial pro-
ceedings guaranteed by freedom of the press. It is argued that a tempo-
rary withholding of news from the public may aid in assuring a fair trial
30. State ex rel. English v. McCrary, 328 So.2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
approved, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977); see also Sentinel Star Co. v. Booth, 372 So. 2d
100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 383 So. 2d 236
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
31. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965), quoted in State ex rel. Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 909 (Fla. 1977).
32. Richmond Newspapers held that a courtroom may be closed provided there
is "an overriding interest articulated in findings." - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
Although Chief Justice Burger's opinion does not define "overriding interest," it is
clear that such a test will not prevail where alternative methods - such as sequestration
- protect a defendant's fair trial rights. However, because Justice Burger was joined
only by Justice Stevens and to a limited degree by Justice White, there was no agree-
ment as to the test for determining when closure is appropriate. See, e.g., Justice Bren-
nan's opinion, joined by Justice Marshall: "What countervailing interests might be suf-
ficient to reverse this presumption of openness need not concern us now. . . ." Id. at
2839 (footnote omitted). See also Goodale, The Three-part Open Door Test in Rich-
mond Newspapers Case, Nat'l L. J., Sept. 26, 1980, at 26.
33. Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1968).
11
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and that if the State and the defendant agree to muzzling the press no
one else has a right to object. We firmly reject any suppression of news
in a criminal trial except in those rare instances such as national security
or where a news report would obviously deny a fair trial. . .. "
When synthesizing these cases and harmonizing them with Gan-
nett and Richmond Newspapers, one should apply the following
thoughts and principles to any case involving a question of public ac-
cess to the courtroom:
1) A presumption that all aspects of the trial are open to public scru-
tiny should govern.
2) In rare instances, the first amendment right of public access will
conflict with the sixth amendment right to a fair trial.
3) In such cases, the trial judge should examine the circumstances of
the case. Specifically, he or she should consider the type of case, the
nature and sensitivity of the evidence, the probability of extensive press
coverage, the size of the potential jury pool, and all other "cogent"
factors.
4) The desire of the litigants to hold the proceedings in private should
have no impact on the judge's decision.
5) If the judge decides that access should be limited, such limitation
should be exercised only to the extent necessary to provide a fair trial.
6) Accordingly, any limitation imposed must go only so far as to pro-
tect the right to a fair trial and no further.
7) Only in the most extreme circumstances, in which there are no less
restrictive alternatives, should access of the public be limited.
8) A jury should be sequestered before a decision to limit access is
made. If sequestration does not prove to be sufficient, the trial judge
must weigh the impact of an open trial upon the possibility of con-
ducting a hearing that lacks fairness.
With such guidelines in effect, the rights of the litigants and the
rights of the public would be best served.
As the Supreme Court of Florida noted:
Freedom of the press. . . is a cherished and almost sacred right of each
citizen to be informed about current events on a timely basis so each can
exercise his discretion in determining the destiny and security of himself,
34. 340 So. 2d at 910.
12
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other people, and the Nation. News delayed is news denied. To be useful
to the public, news events must be reported when they occur. Whatever
happens in any courtroom directly or indirectly affects all the public. To
prevent star chamber injustice, the public should generally have un-
restricted access to all proceedings.
In summary, the impact of Gannett and its progeny will be limited
in this state. Florida has recognized for many years, especially with the
advent of the electronic media, 6 that conflicts between a free dissemi-
nation of information and a fair trial will inevitably arise. Fortunately,
a body of well-reasoned case law exists for perplexed judges to follow.
With the two federal decisions of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers
to guide the exercise of judicial power, the delicate business of balanc-
ing two of our most precious constitutional freedoms can be performed
in such a way as to benefit both litigants and the public.
35. Id.
36. See Chandler v. Florida, 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1979), prob. jur. noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3673 (April 22,
1980). See Smith, Fair Trial - Free Press: The Camera in the Courtroom Dilemma
Continues, 3 NOVA L. J. 11 (1979); See also Hoyt, Prohibiting Courtroom Photogra-
phy: It's Up To The Judge In Florida and Wisconsin, 63 JUDICATURE 290-95 (Jan.
1980). Netteburg, Does Research Support The Estes Ban On Cameras In The Court-
room, 63 JUDICATURE 466-75 (May 1975).
5:1980 1
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Is the Supreme Court Creating Unknown and
Unknowable Law? The Insubstantial Federal Question
Dismissal
Ovid C. Lewis*
United States Supreme Court Justices undoubtedly accept the prevail-
ing notion that the American legal system functions as an instrument
for attaining socially desired ends.' And surely they would agree with
Karl Llewellyn's prescription that judges in resolving justiciable contro-
versies ought to "see and weigh first the relevant problem-situation as a
type, holding meanwhile so far as may be in suspense [their] reactions
to the fireside equities or to other possibly unique attributes of the case
in hand. ' 2
Llewellyn's approach seeks to reach a just decision, reflected in an
opinion articulating a rule of "singing reason."3 Stated another way, a
decision should represent "both a right situation-reason and a clear
scope-criterion on its face [yielding] . ..regularity, reckonability and
justice."'4
The United States Supreme Court's memorandum opinion prac-
tice fails to satisfy these ideals. To the contrary, it appears as though
the Court, when summarily affirming or dismissing an appeal, follows
the advice once given by Lord Mansfield to an army officer. The officer,
just appointed governor of a West India island, was concerned about
* Dean, Center for the Study of Law, Nova University; J.S.D., Columbia Univer-
sity School of Law, 1970.
1. This is, of course, nothing new. Justice Cardozo in 1921 observed that "[flew
rules in our time are so well established that they may not be called upon any day to
justify their existence as a means adapted to an end." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921). See also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
2. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268
(1960).
3. Id. at 183.
4. Id.
14
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his ability to sit as a chancellor and to decide cases. Lord Mansfield
soothed the new governor's fears with this counsel:
Be of good cheer-take my advice, and you will be reckoned a great
judge as well as a great commander-in-chief. Nothing is more easy; only
hear both sides patiently-then consider what you think justice requires,
and decide accordingly. But never give your reasons;-for your judgment
will probably be right, but your reasons will certainly be wrong.'
But justification and elaboration are expected in a mature legal
system.' An opinion must explicate the ratio decidendi to provide-if
not a rule of "singing reason"-at least some rule to ensure that the
Court has acted on principle rather than "fireside equities." When the
Court provides opinions demonstrating that the resolution of an issue is
at least partially the product of principled7 and reasoned 8 decision
making, we are reassured that rules of law do play a role in the judicial
process.
By writing opinions demonstrating that the judgment is the result of
principled and reasoned decisionmaking-not a mental toss of
dice-judges retain and exhibit their objectivity, enhancing the prestige
of the legal process and reenforcing the consensus of legitimacy, the
main source of power for courts in a strong legal system, i.e., a legal
system that is 'the product of a . . . substantial consensus and . . . will-
5. 3 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 481 (3d ed.
1874).
6. On justification and judicial decision making, see R. WASSERSTROM, THE JU-
DICIAL DECISION 172-73 (1961).
7. "Briefly put, the requirements for principled decision are: (1) that a reason for
the disposition of the case be given; and (2) that the case be so decided because it is
held to be proper to decide cases of its type in this way." Golding, Principled Decision-
Making and the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 35, 41 (1963).
8. "Reasoned" decision is more inclusive than decision "on principle" and
has more meaning in administrative context. We forget sometimes that
"arbitrary" action can be either an unjustified departure from general pol-
icy or an undiscriminating and unjust application of general policy to a
concrete situation within its letter but not within its spirit.
Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 145 n.5
(1958).
15
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ing obedience' rather than the product of coerced submission.9
Obviously, if promulgation of a rule does not occur, then law "as a
guide to conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility [because] it is
unknown and unknowable."1 0
The thesis advanced in this article is that the federal question
memorandum opinion practice of the Court comes close to creating un-
knowable law.
A species of memorandum opinions exists that ostensibly complies
with the minimum requirements of reasoned elaboration. These deci-
sions affirm or reverse a case by merely citing a prior controlling prece-
dent."' The Court has indicated that these determinations are on the
merits, unlike denials of certiorari, and thus binding on lower courts.1 2
In fact, the Court itself sometimes cites these summary dispositions as
authority. 3 More often, however, such decisions simply are ignored.
The Court's summary affirmance in Adams Newark Theater Co. v.
City of Newark14 illustrates the lack of respect accorded to such mem-
orandum opinions.
Adams involved an appeal from a conviction for violation of an
9. Lewis, The High Court: Final ... But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
528, 548 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
10. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 3 (1924).
11. The potential for disagreement as to whether a prior decision is controlling
was most evident in the opinions in Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959) and Ohio v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960). For the denouement, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967). But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
12. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967), citing as dispositive
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958). Summerfield is frequently
cited. See, e.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116 (1972). Summerfield was a
memorandum opinion that reversed the lower court, merely citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14. 354 U.S. 931 (1957), rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 851 (1957). The Court
cited as dispositive Alberts v. California, 352 U.S. 962 (1957), Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 352 U.S. 962 (1957), and Roth v. United States, 352 U.S. 964 (1957). The
Court cites to its grants of certiorari and notation of probable jurisdiction and not to
the actual disposition of the cases. For those, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). Justice Warren would
have set Adams for argument. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, and Justice Bren-
nan did not participate in the decision.
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ordinance of Newark, New Jersey, which, inter alia, prohibited lewd
dancing. 5 The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the conviction,
even though it found that theatrical performances, including the bur-
lesque show involved, fell within the protective ambit of the first
amendment.' 6
When the Supreme Court subsequently dealt with other cases in-
volving ordinances proscribing topless dancing (California v. LaRue"7
and Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc."8), it never mentioned Adams, although a
California decision cited in LaRue had cited in its opinion the New
Jersey Supreme Court Adams opinion.' 9 *
The lack of attention given to the Court's memorandum opinions
becomes clearer when one discovers that the California court that had
cited the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion failed to note by citation
or otherwise that Adams was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. 0
The slighting of Adams does not illustrate an isolated instance. In
at least nine other state and federal opinions, the New Jersey Supreme
Court decision is cited with no reference to the Court's affirmance.2
15. The relevant portions of the ordinance, NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES
ch. 8, art. XIV, §8 (1955), are set forth in Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of
Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 475, 126 A.2d 340, 341-42 (1956), aff'd 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
16. 22 N.J. at 475, 126 A.2d at 342.
17. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
18. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
19. The case cited by the Court in LaRue is In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446
P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969). See LaRue,
409 U.S. at 130.
20. See In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 567 n.1, 446 P.2d 535, 539 n.1, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 655, 659 n.1, (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969).
21. Kirzenbaum v. Paulus, 51 N.J. Super. 186, 196, 144 A.2d 25, 31 (1958),
affd, 57 N.J. Super. 80, 153 A.2d 847 (1959); State v. Congdon, 76 N.J. Super. 493,
503, 185 A.2d 21, 30 (1962); Silco Automatic Vending Co. v. Puma, 105 N.J. Super.
72, 93, 251 A.2d 147, 158 (1969), rev'd, 108 N.J. Super. 427, 261 A.2d 174 (1970);
State v. Shapiro, 122 N.J. Super. 409, 420, 300 A.2d 595, 601 (1973); Gardens v. City
of Passaic, 130 N.J. Super. 369, 327 A.2d 250, 256 (1974), affid sub nom Iafelice v.
City of Passaic, 141 N.J. Super. 436, 358 A.2d 805 (1976); Paramount Film Distribut-
ing Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69, 70 n.4 (N.D. 11. 1959); Hudson v.
United States, 234 A.2d 903, 905 n.4 (D.C. 1967); Maryland State Bd. of Motion
Picture Censors v. Times Film Corp., 212 Md. 454, 129 A.2d 833, 835 (1957); Major
Liquors, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 188 Neb. 628, 198 N.W.2d 483, 486 (1972).
I
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Accordingly, the summary disposition in Adams, in its most favorable
light, could be described as a judicial derelict on the legal seas. 22
Even if other courts took cognizance of the Adams memorandum
affirmance, would reference to a prior Court decision provide more
than a judicial Rorschach? Every jurist knows how difficult it is to as-
certain the holding of a case.23
Julius Stone suggests that use of prior precedents is a complex
process in which judges,
by linking instant cases with precedents, and elaborating, by resort to
rhetorical arguments, [generate] fresh solutions in single cases. In these
parts the legal system is 'open,' in the sense that it does not offer
mechanical keys to determinate solutions. This . . . does not mean that
choice is at large, or that decisions may not command some degree of
conviction springing from their anchorage in the topot, the truths taken
as common grounds for the time being. 24
Thus, it is not surprising to find that even when courts attempt to
22. The metaphor was suggested by Justice Frankfurter's comment concerning
the status of Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), given
the Court's decision in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Ry. Co., 342 U.S. 359
(1952). Justice Frankfurter wrote: "the Bombolis case should be overruled explicitly
instead of left as a derelict bound to occasion collisions on the waters of the law." 342
U.S. at 368-69 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in Dice).
23. Sometimes there is no such principle. See, e.g., National Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Or, with blocs on the Court, the holding
requires addition of various principles to which a majority would accede. See, e.g.,
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); Carey v. Population Seres. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
What constitutes a "fact" is itself an extremely complex question. See W. PROBERT,
LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 299-301 (1972); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 369-85
(10th ed. 1958).
24. J. Stone, Reasons and Reasoning in Judicial and Juristic Argument, 18
RUTGERS L. REV. 757, 775 (1964). It also is interesting that T. Kuhn has analogized
conceptual innovations in science to the judicial process: "In a science . . . a paradigm
is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the
common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under new or
more stringent conditions." T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 23
(1962). This parallel is discussed at length in Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial
Behavioralism, 21 CASE W. RS. L. REV. 361, 415-42 (1970).
15 1
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apply prior precedents cited by the Court in summary decisions, little
guidance is available.25 One particular circumstance demonstrates viv-
idly how the Court's memorandum practice fails to communicate effec-
tively the ratio decidendi of a case.
When the Court reverses and remands a case, merely citing an
earlier decision as controlling, a lower court may, instead of following
the Supreme Court's actual message, simply distinguish the case. This
misreading forces the Court to again reverse summarily.28 The lack of
communication in this situation is evident. McLeod v. Ohio27 illustrates
well this Sisyphean process.
In McLeod, the record showed the appellant/accused had made
incriminating statements while voluntarily helping the police to secure
relevant evidence. Although then indicted, he had not been arraigned
and had not requested nor retained counsel. Nor were the incriminating
statements the product of trickery.
25. A clear illustration is provided by the memorandum opinion in United States
v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9 (1966). In that case, the doctrine of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
I 11 (1942), was apparently extended to situations with no substantial impact on inter-
state commerce. Although the lower court did an excellent job of distinguishing Wick-
ard (see 354 F.2d at 555-56), the Court, in reversing, merely cited Wickard. United
States v. Ohio is probably overruled sub silentio by National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). But who really knows? And how many have even considered the
question, given the obscure status of such summary affirmances? The issue explicitly
left unanswered in Usery-whether state sovereignty acts as a limitation on federal
spending power (see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 n.17
(1976))-was resolved by the Court in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 435
U.S. 962 (1978), in what Professor Tribe describes as an "unceremonious summary
affirmance." L. TRIBE, 1979 SUPPLEMENT TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18
(1979). The Court dealt indecisively with the same issue relative to the federal taxing
power in Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781, 781 (1963), "remanded for
further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962)." On re-
mand, the state court distinguished Gideon and adhered to its original judgment.
Doughty v. Sacks, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963). The Court then reversed
in Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964), citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962) and Gideon. See also O'Connor v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 286 (1965) (reversed and
remanded). On remand, the conviction was affirmed. State v. O'Connor, 6 Ohio St. 2d
169, 217 N.E.2d 685 (1966). On appeal, the Supreme Court again reversed. O'Connor
v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966). See also Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967), on re-
mand, 223 Ga. 465, 156 S.E.2d 65 (1967), rev'd by the Court in 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
27. 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
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These factors distinguish McLeod's situation sharply from that in-
volved in Massiah v. United States.28 In that case, the incriminating
admissions of the accused were elicited by trickery and subsequent to
both indictment and arraignment for the federal crime involved and
after counsel had been retained. Indeed, the Court in Massiah ap-
peared to limit its decision to its facts by stating that "[a]ll that we
hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by
federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not consti-
tutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his
[federal] trial."29
The curious concatenation of affirmances and reversals occurred as
follows: The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed McLeod's conviction,"0 and
the Court reversed and remanded to the Ohio court "for consideration
in light of Massiah v. United States .. ." The Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed McLeod's conviction again, finding that "the 'circumstances'
under which his incriminating statements were given were wholly dif-
ferent from those in Massiah."3 2 Finally, the United States Supreme
Court reversed with the unilluminating statement: "The judgment is
reversed. Massiah v. United States. .. ."3 This is perhaps another
demonstration of the extraordinary facility with which a legal mind can
think of something else without thinking of that to which it is
connected.34
If memorandum opinions such as McLeod constitute judicial Ror-
28. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
29. Id. at 207 (emphasis deleted).
30. 173 Ohio St. 520, 184 N.E.2d 101 (1962). Actually, the conviction was af-
firmed when the appeal was dismissed "for the reason that no debatable constitutional
question is involved." Id. at 520, 184 N.E.2d at 101. Apparently, the Ohio Supreme
Court has learned something from the United States Supreme Court.
31. 378 U.S. 582 (1964) (citations omitted).
32. 1 Ohio St. 60, 62-63, 203 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1964).
33. 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (citation omitted).
34. See Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, HARPER'S MAGAZINE 37, 42 (Oct.
1976). See also Von Jhering, Im Juristischen Begriffshimmel, READINGS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 678, 681 (M. Cohen & F. Cohen eds. 1951), in which
Von Jhering made the judicial application when he posited a test for admission to the
heaven of juristic concepts that required the applicant to display "ability to construe a
legal institution without regard to its real practical significance, but purely on the basis
of the concept itself or its original sources."
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schachs, then memorandum opinions dismissing appeals for lack of a
substantial federal question are the pages sans blot because these opin-
ions set forth no precedent. However, the difference is not merely one
of degree, but of kind. At least in summary affirmances and reversals,
the Court finds that there is sufficient disagreement about the merits of
the federal question presented to require citation to an applicable case.
But this is not so where the question is deemed insubstantial.
If a plaintiff attempts to invoke federal jurisdiction in a district
court but his claim is deemed insubstantial, no case or controversy ex-
ists and the case is necessarily dismissed--obviously a decision not on
the merits and without precedential effect. As the high Court has in-
structed lower courts:
Over the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are
without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if
they are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of
merit" . . . ; "wholly insubstantial" . . . ; "obviously frivolous" . . .;
"plainly unsubstantial" . . .; or "no longer open to discussion". . . .One
of the principal decisions on the subject, Ex parte Poresky ...held,
first, that "[i]n the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is essential to
jurisdiction that a substantial federal question be presented. . ...35
We can readily perceive how the Court could conclude that frivo-
lous claims fail to present the type of federal questions required to sat-
isfy the case or controversy article III jurisdictional requisite.36
35. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citations omitted).
36. United States ex rel Mayo v. Satan, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971), pro-
vides an amusing illustration of a frivolous action. There the plaintiff instituted a civil
rights action against Satan for causing the plaintiff misery and placing deliberate ob-
stacles in his path which led to his downfall. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion over the person of Satan. The Supreme Court has frequently indicated that frivo-
lous claims will not support federal jurisdiction. Early cases to that effect include:
Wynn v. Morris, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 3 (1857); Millingar v. Hartupee, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 258, 261 (1867); New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79
(1891); Hamblin v. Western Land Co., 147 U.S. 531, 532 (1893); Wilson v. North
Carolina, 169 U.S. 586, 595 (1898); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Brown, 187
U.S. 308, 311 (1902). In Millingar v. Hartupee, the language the Court used was
particularly revealing. It dismissed a suit for lack of jurisdiction because "[s]omething
more than a bare assertion of [the federal question] .. .seems essential to the jurisdic-
tion of this Court." Id. at 261. See discussion in Ulman & Spears, Dismissed for Want
1 18 Nova Law Journal
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The issue is more complex where the federal question supporting
jurisdiction is arguably insubstantial because it is not open to discus-
sion, i.e., its resolution is a Hobson's choice.3 7 The Heraclitean assump-
tion that the only constancy is change appears to hold with considera-
ble vigor in judicial decision making. Is any resolution by the Court
totally foreclosed from review? The Court has frequently observed that
stare decisis has less force where constitutional interpretation is re-
quired; after all the Court "must never forget, that it is a constitution
. . . [it is] expounding. ' ' 8
A striking example was provided when the Court, after deciding
and publishing its opinion involving court martial jurisdiction over civil-
ians, reversed itself and published a new opinion on rehearing the fol-
lowing term.39
of a Substantial Federal Question, 20 B.L. REv. 501 (1940). The authors note that
"[1]ater cases point to this remark as the first statement of the doctrine that a substan-
tial federal question is a prerequisite of Supreme Court jurisdiction in appeals from
state courts." Id. at 507. There are cases in which the Court did summarily affirm, but
the applicable prior precedents are discussed. See, e.g., Penna Co. v. Donat, 239 U.S.
50, 51-52 (1915).
37. The early cases dealing with insubstantiality by virtue of the certainty of the
relevant rule are cited under the "Rule of Precedents" in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS 309 n.42 (1908).
38. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Justice Bran-
deis also commented incisively on the role of stare decisis in constitutional
interpretation:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more impor-
tant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be right .... This is
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided
correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitu-
tion, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial
and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial
function.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissent-
ing) (citation omitted).
39. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487
(1956), on rehearing, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Of course, a change in the Court's personnel
had occurred, not an unanticipated recurring event. Individual justices do, of course,
reverse themselves. Consider, for example, Justice Black's change of position in West
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Accepting the Court's conclusion that there are federal questions
so settled as properly characterized, along with frivolous claims, as too
insubstantial to support jurisdiction in a district court, then it follows
that the same doctrine should apply to cases where appellate jurisdic-
tion is invoked on the basis of a federal question properly raised. At
least since Marbury v. Madison'40 the Court has considered itself as
constrained as other federal article III courts by the article III case or
controversy strictures. Thus, if the party attempting to invoke the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of an article III court presents as the basis for juris-
diction only an insubstantial federal question, the appeal should be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction-a decision clearly not reaching the
merits. Until Hicks v. Miranda41 however, the precedential effect of a
Supreme Court's dismissal of an appeal for lack of a substantial federal
question was uncertain. In fact, such dismissals were often ignored.
For example, in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co.,42 the
Court dismissed an appeal for insubstantiality, thereby apparently up-
holding the validity of the New York "long-arm" statute.' 3 Yet when
the case is cited in Hart and Weschsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System, one of the most comprehensive casebooks ever pub-
lished, the reference is to Justice Goldberg's denial of a stay, with no
reference to the Court's opinion dismissing the appeal." Clearly the
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
42. 382 U.S. 110 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 1002(1965).
43. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 1963) provided, inter alia, that
A Court may exercise jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary. . . as to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same man-
ner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he:
(2) commits a tortious act within the state ...
The Supreme Court had not previously dealt specifically with this question, although
some state courts had spoken. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 22 Il1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE
644-53 (1965). The relevant decisions of the Court are discussed in Mr. Justice
Goldberg's order denying a stay in the case. See Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid
Co., 382 U.S. 1002 (1965).
44. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 627, 631, 1554 (2d ed.
1973). The same omission occurs in J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL
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authors did not believe such a dismissal was of precedential weight.
Former Justices Goldberg and Clark have indicated that they never
viewed these dismissals as dispositions on the merits.45
The Court ostensibly provided an answer to the question of the
precedential value of dismissals for insubstantiality on appeal in Hicks
v. Miranda.46 In Hicks, the Court stated that cases dismissed for lack
of a substantial federal question constitute dispositions on the merits.4
It also noted in a disingenuous understatement that "[a]scertaining the
reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of real
substance.' 4 The Court had further opportunity to clarify the impact
of a dismissal in Mandel v. Bradley.' In Mandel, the Court wrote:
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 122-23 (1968). The second edition of F. JAMES,
JR. & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 630-34 (2d ed. 1977), makes no reference to
Rosenblatt even though the validity of "long arm" statutes is discussed.
45. Mr. Justice Goldberg mentioned this to the author during a conversation.
Mr. Justice Clark's view is set forth in his concurring opinion in Hogge v. Johnson, 526
F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1975): "During [the eighteen terms in which I sat] . . .[such
dismissals] received treatment similar to that accorded petitions for certiorari and were
given about the same precedential weight." Some political scientists even after Hicks
still believe such a dismissal is to be given the same weight as a denial of certiorari. See
R. FUNSTON, A VITAL NATIONAL SEMINAR 26 (1978).
46. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
47. The evolution of such an unequivocal rule exemplifies a bootstrapping tech-
nique frequently used in legal reasoning. Professor C. Wright supported such a rule in
1963 by citing, inter alia, R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 164
(3d ed. 1962), with a "cf." citation to R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 104 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland eds.
1951). C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 431 (1963). To the same effect, see his
1970 second edition at 495. Robertson & Kirkham note that "the memorandum dis-
missals by the Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal question often consti-
tute undisclosed determinations on the merits." ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDIC-
TION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES at 104. In Hicks v. Miranda,
the Court cites, inter alia, C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 495 (2d ed. 1970).
Professor Wright in his latest edition now relies solely on Hicks. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 551 n.25 (3d ed. 1976). Justice White, author of the Court's opinion
in Hicks v. Miranda, appears uncertain concerning the doctrine he elaborated. In his
dissent from the dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question in Thomas v. New
York, - U.S. ---., 100 S. Ct. 197 (1979), he expresses concern about leaving lower
courts in conflict. If the dismissal is on the merits, as he suggested in Hicks, the conflict
is resolved.
48. 422 U.S. at 344.
49. 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
211
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss1/1
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal
question without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the
statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment ap-
pealed from. They do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite con-
clusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those
actions. 10
Despite the ostensibly clear principle enunciated in Mandel, the
significance of such dismissals remains an enigma. For example, in
Jones v. Louisiana5 1 the Court's rationale for the dismissal is a tene-
brific Zuckerkandlite. 52 Jones followed Duncan v. Louisiana,53 which
held the sixth amendment's guarantee of jury trial applicable to a state
trial where the offense carried a maximum two-year sentence. But
Jones came before De Stefano v. Woods, 4 which determined that the
Duncan doctrine was hybrid prospective. From the Court's decision to
hear De Stefano, it would seem the Court in Jones was applying a
principle relevant to the type of offense to which the sixth amendment
right to jury trial attaches and not a prospectivity issue. But because
Jones involved offenses, one of which resulted in a one-year sentence,
and the Court shortly thereafter applied the jury trial provision to of-
fenses carrying sentences of more than six months in Baldwin v. New
York, 55 certainly the federal question concerning that issue was sub-
stantial at the time of Jones.
Curiously enough, the Court in Baldwin not only fails to mention
Jones, but also states: "In this case, we decide only that a potential
50. Id. at 176. The Court continues to place emphasis on the jurisdictional state-
ment. See McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., - U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 2953 (1980). Because the jurisdictional statement is prepared by counsel
seeking review, the statement could tend to overstate the issues presented.
51. 392 U.S. 302 (1968).
52. Dr. Zuckerkandl, a creation of Robert Hutchins, had as his chief goal reduc-
ing communication to a minimum. A typical Zuckerkandlite was provided by President
Eisenhower's response to a question about integration in Southern schools: "However,
when the Federal Court gets into the thing, you have got a judicial thing, or I mean a
legal thing, that I have gone as far as I know the answer." Hutchins, Living Without
Guilt, 18 CENTER DIARY 37, 38 (May/June 1967).
53. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
54. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
55. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
1 22 Nova Law Journal
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sentence in excess of six month's imprisonment is sufficiently severe by
itself to take the offense out of the category of 'petty.' None of our
decisions involving this issue have ever held such an offense 'petty.' "56
The Supreme Court of Louisiana also did not find precedent from the
high Court to aid it in arriving at a decision.57
Trying to apply the Mandel test to the Duncan, Jones, and Bald-
win trilogy highlights the cacophony of the Court's statement. The ju-
risdictional statement in Jones sets forth the following question
presented: "Do state statutes that deny the right to trial by jury in a
prosecution for Possession of Burglar Tools, where a one year prison
term may be and is actually imposed, violate the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution?"' 8 If the Court, in its
dismissal of Jones, held no right to a jury trial exists where a sentence
of one year is imposed, how, then, did Baldwin, a case involving the
imposition of six month's imprisonment, warrant an extensive opinion?
Was the Baldwin issue not already decided by the dismissal of Jones?
The question naturally arises whether the Court really meant that
dismissals for want of a substantial federal question necessarily "with-
out doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of
jurisdiction." 59 Can the Supreme Court possibly mean what it says
when it dismisses a case presenting truly fundamental issues? Potts v.
Kentucky 0 illustrates the difficulty of taking the Court's words
literally.
Potts was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. The
Court cites the reader to the lower court's decision in Potts v. Kentucky
for the facts and opinion. At the designated page appears a table indi-
cating that the Kentucky opinion in Potts is unreported."1 The jurisdic-
56. 399 U.S. at 69 n.6 (emphasis supplied).
57. State v. Jones, 251 La. 431, 204 So. 2d 775, 778-79 (1967), appeal dis-
missed, 392 U.S. 302 (1968).
58. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 2, Jones v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 302
(1968).
59. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
60. 435 U.S. 919 (1978).
61. The relevant portion of the unreported decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky reads: "The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel has not been presented
to the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time in this court." Potts v. Com-
monwealth of Kentucky, No. 76-257 (Ky. Ct. App. July 8, 1977). It is not unusual to
find significant Court opinions involving unpublished lower court opinions. See, e.g.,
23 115:1980
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tional statement, however, frames the issue before the Court. 2
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 392 U.S. 657, 657 (1968), vacating an unpub-
lished opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal and remanding "for further
consideration in light of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. . .," which is located at 392
U.S. 409 (1968). Predictably the Virginia court found Jones distinguishable, Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588 (1968), and the United
States Supreme Court again reversed. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969). The increase in unpublished opinions is not nearly as disturbing as the
emergence of no citation rules. See Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c) (1977). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Local Rule 11 provides:
"Decisions of this court designated as not for publication should never be cited to this
court or in any material prepared for this court. No such decision should be published
unless this rule is quoted at a prominent place on the first page of the decision so
published."
Justice Stevens comments on this development:
A rule limiting the number of opinions to be published in the official reports is
justifiable and desirable as long as the opinions are available to the Bar and to
the public. For I am well aware of the fact that appellate judges-including
myself-write more than is necessary. But censorship in the form of a no-citation
rule is fundamentally different from a decision not to publish certain opinions
generally.
Address by Justice Stevens to the Illinois State Bar Association's Centennial Dinner:
Some Thoughts and Reflections on the Litigation Explosion and How It Has Affected
the Courts' Ability to Cope with the Problem, reprinted in ILL. B.J. 508, 510 (1977).
The no-citation rules have raised interesting challenges. In Carter v. United States, 590
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977), rehearing denied, 434
U.S. 882 (1977), the petition for rehearing raised the question:
Whether the existence and application to Petitioner's case of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's Local Rule I 1 (rendering the Appellate
Court's decision in Petitioner's case of no precedential value whatsoever) denied
Petitioner his right to an appeal in accordance with the Federal Statutes and the
Constitution of the United States since: (1) Local Rule I1 is substantive and
therefore not authorized by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or 28
U.S.C., Section 2071; (2) Local Rule 11 operates to produce non-justiciable deci-
sions inconsistent with the case or controversy requirement of Art. III of the
Constitution of the United States; (3) Local Rule 11 on its face and as applied in
Petitioner's case, constitutes invidious discrimination in violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (4)
Local Rule 11 unconstitutionally infringes the rights of expression and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing at 2-3, Carter v. United States, 434 U.S. 882 (1977).
62. The jurisdictional statement indicates that the specific challenge raised was:
Do Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 10.06 and 12.54 and their application
124 Nova Law Journal 5:1980
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The facts presented in the jurisdictional statement reflect a shock-
ing lack of effective assistance of counsel at trial. The defense attorney
committed innumerable -blunders at the defendant's trial for rape.
Among other errors, the trial lawyer failed to interview witnesses,
failed to introduce discovery motions, failed to introduce jury instruc-
tions and failed to use damaging statements made by the alleged rape
victim to impeach her credibility.6"
The court of appeal refused to listen to appellant's arguments be-
cause the issue of ineffective legal assistance was not raised in the trial
court. Discretionary review sought on the basis of a due process viola-
tion was denied by the Kentucky Supreme Court. A strict application
of the rule established in Mandel leads to the conclusion that the chal-
lenges made in Potts, i.e., violations of procedural fairness, were re-
jected by the high Court.6" Does this dismissal, as Mandel explicitly
states, prevent lower courts from arriving at a different result when the
next similar factual situation arises? If the answer is yes, then the
Court displays a callous disregard for the fair trial rights of a
defendant.
If jurisdictional statements are the guide to determining the mean-
ing of these dismissals, the general inaccessibility of these jurisdictional
statements is of considerable concern. Mutatis mutandis, we can apply
Justice Jackson's sage advice concerning the interpretation of the
Miller-Tydings Act in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp..65
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Kentucky, as
stated in the case of Caslin v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 491 S.W.2d 832
(1973), wherein the courts held that any appellant may not raise the question of
ineffective assistance of counsel unless the counsel who is being alleged ineffec-
tive raises the question of his own ineffectiveness, or else the question will be
forever barred, violate the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and therefore vitiate the
conviction of the appellant.
Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Potts v. Kentucky, 435 U.S. 919 (1978). The
status of the Potts dismissal is apparently understood by the Kentucky Supreme Court
(see Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Ky. 1979)), but not by some
commentators. See Collier, Criminal Procedure, 68 Ky. L.J. 655, 678 n.120 (1980).
63. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 5-6, Potts v. Kentucky, 435 U.S. 919
(1978).
64. See note 61 supra.
65. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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There are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possible the
meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are intended for
all of our people to live by; and the people go to law offices to learn what
their rights under those laws are. Here is a controversy which affects
every little merchant in many States. Aside from a few offices in the
larger cities, the materials of legislative history are not available to the
lawyer who can afford neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of housing,
or the cost of repeatedly examining the whole congressional his-
tory. . . .To accept legislative debates to modify statutory provisions is
to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the country.66
Frequently the Court and lower courts appear oblivious to the in-
substantial question dismissals. Fairly representative is the striking
omission in the Supreme Court of Ohio's opinion in Primes v. Tyler,6 7
which held that the Ohio guest statute violated the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause. The opinion rested on both state and
federal provisions. Certainly as to the federal provision, the overriding
authoritative law comes from the Court.
Prior to writing the opinion in- Primes, the justices of the Supreme
Court of Ohio should have been aware of Cannon v. Oviatt, 8 a case
dismissed by the Court for lack of a substantial federal question. The
jurisdictional statement in Oviatt indicated that the question presented
was:
Whether the Utah guest statute, section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection guaran-
tee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in
creating classifications among those permitted and those denied recovery
for negligently inflicted injuries that bear no fair, substantial or rational
relation to the purposes of the legislation. 9
The Ohio court did cite the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Can-
66. 341 U.S. at 395, 396-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
67. 43 Ohio St. 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
68. 419 U.S. 810 (1974).
69. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810
(1974). Shortly after this, jurisdictional statements began to appear in microform,
making them more accessible. More libraries now have the relevant material. Compare
R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 10-15 (3d ed. 1962) with R.
STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1158-72 (5th ed. 1978).
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non v. Oviatt,70 but completely ignored the affirmance through dismis-
sal by the Court, even though a later Court decision is cited.7 1
The Court itself generally acts as though the dismissals are nonex-
istent, but often enough relies on them to require lawyers and courts to
become knowledgeable about their potential import.7 2 Justice White's
opinion, in Patterson v. New York, 7 provides a striking example of the
significance of a dismissal. In Patterson, New York law required a de-
fendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emo-
tional disturbance to reduce the charge to manslaughter. The
constitutional question presented was whether the New York rule was
consistent with the doctrine enunciated in Mullaney v. Wilbur,7 ' which
established that the state must prove all elements of a criminal offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice White, in rejecting the defendant's
Mullaney argument, reasoned:
Subsequently [after Mullaney], the Court confirmed that it remained
constitutional to burden the defendant with proving his insanity defense
when it dismissed, as not raising a substantial federal question, a case in
which the appellant specifically challenged the continuing validity of Le-
land v. Oregon. This occurred in Rivera v. Delaware, an appeal from a
Delaware conviction which, in reliance on Leland, had been affirmed by
the Delaware Supreme Court over the claim that the Delaware statute
was unconstitutional because it burdened the defendant with proving his
affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. The
70. 43 Ohio St. at 203, 331 N.E.2d at 728 (1975).
71. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
72. In Hicks the Court was quite emphatic: "The three-judge court was not free
to disregard [an earlier dismissal for insubstantiality]." 422 U.S. at 344. The Court has
vacillated considerably on how much deference is due. It appears the Court views itself
not as constrained as it would be by a plenary opinion: "our decision not to review fully
the questions presented in Orsini v. Blasi [423 U.S. 1042 (1976), dismissing for lack of
substantiality] is not entitled to the same deference given a ruling after briefing, argu-
ment, and a written opinion .... Insofar as our decision is inconsistent with our dis-
missal in Orsini, we overrule our prior decision." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
390 n.9 (1979). To the same effect, see Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 400
U.S. 173, 180-81 (1979). For an earlier case dealing with the precedential weight ac-
corded summary affirmances, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).
73. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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claim in this Court was that Leland had been overruled by Winship and
Mullaney. We dismissed the appeal as not presenting a substantial fed-
eral question. Cf. Hicks v. Miranda. .... 75
With considerable prescience, Justice Brennan earlier observed, in
dissenting from the dismissal in Rivera v. Delaware,7 6 that
The Court's summary disposition of this case is especially inappropriate
since Hicks v. Miranda accords that disposition precedential weight. See
also Colorado Springs Amusements v. Rizzo. Given the transparent ero-
sion of Leland by Winship and Mullaney, the question whether Leland
has continuing validity surely merits full briefing and oral argument.7 7
It is not unusual for the Court to base all or part of its decisions in
cases given plenary consideration on prior memorandum dismissals for
the lack of substantiality.7 8 Once counsel and lower courts become
more knowledgeable about the Court's use of these dismissals, we can
anticipate more frequent incorporation of these precedents into briefs
and lower court opinions.
Conclusion
The Court's extensive use of dismissals for lack of a substantial
federal question (in the post-Hicks v. Miranda era)79 constitutes a seri-
75. 432 U.S. at 205 (citations omitted).
76. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
77. 429 U.S. at 880 (citations omitted).
78. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm., 424 U.S. 645, 646
(1976); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443 (1979); Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664,
686 n.6 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. During the 1974-1978 terms, the Court dismissed 357 appeals for lack of
substantial federal question, an average of approximately 71 cases per term. There
were 85 dismissals during the 1979 term.
Dismissal for Lack of
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ous intrusion into the Rule of Law. A brief survey of this practice
reveals that the Court uses this technique in a significant number of
cases to generate "law" that is generally unknown-if not unknow-
able-but that is binding precedent for all except Supreme Court Jus-
tices who can selectively overrule, ignore, or cite these dismissals at
their discretion. Indeed, just the description of the practice sounds like
the antithesis of a Rule of Law. The cost, then, must be counted as
high for the Court as an institution that depends so much for its power
and effectiveness on continued perception by the legal profession and
the public that its decision making involves a process of reasoned elabo-
ration in which cases are resolved according to neutral principles.
To revert to the earlier pre-Hicks position that such dismissals,
like denials of certiorari, are not of precedential weight would cost the
Court nothing in terms of consistency or guidance to the litigants and
public.
This position would also appear to be more consistent with its ju-
risprudence concerning article III jurisdiction. Why the Court contin-
ues like Caligula to adhere to this pernicious practice defies explana-
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The Marriage Penalty: Restructuring Federal Law to
Remedy Tax Burdens on Married Couples
Gail Levin Richmond*
In 1975 Professor Boris Bittker wrote a comprehensive article entitled
Federal Income Taxation and the Family.' Later that year, David and
Angela Boyter obtained the first in a series of three divorces.2 The
Boyters undertook year-end-divorce/year-beginning-marriage ceremo-
nies in 1975-76 and in 1976-77,1 not because of marital discord but
rather to "upgrade" their income tax filing status from married to
single.
The Boyters illustrate a problem addressed by Professor Bittker in
the second part of his article.4 They, like many other dual income mar-
ried couples, pay a higher income tax on their combined salaries be-
cause they are married than they would pay if they were single. What
set the Boyters apart from the majority of this group is the self-help
remedy they employed to reduce this tax burden. While the efficacy of
* A.B., University of Michigan, 1966; M.B.A., University of Michigan, 1967;
J.D., Duke University, 1971; Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for
the Study of Law.
1. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389
(1975).
2. The Boyters' divorces have been the subject of various articles, both scholarly
and those designed for popular reading. See, e.g., Note, The Haitian Vacation: The
Applicability of Sham Doctrine to Year-End Divorces, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1332 (1979);
Comment, Congressional Sanction of Illicit Cohabitation-The Tax Reform Act of
1969, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 940 (1979); Richmond, Divorce American Style (For
Taxes), NOVA PERSPECTIVE, Spring 1980, at 4; Griping Grows Louder Over "Marriage
Tax," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 29, 1979, at 71; Kaminski, The Marriage
Penalty & Other Taxing Aspects of Wedded Life, Nat'l L.J., June 2, 1980, at 24, col.
1; Main, Making Marriage Less Taxing, MONEY, Jan. 1980, at 47; McIntyre, Individ-
ual Filing in the Personal Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L.
REV. 469 (1980).
3. Their 1977 divorce was not followed by remarriage. The couple continues to
live together, however.
4. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1416-44.
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that remedy has been placed in doubt by the Tax Court's recent deci-
sion upholding the government's challenge to the validity of the 1975
and 1976 divorces,5 the problems illustrated by the Boyters' actions
must be faced by Congress shortly,8 whether or not a successful appeal
is taken from the Tax Court decision.7 Several bills already await ac-
tion by Congress, 8 and some state governments have implemented al-
ternatives to what has been called the "marriage penalty.", This article
5. Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. -, Nos. 11445-77 & 11446-77 (Aug. 6,
1980). Although the Internal Revenue Service attacked the 1975 and 1976 divorces as
shams, it has not done so with respect to the 1977 divorce, in which the Boyters be-
came permanently unmarried. Compare Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40, with IRS
Private Letter Ruling 7835076 (1978). The Tax Court did not reach the government's
contention that the Boyter divorces were shams for purposes of federal law, as it was
able to decide the marital status question on state law grounds. Because the Boyters
remained Maryland domiciliaries while obtaining divorces in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, Judge Wilbur determined that "Maryland would not recognize the foreign
divorces as valid to terminate the marriage. . . . " 74 T.C. at _. The opinion con-
tains an extensive discussion of state recognition of foreign divorce decrees. This discus-
sion was deemed necessary because there was no Maryland decision directly addressing
this issue and the court was forced to choose the rule it felt the Maryland high court
would have adopted. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
6. Both the Democratic and Republican platforms state their respective parties'
opposition to the "marriage penalty." See, e.g., Democratic Party platform plank on
"Women and the Economy," approved by the platform committee on June 24, 1980;
Republican Party platform plank on "Strong Families," approved by the convention on
July 15, 1980. Already introduced in Congress and awaiting action are over thirty bills
dealing with the problem in one way or another. These bills are listed by type in Ap-
pendix I infra and are discussed later in this article at pp. 45-54 infra.
7. Because the Boyters reside in Maryland, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit would hear any appeal. In its recent decision in Ensminger v.
Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979), that court noted various cases in which
the different tax rate schedules had survived challenges to their constitutionality. Id. at
192. Earlier in the opinion, the court remarked that certain inequalities in tax conse-
quences may result from residence in one state as opposed to another, "but it illustrates
the deference Congress has demonstrated for state laws in this area and its attempts to
insure that, in the application of federal tax laws, taxpayers will be treated in their
intimate and personal relationships as the state in which they reside treats them." Id.
at 191. Only if the court of appeals disagrees with the Tax Court on the state law issue
will the sham issue be raised again in Boyter.
8. See Appendix i infra.
9. Later in this article the tax systems of New York, North Carolina and Ohio
will be discussed as illustrating issues raised by the various alternatives for federal
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will discuss the suggested solutions and offer further proposals for legis-
lative study.
A Brief Historical Perspective
One can best understand the conflicting viewpoints which resulted
in Boyter if that case is viewed from a historical perspective. The major
federal ° taxes that affect residents of the United States are the income
tax and the various taxes imposed on gratuitous property transfers, gift,
estate and generation skipping transfer taxes. To some extent, but by
no means entirely, the amount of these taxes paid by any particular
individual is dependent upon his or her marital status. Thus, the focal
point of the material which follows is the use of marital status in legis-
lation and judicial decisions affecting federal tax liability.
The first income tax statute,"1 assessing a flat three percent tax on
incomes in excess of eight hundred dollars,12 did not mention marital
status; the tax was imposed on the income of "every person."13 Subse-
quent Civil War era income tax statutes did not vary in this regard,1
4
nor did the short-lived 1894 Act.1
5
action. See pp. 54-57 infra.
10. Because not all of the states levy income or transfer taxes, and because those
which do have not opted for uniformity in approach, discussion in this section will be
limited to federal taxes. But see Appendix II infra for a comparison of certain charac-
teristics of state income tax laws.
11. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309. Although repealed less than
a year later, Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 473, its treatment of individu-
als was repeated in subsequent legislation. See statutes cited in note 14 infra.
12. Because the first $800 was exempt from this tax, a slight degree of progres-
sion did exist.
13. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309. So long as the tax was
essentially proportional in nature, married couples who both had income paid the same
amount of tax they would have paid had they been single and living together and the
same amount on two separate returns as would have been due had a combined return
been allowed or required.
14. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 473; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 74,
§ 11, 12 Stat. 723; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 281; Act of Mar. 3,
1865, ch. 78, § 1, 13 Stat. 479.
15. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 553, declared unconstitutional
as an unapportioned direct tax in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
affid on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
33 1
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In 1913 Congress enacted the first post-sixteenth amendment in-
come tax statute.16 As the committee reports indicate, marital status
was considered relevant to an individual's tax burden. While the first
$3,000 of a single individual's income was deductible in computing tax-
able income, married couples could exempt the first $4,000.17 In ex-
plaining its decision to vary the exemption from the flat $4,000 deduc-
tion proposed by the House of Representatives, the Senate Finance
Committee stated: "[I]t is deemed equitable as recognizing the added
obligations on account of marriage and children and salutary as em-
phasizing the family as the unit in our social structure." 18
Because each individual filed a tax return based upon his or her
own income, two single individuals living together could take advantage
of $6,000 in exemptions if each had income of at least $3,000; if only
one had any income, there would be only one $3,000 exemption. 9 A
married couple living together2 could exempt no more than $4,000 re-
gardless of how much income each earned. By the same token, that
couple could exempt the full $4,000 even if only one spouse earned
income.21
In one respect the married and the single individual received iden-
tical treatment. Each was subjected to tax only on his or her own in-
come. This was an important consideration for married couples, be-
cause the 1913 tax rates were graduated, 22 and in almost every
instance a higher tax would be due if two incomes were combined on
the same return than if each spouse filed a return reporting only one
income.23
In fact, the 1913 income tax provisions differentiated more be-
16. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166.
17. Id. § II(C).
18. S. REP. No. 80, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1913).
19. The same result would obtain for two single individuals who were not living
with any other person.
20. The House version provided that each spouse should be entitled to a $3,000
exemption if the couple was living separate and apart from each other. S. REP. No. 80,
supra note 18, at 24.
21. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(C), 38 Stat. 168.
22. Rates ranged from 1% on the first $1,000 of taxable income to as high as 7%
on taxable incomes in excess of $500,000.
23. If one spouse had a net loss which could have offset the other spouse's in-
come, combining the two incomes would result in lower tax liability.
134 Nova Law Journal 5:19801
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tween married couples deriving a substantial portion of their income
from property and those receiving their income from salary, and be-
tween married couples in community property states and those residing
in common law jurisdictions, than they did between married and single
taxpayers. In the first instance, where income was derived from prop-
erty, full advantage could be taken of income splitting if the couple
divided ownership of the property rather than having only one spouse
hold title. Because there were no federal transfer taxes in effect in
1913, property ownership could be arranged to allow income splitting
without the imposition of an inhibiting transfer tax. As single taxpayers
also could make use of property transfers to affect their tax conse-
quences, marital status conferred neither benefit nor detriment.
When Congress enacted an estate tax in 1916, it failed to include
a tax on inter vivos transfers. 4 Thus, property transfers to equalize
income remained an effective tax reduction tool in a time period when
income tax rates underwent a significant increase in the degree of their
progressivity.25
Although the 1920s were generally a period of income tax reduc-
tion,26 a gift tax was enacted in 1924 to limit what might otherwise be
deemed the voluntary nature of the estate tax.27 Two years later this
tax was repealed, and property owners continued to be favored over
salaried workers with respect to their opportunities for tax reduction.2 8
The community property/common law jurisdiction distinction be-
came important as soon as tax rates were graduated. The eight commu-
24. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 200 et seq., 39 Stat. 777.
25. The maximum combined rate was increased from 7% in 1913 to 15% in 1916
and to 67% in 1917. The rapid increases in tax rates can be explained by the unprece-
dented funding needs occasioned by World War I. Although the income tax itself was
not increased until 1916, additional excise taxes were levied in 1914 to replace customs
revenue lost during what was then the European War. See S. REP. No. 813, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). The 1916 increases were attributed in part to the need to
fortify the country, while the 1917 increases were passed to "defray war expenses."
H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916); H.R. REP. No. 45, 65th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1917).
26. At the time the final bill of the decade was enacted, the maximum individual
income tax rate was 25%. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 11-12, 45 Stat. 795-97.
27. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 319, 43 Stat. 313.
28. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200(a), 44 Stat. 126.
351
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nity property states2" treated married couples as a form of partnership,
with the result that each spouse owned one-half of all property ac-
quired by the community, including income from both property and
personal services. If such ownership carried with it the right of report-
ing one-half of the community's income on each spouse's return, re-
sidents of these states would pay lower taxes than residents of common
law states, where income was the property of the spouse who earned it
and who was, therefore, solely liable for the taxes. The different tax
rules imposed upon residents of these two types of jurisdiction inspired
substantial legislation and litigation in the period between 1913 and
1948.
The Revenue Act of 1921 brought about a reduction in the high
tax rates in effect during World War I, resulting in a maximum com-
bined normal and surtax rate of fifty-eight percent for 1922.0 The
1921 legislation also carried with it a right for married couples that
was in most respects of no value: if they so wished, a husband and wife
could combine their incomes on one joint return.3 1 Because no separate
rate structure for such returns existed, the use of this privilege gener-
ally meant a higher tax burden in addition to joint and several
liability.3 2
The House of Representatives attempted to add to that law section
208, which was designed to eliminate the disparity of treatment be-
tween married couples residing in common law states and those resid-
ing in the community property jurisdictions. Section 208 would have
included all community income in the gross income of the spouse hav-
ing the management and control of the community property.3 3 The
Senate deleted this provision from the 1921 Act. 4
Because section 208 reflected a position held by the Treasury De-
partment for several years, its congressional defeat was not its final
bow. Indeed, the government's claims were upheld in United States v.
29. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and
Washington.
30. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 210, 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. 233-37.
31. Id. § 223, 42 Stat. 250.
32. A lower tax would be possible, of course, if one spouse had losses to offset
against the other spouse's income.
33. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
34. H.R. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1921).
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Robbins,35 involving the California community property law in effect
before 1917.36 Even though the wife was granted a vested interest in
community property in the other seven community property states, the
broad powers of management granted the husband gave rise to doubts
about the continued efficacy of income splitting in those jurisdictions as
well. These doubts were resolved in the 1930 decision of Poe v. Sea-
born,37 but the statute of limitations was extended for community prop-
erty returns pending the outcome of that litigation.38
Seaborn3 9 and another 1930 case, Lucas v. Earl,4 gave the Su-
preme Court the opportunity to examine two income splitting arrange-
ments--one a creature of community property law, the other a result of
private contract. The Court determined that these arrangements had a
different effect insofar as their federal income tax consequences were
concerned. As noted earlier, the Treasury Department had attacked di-
vision of income in community property states, yet the Supreme Court
allowed such division in Seaborn, averring that "The law's investiture
of the husband with broad powers, by no means negatives the wife's
present interest as a co-owner." '41
The Court was not unmindful of the fact that this decision would
result in differential treatment for common law and community prop-
erty residents. 42 Earlier that same year, it had invalidated a contractual
arrangement for interspousal income splitting. Although the contract
involved in Earl predated the post-sixteenth amendment income tax by
twelve years, the Court felt that validating such an arrangement would
allow "the fruits [to be] attributed to a different tree from that on
which they grew."'43 The net result of these cases was that residents of
community property states were able to benefit from lower taxes on
salary income if only one of them worked than were similarly-situated
35. 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
36. An excellent discussion of this litigation appears in Bittker, supra note 1, at
1404-07 and sources cited therein.
37. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
38. H.R.J. Res. 340, ch. 495, 46 Stat. 589 (1930).
39. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
40. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
41. 282 U.S. at 113.
42. Id. at 117-18.
43. 281 U.S. at 115.
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residents of common law states. But because no gift tax existed then,
this disparity was not present with respect to income from property so
long as the common law state residents were willing to share
ownership.
Shifting property interests between spouses became costlier in
1932, when a permanent gift tax was enacted.," As ownership of com-
munity assets was automatically split by operation of the state commu-
nity property laws, the burden of this tax fell primarily on residents of
the common law states. The 1932 Revenue Act signaled a change in
the direction income tax rates were to take during the next several
years. The maximum rate of twenty-five percent in effect since 1928
was replaced by a new schedule with a maximum rate of sixty-three
percent.' 5 During the 1930s, Congress, in an attempt to balance the
budget at a time when fewer people were employed and paying taxes,
continually raised tax rates.46 Again, even if only one spouse were em-
ployed, the brunt of these rate increases fell on families in common law
states because income splitting was limited to the community property
states.
In 1941 Congress attempted certain reforms. The House Ways
and Means Committee proposed mandatory joint returns for married
couples. The committee believed this change would correct five "inequi-
ties" in the law: (1) a higher tax was paid by families where only one
spouse contributed to family income than by families where both
spouses contributed; (2) families living in community property states
paid smaller taxes than families living in other states; (3) families
whose incomes were attributable to earnings paid higher taxes than
families whose incomes were attributable to investments; (4) the option
of filing joint or separate returns always operated to the detriment of
the government and to the advantage of the taxpayers; and (5) taxes
were being reduced through the use of family partnerships, gifts and
trusts.' 7 The second and third committee objections have been dis-
44. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501, 47 Stat. 245.
45. Id. §§ 11-12, 47 Stat. 174-77.
46. Id.; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680; Revenue Act of 1935, ch.
829, 49 Stat. 1014; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648; Revenue Act of 1938,
ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447.
47. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1941).
1 38 5:19801
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cussed earlier in this article,48 and the fifth is directly related to the
third. The fourth objection was, of course, correct, but the first objec-
tion suffered from a basic shortcoming. The committee considered the
income tax the only difference in disposable income separating a couple
for whom one spouse was the sole contributor and another couple, both
of whom were employed. In actuality, the second couple's work-related
outlays were higher,49 as was its other tax burden, the "Social Secur-
ity" tax.50
The Senate Finance Committee focused its reforms on the commu-
nity property/common law state distinction. It would have taxed
earned income to the spouse who actually earned it, taxed community
investment income to the spouse having management and control
thereof, and allocated deductions and credits to the spouse reporting
the income to which these items related.5 1 None of these proposals be-
came law.52
When it became clear that Congress would grant residents of com-
mon law states no relief from what they considered oppressive tax bur-
dens,53 several state governments created their own solution. In 1939
Oklahoma adopted an elective community property law. Oregon fol-
48. See discussion at pp. 34-36 supra. Not every community property state
spouse benefits from these income allocations. Each spouse must report one-half of the
community's income even though one of them, perhaps because of marital discord, ac-
tually receives a smaller amount.
49. See discussion at pp. 41 & 45 infra.
50. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, tit. VIII, § 801, 49 Stat. 636. This tax was
initially imposed at the modest rate of 1% on the first $3,000 of wages.
51. S. REP. No. 673 (Part 1), 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1941).
52. H.R. REP. No. 1203, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1941). The 1941 Act almost
included a Senate provision that common law state residents could have used as an
income splitting device had they been as imaginative as the Boyters; alimony was to be
taxed to the recipient and deducted by the payor. Although deferred in conference, this
provision was added to the law in 1942. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 120, 56 Stat.
816-17. Also enacted in 1942 were rules making the estate and gift tax provisions con-
cerning community property more similar to those affecting property in common law
jurisdictions. Id. §§ 402, 453, 56 Stat. 941, 953. These changes were upheld in Fernan-
dez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
53. The 1938 Act provided for tax rates ranging from 4% to 79%. Revenue Act
of 1938, ch. 289, §§ 11-12, 52 Stat. 452-54. The 1942 legislation raised these rates so
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lowed suit in 1943.
In Commissioner v. Harmon," the Supreme Court analogized the
voluntariness of these self-help remedies to the contract provisions in
Lucas v. Earl,55 rendering them ineffective for federal income tax pur-
poses. In the next four years, these states, along with Nebraska, Michi-
gan, Pennsylvania, and the territory of Hawaii, adopted mandatory
community property systems which the Internal Revenue Service ac-
cepted as valid.5" With other states threatening to make this fundamen-
tal change in their basic rules of property law, Congress acted in 1948,
a year in which federal revenue demands were temporarily diminished
compared to what they were during World War II.57
Rejecting the 1941 proposals as being either too costly for married
individuals,58 or unduly burdensome for couples with earned, as op-
posed to investment, income,59 Congress adopted a separate tax rate
schedule for married individuals.60 If they chose to file a joint return,
the married couple would pay a tax which was twice as large as the tax
imposed upon a single person (or a married individual who filed sepa-
rately) with one-half of their combined income. Thus, the degree of
progression applied to married individuals' joint return rates was only
one-half that applied to all other taxpayers, at least until each group
reached the highest tax bracket.""
Little legislative activity occurred until 1969,62 when Congress de-
54. 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
55. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See pp. 37-38 supra.
56. I.T. 3743, 1945-1 C.B. 142-43; I.T. 3782, 1946-1 C.B. 84.
57. H.R. Rup. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 13 (1948).
58. This criticism was made with respect to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee proposal.
59. The Senate Finance Committee proposal was discarded on this basis.
60. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 114. This act also added estate
and gift tax marital deductions and a provision allowing married couples to split the
gift tax consequences of gifts either spouse made to a third party. Id. §§ 361, 372, 373,
62 Stat. 117-21, 125-28. These provisions gave married couples a clear advantage over
unmarried individuals insofar as property arrangements were concerned.
61. Id. § 101, 62 Stat. 111.
62. A separate rate schedule for heads of households was enacted in 1951, thus
reducing some disparities in taxation of married couples and single individuals, at least
in cases where the latter group had certain family obligations. Revenue Act of 1951,
ch. 521, § 301, 65 Sta. 480. In addition, a limited deduction for job-necessitated child
care expenses was added to the law in 1954. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 214,
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cided that the 1948 legislation produced an unnecessarily large dispar-
ity between taxes paid by married couples and by single individuals
with the same income. 3 For example, the $6,070 tax paid by a single
individual with respect to a $20,000 taxable income was thirty-eight
percent greater than the $4,380 paid by a married couple with the
same income." Any extra costs of supporting two individuals on the
particular amount of income had to be offset by the economies of scale
occasioned by their living arrangement and the additional savings if
household tasks were undertaken by one spouse rather than by paid
household help.6 5 The latter advantage diminished in importance if
both spouses were employed, and in that situation their combined job-
related costs of earning the household's income could exceed such costs
borne by the single individual. In enacting a tax rate reduction for sin-
gle individuals, Congress established a rate schedule designed to limit
their extra burden to twenty percent above that imposed upon married
individuals enjoying the same taxable income.6
Using rates currently in effect for 1980,7 the relative tax burdens
of single and married individuals is summarized in the following
table: 8
68A Stat. 70-71. Because of the income phase-out imposed upon married individuals,
single workers were more likely to benefit from this deduction than were married
couples. Id. § 214(b)(2).
63. S. REp. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 260-62 (1969).
64. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 111, 78 Stat. 20. Viet Nam era
tax surcharges are ignored in these computations. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 90-364, §
102(a), 82 Stat. 251 (1968).
65. These computations also had to take into account the fact that no tax was
imposed upon the imputed income attributable to the homemaker spouse's services.
66. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 63, at 262.
67. Several bills providing lower tax rates for 1981 have been introduced into
Congress. The extent of any future tax reduction is at best speculative, particularly in
view of the revenue loss occasioned by combining a general tax cut with a reduction in
the marriage penalty.
68. I.R.C. § 1. The single individual's liability would be reduced to $17,642 if
personal services were his only income source. Id. § 1348.
41 1[5:1980
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TAX PAID AT VARIOUS INCOME LEVELS
Filing Status of Taxpayer:
Married, Married, Single
Taxable Joint Separate Individual's
Income Return Return Return
$ 5,000 $ 224 $ 531 $ 422
10,000 1,062 1,613 1,387
25,000 4,633 7,389 5,952
50,000 14,778 20,999 18,067
Since 1948, the joint return rates have been based upon the fiction
that each spouse earned one-half of the couple's combined income.6 9
Thus, the tax on a couple's joint return income of $50,000 is twice the
tax on separate return income of $25,000. Married individuals benefit
from this fiction whenever one spouse provides all their combined in-
come, one spouse has a loss for the year to offset against the other's
income, or one spouse's income is substantially smaller than that of the
other spouse.70 The couple described above would thus pay tax of
$14,778 using a joint return no matter how their $50,000 income was
derived. Had they filed separate returns their tax burden could have
been as high as $20,999.71 Even if both worked, separate returns would
result in a combined tax exceeding $14,778 whenever one spouse con-
tributed more than $27,100 (and the other, less than $22,900) of the$50,000.72
69. While the fiction has some validity in community property states in view of
the property rules there in effect, joint ownership is not a prerequisite to the use of
these rates by either common law or community property jurisdiction residents.
70. The benefit ceases, depending upon income level, when the lesser-earning
spouse contributes between 10% and 35%. At most income levels, the lesser earning
spouse need contribute only 20% to 25% for the penalty to be felt. JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION STAFF REPORT ON INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND
SINGLE PERSONS (1980), reprinted in Daily Tax Report, Apr. 2, 1980, at J-1, J-8
[hereinafter cited as JCT STAFF REPORT]. Other provisions benefit married couples
filing joint returns. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 165(c)(3), 179, 1244. See also I.R.C. § 116, as
amended by Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 404
(Apr. 2, 1980). Still other provisions require joint filing if married couples are to avail
themselves of the benefits offered. See I.R.C. §§ 85, 105(d), 1348.
71. This tax would result if all $50,000 were attributable to one spouse.
72. At these income levels, each spouse has reached the 49% bracket. For every
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss1/1
The Marriage PenaltyS5:1980
Single individuals do not benefit from this fiction. They pay tax on
their separate incomes, rather than on a pooled amount, no matter
what their living arrangements. Because the rate schedule they use ap-
plies lower rates to their income than would be applied to the same
amount of income produced by a married individual filing a separate
return, single taxpayers living together may pay a smaller tax than that
imposed upon a married couple with the same combined income. Re-
turning to the original example involving income of $50,000, the mar-
ried couple will pay $14,778 on a joint return no matter who earns the
income; on separate returns they will pay that amount or more. Two
single individuals would pay $5,952 each, a total of $11,904 if each
earns $25,000. Indeed, even if one of them earned more than $27,100
(and the other, less than $22,900), they would still pay a total com-
bined tax lower than that paid by the married couple in most situa-
tions.73 This savings, or what some commentators call the "marriage
penalty" is attributable to two factors: first, rates are lower for single
individuals than for married individuals filing separately; and second,
income tax is paid on income in excess of a "zero bracket amount."7' 4
Because this amount is $2,300 for a single individual, two such individ-
uals are entitled to exempt from tax the first $4,600 of their earnings.7 5
A married couple is limited to a maximum of $3,400 whether or not a
joint return is filed.
It should be noted that the 1969 legislation did not raise the taxes
paid by married couples; it simply did not lower them. As labor force
participation by married women increased in response to such diverse
factors as smaller family size, longer life expectancy, shorter marriage
span, 7 better educational opportunities,77 increased employment oppor-
dollar of income transferred from the lower to the higher earning spouse, the former's
tax consequences would drop to the 43% or lower bracket while the latter's would in-
volve the 49% or higher bracket. Thus, more of the combined income would be taxed at
higher rate levels, producing a higher combined tax.
73. At the $50,000 income level, a marriage penalty exists when the lesser earn-
ing spouse contributes as little as 20% of the combined income, a $10,000/$40,000
split. JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-8.
74. I.R.C. § 63(b)-(c).
75. Id. § 63(d)(2). Of course, each individual must have at least $2,300 of in-
come (in excess of the personal exemption) to take full advantage of the deduction.
76. Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicates that divorced women have the
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tunities in nontraditional occupations, 8 inflation, and a higher mini-
mum wage,79 many couples found themselves in the situation facing
David and Angela Boyter; that is, they had to pay higher income taxes
because they were married.
While it appears the Boyters have failed in their particular at-
tempt to remedy the problem of the marriage penalty for 1975 and
1976, the changes in workforce participation by married women will
continue to put pressure on Congress to adopt one or more of the solu-
tions presently before it.8 0 Many couples, particularly those with minor
children, will find the Boyters' successful 1977 solution an unacceptable
alternative. Even if the Boyters ultimately prevail, the majority of simi-
larly situated taxpayers will be unwilling to undergo the expense and
effort involved in successive year-end divorces and the necessary year-
beginning marriages.81
Evidence was introduced at a recent House Ways and Means
Committee hearing that "work decisions of married women are far
more sensitive to tax considerations than are those of single persons or
married men."82 Thus, the marriage penalty may be viewed by many in
Congress as vitiating the effects of federal legislation providing equal
STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-18. In view of the shorter time span between mar-
riage and divorce, Congress amended the social security provisions allowing survivor's
benefits to a divorced spouse and now requires that the marriage have lasted only 10
years as opposed to the 20-year period previously required. 42 U.S.C. § 416(d) (Supp.
11 1979), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-216, tit. III, § 337(a), 91 Stat. 1548.
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, §
901, 86 Stat. 373).
78. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(1976)).
79. The minimum wage will increase from $3.10 per hour in 1980 to $3.35 in
1981. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. 1 1977) (added by Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 2(a), 91 Stat.
1245). The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 5(a)(2),
75 Stat. 67, had increased it to $1.15, and further increases were enacted in 1966 and
1974.
80. At least one court held that remedies for the marriage penalty should be
formulated by Congress. Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. Any rush to the state divorce courts (assuming Boyter has closed the gates to
Haiti and the Dominican Republic) may mobilize those institutions to ask for Congres-
sional relief.
82. JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-10 and sources cited therein.
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educational and employment opportunities fot women. 83 Finally, to the
extent that relief, whether attributable to legislation or to self-help
measures, gives rise to a reduction in tax revenues, Congress would be
better able to predict the size of the revenue loss and adopt offsetting
measures if savings are available to taxpayers without regard to their
willingness to obtain divorces.
The plethora of bills pending in Congress vary in their provisions
from a deduction or credit for the dual income married couple to op-
tional single filing status. These proposals are discussed, along with
counterparts already in use at the state level, in the remainder of this
article.
Deductions or Credits for Job-Related Outlays
Because married couples who are both working outside the home
generally incur larger expenses for such items as meals, transportation,
and clothing than do couples with one worker and one homemaker, tax
deductions or credits frequently have been proposed to offset these ex-
tra costs. Although such deductions might be justified under section
162 as ordinary and necessary business expenses because they are in-
curred to allow the second spouse to take employment, bringing such
expenditures within the umbrella of the business expense deduction is
unlikely. The administrative burdens flowing from such an allowance
should not be underestimated. Indeed, several issues would present
themselves for immediate resolution.
First, a decision would have to be made as to which spouse's ex-
penses would be deemed the extra costs. Possible choices include the
spouse with the higher(lower) expenses, the spouse with the
higher(lower) earnings, and the spouse who entered the labor force
most recently.84 Once this decision is made, Congress can then move on
to the question of whether that spouse's total expenses for work-related
items are to be deducted or only those outlays in excess of the amount
he/she would otherwise incur. The latter choice is more satisfactory
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1976)(originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 92-318,
tit. IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 373); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. (1976)).
84. In dealing with the credit for child care outlays, Congress chose the lesser
earning spouse. I.R.C. § 44A.
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from a theoretical standkoint inasmuch as only such additional outlays
are a necessary concomitant of earning the extra taxable income.
Moreover, if the prospect of "lavish or extravagant" deductions worries
Congress, automatic disallowance of the "fixed" portion of these out-
lays should be an acceptable solution. Incremental cost computations,
although no longer used for entertainment expenses, 85 have long been
an accepted practice in tax computations.86 Subjective questions could
be reduced if some statutory or administrative percentage were treated
as the incremental portion of the employee's actual costs. But basing
the deduction on incremental cost requires increased recordkeeping and
computations, which in turn magnify both the risk of taxpayer error in
computing tax liability and the cost of monitoring taxpayer compliance.
While allowing the full cost of certain items as deductions reduces the
computations involved, this step provides taxpayers little incentive for
controlling what are to a large extent "personal, living or family
expenses." '87
The real problem with allowing these items as deductions under
section 162 transcends mere difficulties in administration and computa-
tion. Such outlays must be viewed as business expenses under section
162, regardless of who makes them, or they should not be treated under
section 162 at all. If meals, transportation, and clothing expenses are to
be deductible for the second working spouse, the same treatment should
be granted those outlays when made by unmarried workers or the
spouse who is the family's sole breadwinner. Since Smith v. Commis-
sioner,88 in which the Board of Tax Appeals held that the wages of a
babysitter who was hired so that parents could work was not a section
162 expense,89 a "but-for" rationale has been insufficient to justify sec-
tion 162 status for outlays with a strong personal flavor. Too many
years of contrary interpretation should prevent use of section 162 here;
but, as the history of the child care credit 90 indicates, other means of
providing relief are available.
85. But see Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2 C.B. 129.
86. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 123; Treas. Reg. § 1.213-I(e)(1)(iii)(1962).
87. I.R.C. § 262.
88. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aft'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
89. 40 B.T.A. at 1039.
90. I.R.C. § 44A.
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Congress enacted section 214 in 19549' to provide a limited child
care expense deduction for working taxpayers. Over the years this de-
duction has been broadened in its coverage and reformulated as a
credit. There are, however, fundamental differences involved between
expenditures for child care and other items of outlay, the size of which
is affected by workforce participation. The cost of child care is, for the
average family, a temporary phenomenon inasmuch as one's children
soon reach an age where custodial care becomes unnecessary. 2 The
outlays for one's own meals and similar items continue throughout the
term of workforce participation, a period of thirty years or longer. In
addition, child care outlays frequently decrease after the child reaches
first grade, when only after-school care costs become necessary.93 With
the possible exception of clothing, the worker's job-related expenses do
not follow this pattern.
Perhaps the most important distinction involved between these out-
lays is one of underlying policy. To reduce the risk that children will be
left unattended or perhaps warehoused in an inadequate (and not nec-
essarily inexpensive) setting, the tax revenue foregone by the govern-
ment could be viewed as an investment, the return from which may
eventually be received in the form of a reduced juvenile crime rate. In
addition, persons performing child care services may now, by virtue of
Internal Revenue Service reporting requirements,94 be spotlighted as
receiving gross income which otherwise might go unreported. It is ques-
tionable whether allowing outlays for other items would serve such pur-
poses. Because the items are already expenditures, only the incremental
cost can be justified as work-related.95 Second, because these items are
91. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 214, 68A Stat. 70-71. The discussion of
this provision ignores the fact that some families send their children to nursery school
even though one spouse never works outside the home.
92. I.R.C. § 44A allows no credit for care of a person age fifteen or older unless
such person is incapable of caring for himself.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.214A-l(c)(3)(1976) disallowed a deduction for educational
expenses of a child in the first or higher grade. Compare-Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(0(2) &
(5)(Ex.3)(1956) with Treas. Reg. § 1.214A-1(c)(5)(Ex.2)(1976). See also Brown v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C..-.._, Nos. 8592-77 & 11685-77 (filed Oct. 24, 1979).
94. Internal Revenue Service Form 2441, used for claiming the child care credit,
requires the name and address of the person rendering care, the amount of money paid
such person, and, in certain instances, that person's social security number.
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purchased from established businesses, their reporting would be of little
value in increasing taxpayer compliance.
While allowing a deduction or credit for these job-related costs
may not have the same appeal as that generated by child care out-
lays,9 6 an argument can be made for tax relief to offset costs which are
clearly job-induced and which do not result in benefits to the worker.
The most compelling example of such a cost is the social security tax
imposed upon most workers. If one spouse works and the other stays
home, a participation pattern upon which the social security system is
founded,97 the employed spouse is eligible to receive from this program
death benefits, disability benefits and retirement benefits based upon a
formula which takes into account the amount of his covered wages.9 8
The nonemployed spouse is eligible to receive retirement payments
equal to a percentage of those received by the employed spouse both
during that spouse's life and after his death.9 If both spouses work,
each pays the social security tax and is eligible for these benefits. How-
ever, to the extent the second spouse would be entitled to some or all of
these amounts even if he or she did not work and pay this tax, the tax
payment does not provide any benefits and can be considered a job-
related outlay for which there are no elements of personal enjoyment.
Generally, the spouse with the lower wage is the one for whom the
outlay is not proportionately covered by available benefits, so that
spouse is the most appropriate person to be granted any tax relief that
is legislated.
As explained above, unless one is willing to argue that job-related
expenses are deductible as employment-related for all workers, justify-
ing the deduction of any outlays other than for social security taxes
becomes difficult. Even a deduction in situations where the second job
was necessary to lift the family above a poverty level involves a rather
tenuous extension of the deduction currently allowed the moonlighting
96. See discussion at pp. 46-47 supra.
97. See REPORTS OF THE 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOC.
SECURITY BULL., Feb. 1980, at 3, 6, 12.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)&(i), 423 (1976) (benefits); id. § 415 (computation of
primary insurance amount).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b),(c),(e),(f) (1976) (benefit generally 50% of the worker
spouse's benefit during that spouse's life and 100% after his or her death).
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worker for transportation between jobs. 100 Section 43 already allows a
credit for low income families, regardless of the number of workers, in
situations where there is a dependent child. Moreover, in the low in-
come situation, relief could be increased by modifying section 43 to
provide a higher income phase-out for married individuals than is pro-
vided for single individuals.10 1 Differing income levels can be justified
because the requirement of a dependent insures that a different mini-
mum number of persons will be supported by the income, three for a
married couple and two for other taxpayers. Because section 43 benefits
are currently awarded whether one or both spouses work, such higher
limits for couples might be further conditioned on both spouses having
income, thus providing an alternative method of allowing for the extra
costs generated by the second worker in a low income family.10 2
While a deduction may be hard to fit within existing notions of
what constitutes an ordinary and necessary business expense, it cannot
be rejected summarily. If Congress decides that the marriage penalty is
sufficiently severe to require relief, then a deduction still must be con-
sidered, not as theoretically justified but rather as one method of for-
mulating such relief.
The decision between a credit and a deduction involves several
considerations. The revenue lost if a credit is used is probably easier to
predict than it would be if a deduction were chosen because the amount
of tax foregone in the latter situation is dependent upon the tax rate
otherwise applicable.108 Likewise, the use of a deduction, unless it is
provided for in section 62, could easily result in job-oriented deductions
alone exceeding the zero bracket amount. In that situation a large per-
centage of persons who presently do not itemize will be forced to keep
records of medical expenses, charitable contributions, and similar
items.104 Finally, a credit can be defended using an "ability to pay"
100. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 C.B. 261, 263; Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2
C.B. 86, 87 (Ex.7).
101. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 85.
102. I.R.C. § 44A, while not raising the child care credit when both spouses
work, precludes its use in most situations where one does not.
103. The forecasting problem is, of course, reduced if a ceiling is placed upon the
amount of the deduction.
104. On the other hand, if the deduction is listed in I.R.C. § 62, it can affect the
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rationale as a means of granting a proportionately higher benefit to
lower income individuals. If, however, the credit were set at or below
the lowest tax rate percentage, no taxpayer would be better off with a
credit than with a deduction. 0 5
To the extent a credit percentage greater than the lowest marginal
bracket is chosen, the amount by which the credit exceeds the savings
attributable to the deduction can be viewed as a subsidy to lower in-
come taxpayers. Such a subsidy falls short of full cost recovery, how-
ever, in at least three aspects. Unless the credit is set at one hundred
percent of cost, it is not a full subsidy.' 06 Likewise, if the credit is not
refundable, it is not a subsidy to the extent it exceeds the current year's
tax liability.10 7 Finally, to the extent a taxpayer's outlays are subject to
an overall dollar limitation, there is less than a full subsidy once costs
exceed the limit.'0 8
The bills pending in Congress which allow a deduction10  or a
credit ' 0 for dual income couples adopt a combination of the ap-
proaches used in computing the child care and earned income credits.
These bills allow a percentage of the earned income of the spouse with
the smaller earnings to be deducted or credited in computing income
tax liability. They do not provide full relief, however, because the speci-
fied percentage is applied against the lesser of such income or a prede-
termined dollar limit."' Thus, the proportionate relief granted in the
sons who do itemize. Many of the bills now pending in Congress avoid both problems
by providing for a deduction which is in addition to the deductions listed in § 62 but is
not an itemized deduction. See, e.g., H.R. 6203, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 1(b) (1979).
105. Exceptions to this rule could occur if the taxpayer would use the zero brack-
et amount and get no benefit from the deduction or if the credit were made refundable,
as § 43 credits already are.
106. The earned income credit, while limited to 10% of the first $5,000 of wages,
does operate in this fashion for very low income taxpayers. I.R.C. § 43. This credit was
designed to offset the effect on low income workers of social security taxes, currently
6.13% of wages. The 10% credit exceeds the full subsidy at covered wage levels of
$6,700 or less (as well as for the minority of workers whose jobs are not covered by the
social security system).
107. The credit authorized by I.R.C. § 43 is refundable, however.
108. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 44A.
109. See, e.g., H.R. 6822, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6203, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979); S. 1247, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
110. See, e.g., H.R. 6798, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
111. H.R. 6822, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), would allow a deduction equal to
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higher brackets is limited, and a marriage penalty would still remain to
some extent."1 2
These proposals have several virtues: first, they involve fewer com-
putational difficulties than would be involved in allowing an offset for
actual costs or in allowing married individuals to file as single individu-
als;113 second, they limit the revenue loss engendered by such relief.11, 4
As between a deduction and a credit, it has been calculated that a
credit "would not be as effective as a deduction, per dollar of revenue
loss, in reducing marginal tax rates in the high income brackets, where
high marginal rates present the most serious problems."11 5
Because these proposals are limited to a percentage of earned in-
come, disparity of treatment still will remain between married and un-
married couples deriving income from investments. This disparity is
relatively more burdensome in one regard: income from investments is
not eligible for the maximum tax rate of fifty percent applied to earned
income.'1 6
the lesser of $2,000 or 10% of the earned income of the spouse with the smaller earn-
ings. This bill differs from the other deduction bills listed in note 109 supra in that its
relief is granted only if the lesser earning spouse's earned income is at least 20% of the
spouses' combined income. See the discussion at note 70 supra.
112. As the JCT STAFF REPORT indicates, "a cap means that there would be no
reduction in the marginal tax rate on a second earner whose earnings exceeded the cap
." JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-15.
113. See discussion at pp. 45-46 supra and at pp. 53-58 infra.
114. The JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at J-14 to J-16, provides the fol-
lowing estimates of revenue loss: a 20% deduction with a $20,000 cap would decrease
revenues $7.1 billion; a 10% deduction with no cap would decrease revenues $3.7 bil-
lion;.and a 10% deduction with a $10,000 cap would decrease revenues $3.2 billion. A
10% credit would result in an $11.7 billion loss even with a $10,000 earnings cap. On
the other hand, the revenue loss from optional separate filing would range between $7.0
billion and $8.7 billion, depending upon how deductions and investment income were
allocated. Id. at J-14. Mandatory separate filing, because of its effect on one-earner
couples, would actually increase federal revenues by as much as $18.1 billion. Id. at J-
13.
115. Id. at J-16.
116. I.R.C. § 1348. Once each wage earner has earned income in excess of the
amount taxed at rates of 50% or less, the flat 50% rale comes into effect and there is no
additional discrimination between married and unmarried workers. This effect occurs
at a much higher level of income with respect to investment income, which can be
taxed at rates as high as 70%.
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However, the discrimination does not always work against the
married couple. If two individuals receive substantial amounts of in-
come from property, as opposed to salaries, they probably will pay a
lower tax if they remain single. However, if substantially all such in-
come is received by one of them, a joint return favors the married
couple. The married couple also has an advantage over the unmarried
couple because the marital deduction is available to allow tax-free inter
vivos transfers of property between spouses .1 7
Mandatory and Optional Separate Filing
As an alternative means of providing relief, several bills would per-
mit married individuals to file separate returns using the rates applied
to single individuals. While most of these bills present this filing status
as an option," 8 a few of them would make separate filing mandatory. 19
In those situations where the existing joint return/separate return rules
give rise to a marriage penalty, optional or mandatory use of the single
return rates would provide almost complete relief. However, in those
situations where the married couple's income is earned primarily by
one spouse, the present system results in lower taxes. Mandatory sepa-
rate returns could thus result in increased taxes.120
Compulsory separate returns were effectively the rule prior to
117. I.R.C. § 2523. Because up to $100,000 of property can be transferred free
of gift tax, the income from this $100,000 can be shifted free of tax consequences.
There may be a $50,000 reduction in the ultimate estate tax marital deduction, but this
would usually be insignificant if income shifting were the goal, because the effect of
such reduction would not be felt until a future period. See I.R.C. § 2056.
118. See, e.g., H.R. 5012, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
119. See, e.g., H.R. 4467, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). These bills use present
joint return rates. They would also ignore community property allocations and tax
earned income to the spouse performing the services. Id. § l(b)(1). While these bills
are generally treated as requiring separate filing, their actual effects are a return to the
pre-1948 rules and equality of treatment for common law and community property
state residents.
120. Such increases would occur at every income level, but the relative percent-
age of returns affected adversely would be greatest at family income levels below
$15,000 and above $30,000, at least in situations where investment income and deduc-
tions were allocated pro rata based upon earned income. JCT STAFF REPORT, supra
note 70, at J-14.
152 5:19801Nova Law Journal
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1948.121 Their use would once again reinstate the distinction between
salary earners and persons deriving substantial amounts of income from
property and the distinction between community property and common
law state residents. While schemes such as those proposed in 1941122
could be appended to such a measure, mandatory separate returns are
unlikely to gain taxpayer support from any group other than single
individuals.123
Optional separate filing creates a situation similar to that recog-
nized by the House Ways and Means Committee in 1941; that is, it
always will be employed to the detriment of the government. This ob-
jection loses much of its force, however, if the proposal is viewed as a
taxpayer relief measure from which the government is expected to lose
revenue.
Among the objections that have been raised to proposals allowing
married individuals to compute their taxes as if they were single are
those relating to the size of the revenue loss, complexities in record-
keeping, and notions of equity toward single individuals who would not
be granted that alternative. The revenue loss caused by optional
separate filing using single rates could be substantially greater than the
loss caused by allowing a deduction or credit.1 2' But in theory, the
same amount could be lost if every married couple who would benefit
from this proposal obtained a year-end divorce.
Alluding to this potential run to the divorce courts does not detract
from the certain revenue loss that approved separate filing would bring.
Indeed, Congress could prevent a self-help solution by adopting a new
definition of marital status, such as being married more than one-half
of the year or being married any time during the last half of the
year. 125 Alternatively, a rate schedule could be developed for cohab-
iting individuals to solve the problem raised by the Boyters' second
solution.126
121. See discussion at pp. 34-40 supra.
122. See discussion at pp. 38-39 supra.
123. Residents of community property states and couples deriving their entire
income from investments may, however, remain neutral.
124. See note 114 supra.
125. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 143(b)(1), 542(a)(2).
126. This alternative was not discussed in the JCT STAFF REPORT, supra note
70. It is discussed in Bittker, supra note 1, at 1398-99, and rejected as unfeasible.
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Another means of reducing the revenue loss would be to modify
the gift and estate tax marital deduction provisions. A reduction of the
allowable marital deduction could be implemented using a formula
designed to compensate the government for income taxes lost when a
couple files as single individuals. Such a modification can be justified
theoretically. If the couple had remained single, they would not have
been entitled to any marital deduction at all. To the extent that marital
status confers detriments a couple wishes to avoid, its benefits should
be treated in a consistent fashion.
Obviously, using the marital deduction to offset revenue losses has
its drawbacks. First, couples who benefit from joint returns will not be
affected, and they are frequently the couples deriving the greatest bene-
fit from the marital deduction. 127 Second, the proposal introduces yet
another set of calculations into each couple's decision about filing sta-
tus-this new set involving at best hypothetical facts as to future gift
and estate taxes. Finally, the need for the marital deduction is removed
if the couple is willing to obtain a divorce each time their wealth is held
in a sufficiently disparate fashion. Expeditious use of section 2516 will
thus reintroduce the question of sham in a context slightly different
from that in Boyter.128
The complexity involved in optional separate filing stems from the
fact that married couples would have to do at least three separate com-
putations of taxable income and tax: his, hers, and theirs. The compu-
tations of the separate incomes would be complicated further by the
recordkeeping requirements necessary to determine which items of in-
come and deduction are allocable to each spouse. 129 While this added
complexity no doubt would be an inconvenience both for the taxpayer
and for the government, it is presently a fact of life for residents of
several states, among them Ohio, New York and North Carolina.
127. High income couples who benefit from joint returns probably do so as to
both earned and investment income and can use the marital deduction to reduce taxa-
tion on transfers of property producing the latter. Their ability to do so was signifi-
cantly expanded by the changes in the gift tax marital deduction enacted in 1976. See
I.R.C. § 2523.
128. Unlike the marital deduction provided by I.R.C. § 2523, the benefits of
I.R.C. § 2516 are not subject to dollar or percentage limitations.
129. These problems involve more than a decision between separate and joint
checking accounts.
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Ohio residents already are forced to do what the optional single
filing status bills would require: that is, compute their taxes jointly and
separately and decide which is more advantageous. In fact, the Ohio
computation must be done twice, as state income taxes also must be
considered. Because Ohio has only one rate schedule, 130 used by all tax-
payers regardless of filing status, a joint state return would result in a
higher tax1 " than would separate returns whenever each spouse had
positive income.1 3 2 Filing a joint state return also would result in a
lower state tax if one spouse had a loss to offset against the other
spouse's income.
Obviously, the Ohio system favors the filing of separate state re-
turns. Nevertheless, joint returns comprise the majority of filings, 33 be-
cause Ohio law requires married individuals to use the same filing sta-
tus in filing their state returns as they use in filing their federal
returns.'"
As discussed earlier in this article, married individuals are rarely
'benefited by filing separate federal returns, 3 5 but the earlier discussion
proceeded on the assumption that only federal tax liability was rele-
vant. As Ohio taxpayers are frequently able to benefit from separate
state returns, some married couples are forced every year to make six
different tax computations to ascertain the lowest possible tax liabil-
ity.136 Because the maximum amount that can be saved by filing sepa-
rate state returns is five hundred -dollars, 37 the couple's computations
130. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5747.02 (Page 1980).
131. Like most other states, Ohio has a graduated rate schedule so that the tax
rate increases as income rises. Id.
132. There will be no marriage penalty if (1) the couple's total taxable income
was $5,000 or less or (2) one spouse's income was less than the personal exemption.
133. [1978] Omo DEP'T OF TAX ANN. REP. 54-55.
134. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5747.08(E) (Page 1980).
135. See pp. 42-43 supra.
136. Computations of each spouse's taxes and of their combined tax are required
at both the state and federal levels. Additional federal coinputations may be required
to ascertain eligibility for income averaging or the maximum tax on personal service
income. See I.R.C. §§ 1301, 1348.
137. The first $40,000 of income is taxed at graduated rates, with a maximum
tax of $900. All income in excess thereof is taxed at a flat 3 %. If each spouse earned
$40,000, the second spouse's tax before credits would be $900 on a separate return and
$1,400 on a joint return.
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are eased considerably if they start at the federal level and find that
joint federal returns save them more than that amount.138
The computation should also begin with the federal returns be-
cause the Ohio taxable income computation is based upon federal ad-
justed gross income. Thus, even in those cases where multiple computa-
tions are needed to determine which income combination yields the
smallest tax, the computations are not as complex as those required in
New York or North Carolina.
A typical family that will pay a smaller overall tax filing sepa-
rately for both Ohio and federal purposes is one in which both spouses
earn a salary of $10,000. The couple has no dependents, income other
than salary, or deductions beyond the zero bracket amount. Their com-
bined Ohio joint return income would be $18,700; on a separate return
each would report $9,350. Their combined federal joint return income
would be $18,000; on separate returns each would report $9,000. Their
comparative tax liabilities are illustrated in the table below, which is
based upon tax liability before credits.
TAXES PAID: FEDERAL AND OHIO




Ohio does provide a partial reduction in the extra tax burden im-
posed upon working couples who file joint returns. A credit against the
income tax is allowed whenever both spouses have federal adjusted
gross incomes of five hundred dollars or more from nonpassive
sources. 139 The joint filing credit is a sliding percentage of the tax oth-
erwise due.140 Like the federal credits which have been proposed, the
Ohio credit does not purport to offer, complete relief from the addi-
tional tax paid by those filing joint returns. 141 While optional filing sta-
138. The federal computations will frequently take into account items that are
not involved in Ohio tax computations, such as the requirement of a joint return if a
child care credit is claimed. I.R.C. § 44A(f)(2).
139. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.05(I) (Page 1980).
140. Id.
141. The maximum credit of 20% is available only if taxable income is $10,000
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tus has been proposed in the past in Ohio, thus far it has been rejected
as involving too great a revenue loss.1 42 Should the federal government
now adopt one of the optional filing status bills, Ohio, unless it changes
its existing law, will find that a larger number of its residents will be
filing separate state returns.
New York residents have far more freedom of choice than their
counterparts in Ohio. They are allowed to file separate state returns
even though joint federal returns are utilized.1 3 Because New York's
state tax rates are graduated steeply, 44 married individuals frequently
find separate state returns advantageous. So long as individuals remain
married, however, joint federal returns almost always are preferable to
separate returns using the existing rate schedules.
The complexities inherent in the New York return situation stem
primarily from allocation problems: records must be kept which can be
used to compute each spouse's proper share of the combined income
and deductions reported on the federal return. The same problem of
allocation exists in North Carolina, which has yet a third solution to
the problem of how married couples are to be treated for tax purposes.
North Carolina, which like Ohio and New York has only one rate
schedule, 4 5 does not allow the filing of joint state returns. 46 Because
its standard deduction is relatively low, 147 itemized deductions are com-
mon, and North Carolina residents are quite proficient at gathering the
data necessary to compute two separate state returns 48 and either sep-
arate or joint federal returns.
One means of reducing the recordkeeping problems, as well as re-
or less. Id.
142. Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, Ohio Department of
Taxation, to Gail Levin Richmond (July 22, 1980).
143. N.Y. TAx LAW § 611 (McKinney 1975).
144. Id. § 602(d) (McKinney Supp. 1979). The rates run from 2% to 14%.
145. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-136 (1979) with GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-
3601(b)(1980).
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-152(e) (1979).
147. Id. § 105-147(22) (lesser of 10% of adjusted gross income or $550).
148. Even single individuals are required to keep multiple records, because
North Carolina allows several deductions not permitted in federal computations. Id. §
105-147(6)&(7) (federal airline excise tax; federal telephone excise tax; employer's
share of FICA tax on household help; a percentage of dividends received from corpora-
tions having income allocable to North Carolina).
57 1
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ducing the avoidance problems which could result if the bulk of deduc-
tions were taken by the spouse with the higher income, would be to
adopt the method which is already in use for couples when one spouse
is averaging income. While gross income and deductions authorized in
computing adjusted gross income are allocated to the spouse who pro-
duced them, all other deductions are prorated between the spouses us-
ing the ratios of their respective adjusted gross incomes.149 The same
allocation method is used in computing the maximum tax on earned
income, in this context to differentiate between earned and unearned
income as opposed to husband's and wife's income.150 In addition, to
reduce the government's data checking difficulties, the optional single
returns could have two columns, as is done in many states. 61 Each
spouse's income and deductions then would appear on the same form.
Thus, while complexity clearly will be increased using single filing sta-
tus, the extent of such increase need not be unmanageable.
The problem of providing equitable relief for single individuals
takes the entire discussion full circle to the changes which were made
in 1948 and 1969. In testifying before the House Ways and Means
Committee, a Treasury Department official noted four goals by which
tax policy has been guided: the income tax should be progressive; mar-
ried couples with equal combined income should pay the same tax; a
tax penalty should not be imposed on marriage; and a tax penalty
should not be imposed on becoming or staying single.152
As the official astutely noted, it is impossible to achieve all four
goals simultaneously.153 Perhaps the best that can be done at this time
is to chip away at the marriage tax penalty rather than to eliminate it,
thus limiting the unfairness caused to single individuals. In deciding
among various remedies, Congress must, of course, consider federal
revenue loss. However, it should not neglect an examination of alterna-
tives already in use at the state level and of the effect its decision will
have on states such as Ohio. No matter what is done by Congress in
149. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1304-3(c)(1966).
150. I.R.C. § 1348(b)(2).
151. E.g., North Carolina and New York.
152. Hearings on Income Tax Treatment of Married Couples and Single Per-
sons Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
Daily Tax Report, Apr. 2, 1980, at J-20 (statement of Emil Sunley).
153. Id.
158 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
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the 1980s, the likelihood of eliminating all objections and self-help
remedies is minute. Indeed, as Bittker stated in 1975, "the chosen solu-
tion will itself turn out, sooner or later, to be a problem." 1"
154. Bittker, supra note 1, at 1463.
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APPENDIX I
BILLS INTRODUCED IN THE 96TH CONGRESS






B. Credit Allowed Based Upon Earnings of Lesser-Earning Spouse or Other Formula
S. H.R.
3032
C. Optional Separate Filing
S.
336
D. Mandatory Separate Filing
6798 8199





108 1390 2553 4467
140 1936 2916 4695
207 2077 3077 6209
1295 2268 3256 7975
*The Carter Administration has adopted the approach embodied in H.R. 5829.
160 5:1980 1
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APPENDIX II
STATE INCOME TAX PROVISIONS
A. States Imposing No Income Tax
Florida South Dakota Washington
Nevada Texas Wyoming
B. States Imposing No Income Tax on Earned Income
Connecticut New Hampshire Tennessee
C. States Imposing an Income Tax at a Flat Rate
Illinois Massachusetts Pennsylvania
Indiana Michigan
D. States Imposing an Income Tax at a Flat Percentage of Federal Liability
Nebraska Rhode Island Vermont
E. States Imposing an Income Tax Using Multiple Graduated Rate Schedules
1. States in Which Single Individuals Use the Same Rate Schedule as Married
Individuals Filing Separate Returns
Alaska* Idaho Oklahoma
Arizona Kansas Oregon
California Louisiana West Virginia
Hawaii Maine
2. States in Which Single Individuals Use a Lower Rate Schedule than Do Married
Individuals Filing Separate Returns
Georgia New Mexico Utah
F. States Imposing an Income Tax Using One Graduated Rate Schedule
1. States Requiring Joint State Returns When Joint Federal Returns Are Used
New Jersey Ohio
2. States Allowing or Requiring Separate State Returns
Alabama Maryland North Carolina
Arkansas Minnesota North Dakota




*before the September 1980 repeal of the Alaska income tax
611The Marriage Penalty15:1980
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1980 Florida Legislature - Drug Paraphernalia
Banned: Florida Statutes 893.145-893.147.
With the adoption of Florida Statutes §§893.145, 893.146, and
893.147,1 the Florida Legislature has escalated the battle to prohibit
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.145-47 (Supp. 1980):
893.145 Drug paraphernalia defined. The term "drug paraphernalia" means
all equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are used, intended for
use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvest-
ing, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing,
testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, in-
jecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a con-
trolled substance in violation of this chapter. Drug paraphernalia is deemed to be
contraband which shall be subject to civil forfeiture. It includes, but is not lim-
ited to:
(1) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating,
cultivating, growing, or harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled
substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived.
(2) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in manufacturing, com-
pounding, converting, producing, processing, or preparing controlled substances.
(3) Isomerization devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in in-
creasing the potency of any species of plant which is a controlled substance.
(4) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or designed for use in identi-
fying, or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness, or purity of, controlled
substances.
(5) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or designed for use in weigh-
ing or measuring controlled substances.
(6) Diluents and adulterances, such as quinine hydrocholoride, mannitol,
mannite, dextrose, and lactose used, intended for use, or designed for use in cut-
ting controlled substances.
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for use, or designed for use in
removing twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining, cannabis.
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons, and mixing devices used, intended
for use, or designed for use in compounding controlled substances.
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, intended for
use, or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances.
(10) Containers and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use
in storing or concealing controlled substances.
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, intended for use,
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the possession, manufacture, sale and advertisement of drug parapher-
or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled substances into the human
body.
(12) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, inhal-
ing, or otherwise introducing cannabis, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the
human body, such as:
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or
without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls.
(b) Water pipes.
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices.
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks.
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a
cannabis cigarette, that has become too small or too short to be held in the hand.







(m) Ice pipes or chillers.
893.146 Determination of paraphernalia. In determining whether an object
is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority or jury shall consider, in addi-
tion to all other logically relevant factors, the following:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning
its use.
(2) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of
this act.
(3) The proximity of the object to controlled substances.
(4) The existence of any residue of controlled substances on the object.
(5) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone
in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reason-
ably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this act. The inno-
cence of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation of
this act shall not prevent a finding that the object is intended for use, or designed
for use, as drug paraphernalia.
(6) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use.
(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict
its use.
(8) Any advertising concerning its use.
(9) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale.
(10) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor
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nalia. Taken with some modifications from the Model Drug Parapher-
nalia Act (MDPA),2 the new statutes are the latest in Florida's at-
tempts to stem the tide of increasing drug abuse.
Not a unidimensional conflict, Florida's struggle reflects our soci-
ety's drug dilemma. A nationwide study of high school seniors during
1975-79 showed an appreciable rise in illicit drug use, particularly ma-
rijuana and cocaine. Trends in use at lower grade levels showed mari-
or dealer of tobacco products.
(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object or
objects to the total sales of the business enterprise.
(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the
community.
(13) Expert testimony concerning its use.
893.147 Possession, manufacture, delivery, or advertisement of drug
paraphernalia;
(1) Possession of drug paraphernalia. It is unlawful for any person to possess
drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misde-
meanor of the first degree, punishable as provided for in s. 775.082, s. 775.083,
or s. 775.084.
(2) Manufacture or delivery of drug paraphernalia. It is unlawful for any
person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to
deliver drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasona-
bly should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into
the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act. Any person who
violates this section is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as pro-
vided for in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) Delivery of drug paraphernalia to a minor. Any person 18 years of age
or over who violates subsection (2) by delivering drug paraphernalia to a person
under 18 years of age is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as
provided for in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(4) Advertisement of drug paraphernalia. It is unlawful for any person to
place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertise-
ment, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that
the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the sale of
objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia. Any person who vio-
lates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as
provided for in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
2. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MODEL DRUG PARAPHER-
NALIA ACT (1979) [hereinafter cited as MDPA].
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juana use rising steadily at all grades down through the eighth grade.3
Florida's own intense problem is demonstrated by U.S. Customs statis-
tics showing that almost 44% of the cocaine seized nationwide in 1978-
79 was in the Miami district."
Supporting drug paraphernalia laws are parents groups, the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice, state
and local law enforcement agencies, the White House,5 and various
state and local bodies, including the Florida Legislature. From their
perspective, the legal sale of drug. paraphernalia encourages drug
abuse, particularly among children and teens, through easy availability
of drug accessories. Peter Bensinger, administrator of the Drug En-
forcement Administration, presented their arguments in his statement
before the House Select Committee on Narcotic Abuse and Control,
"the paraphernalia industry, by its very existence. . . is condoning -
even advocating - the use of illegal controlled substances." He fur-
ther characterized the paraphernalia industry as a "multi-million dollar
big business that facilitates and glamorizes drug use ' 7 while preying on
the drug fantasies of youth. It is a natural step from this point of view
to an attack on the "head shops"8 that distribute drug accessories. Par-
ents' groups participate by lobbying for state and local laws, pressuring
merchants, and waging fierce public relations campaigns.9 Even Mc-
Donald's joined the fight by changing the design of its coffee stirrers
when drug users were discovered using them to inhale cocaine and
PCP, an animal tranquilizer 0 commonly known as angel dust. The
3. L. JOHNSON, J. BACHMAN, & P. O'MALLEY, 1979 HIGHLIGHTS: DRUGS AND
THE NATION'S HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, FIVE YEAR NATIONAL TRENDS (DHEW Pub.
No. (ADM) 80-930 1979).
4. NAT'L INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, Drug Abuse Indicator Trends, I PRO-
CEEDINGS 115 (1979).
5. Myers, DEA Legal Counsel Official Explains Paraphernalia Issue, 10 NAR-
COTICS CONTROL DIG. 6 (1980).
6. Hearings of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Peter Bensinger).
7. Id. at 1.
8. See High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364, 366 n.2 (1978) for a
definition.
9. Satchell, Head Shops: Gateway to the Drug Scene, Fort Lauderdale News/
Sun Sentinel, June 15, 1980, (Parade Magazine), at 5, col. 4.
10. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1979, §1, at 8, col. 6.
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fight continues in Florida with the advent of sections 893.145-893.147.
Aligned against these groups are head shop owners, the parapher-
nalia industry, and libertarians. In their view, anti-paraphernalia laws
penalize legitimate businesses and deprive adults of their free speech"'
and property rights through their vagueness, overbreadth and propen-
sity to selective enforcement. They allege further that anti-parapherna-
lia laws are absurd and impractical, akin to "banning swizzle sticks to
prevent alcoholism."12 In addition, they point to the disparity between
the trend toward decriminalizing marijuana while imposing criminal
sanctions on possession of paraphernalia. 13
Historical Background
Although expanding drug use and the mushroom-like growth of
the accessories industry have sparked renewed interest in anti-para-
phernalia laws, this conflict is not a new one. Nor is it Florida's first
experience with drug paraphernalia laws. In 1969, Florida enacted its
first statute prohibiting both possession and sale of drug paraphernalia.
However, only a few possession cases14 and no sale cases arose under
that statute. The sale prohibition was consequently repealed when Flor-
ida adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in 1973.15
Florida's 1969 provision was similar to general "implements of
crime"16 laws, with the added element of intent that the "device, con-
11. Antanoff, Those Mothers Are Trampling Adult Rights, 59 HIGH TIMES 8
(1980). The Florida Bar was also opposed to Senate Bill 291 on the latter two grounds,
Fla. Bar News, May 15, 1980, at 10, col. 3.
12. Antanoff, supra note 11, at 8.
13. Id.
14. Kirtley v. State, 245 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Goble v.
State, 324 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Turner v. State, 329 So. 2d 360
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Davis v. State, 371 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Dacus v. State, 307 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Merit v. State,
342 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Falin v. State, 367 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); D.M.M. v. State, 275 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
15. Florida adopted the major provision of the U.S.C.A. with numerous varia-
tions, omissions and additions in The Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act. 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 190 (1979).
16. Christianson, Heroin Paraphernalia: Breakdown of a Fix, 10 CaiM. L.
BULL. 493 (1974).
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trivance, instrument, or paraphernalia be used for unlawfully" 17 ad-
ministering any controlled substance. Today the Drug Enforcement
Administration uses the implements of crime analogy to support the
MDPA, comparing it to other federal paraphernalia laws. 8 However, it
was that same analogy which weakened some prior implement of crime
statutes. In Rosenberg v. United States,19 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that lactose, dextrose, quinine, and gelatin cap-
sules were not "instruments," "tools," or "implements" within the
meaning of a statute making it illegal to possess the implements of a
crime.2" In 1973, the same court reversed the appellant's conviction in
Williams v. United States.21 The Court found that the possession of a
small, wooden pipe without further evidence as to its shape and size,
and absent evidence as to nature and significance of marijuana residue,
did not have the "sinister" implication of possession of the implements
and tools of a crime.22 Mere possession of the pipe was not sufficient to
support a conviction of possessing the implements of a crime, e.g., nar-
cotics paraphernalia.
The general "implements of crime" statutes have another flaw in
their application to non-traditional drug paraphernalia. That flaw is the
inability of statutes initially drawn up for heroin control2s to extend to
other items such as the rolling papers used with marijuana, the pipes
used with hashish, and the mirrors and razor blades used with cocaine.
The items used to administer these controlled substances are far re-
moved from the more blatant paraphernalia of heroin use, and are not
commonly thought of as narcotics paraphernalia. This common experi-
ence provided the underlying reasoning in Cole v. State of Oklahoma24
17. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(3)(a)(4) (1969).
18. Myers, supra note 5, at 6. Myers cites examples in which the DEA compares
drug paraphernalia laws to federal firearms statutes (26 U.S.C. § 5845), moonshine
paraphernalia laws (26 U.S.C. § 5686), wagering paraphernalia laws (18 U.S.C. §§
1952, 1953), counterfeiting paraphernalia statutes (18 U.S.C. § 492), wiretapping and
eavesdropping paraphernalia statutes (18 U.S.C. § 2512), and illicit tobacco parapher-
nalia statutes (26 U.S.C. § 5763).
19. 297 A.2d 763 (D.C. 1972).
20. Id. at 766.
21. 304 A.2d 287 (D.C. 1973).
22. Id. at 289.
23. Christianson, supra note 16, at 508-10.
24. 511 P.2d 593 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
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where that state's drug paraphernalia statute was found invalid. The
court noted that a person of ordinary intelligence could not determine
what was or was not legal to possess.2 5
Although Florida attempted to cure the flaw of a general imple-
ments of crime statute by adding the element of criminal intent, the
provision was unsatisfactory from a prosecutorial point of view. De-
pending on the charges, possession of narcotics paraphernalia could ei-
ther be a felony of the third degree or a misdemeanor of the first de-
gree.2 6 Failure to charge a felony in informations and confusion by trial
courts in classifying offenses caused sentences to be reduced.27
The standard of actual knowledge28 found necessary by the courts
was also difficult to prove. Evidence of possession was legally insuffi-
cient unless it could be shown by direct evidence that the defendant
had actual knowledge of the presence of drug paraphernalia, or unless
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could
lawfully infer such knowledge.2 9
Possession of narcotics paraphernalia was frequently tacked onto
charges of possession of a controlled substance 0 in an effort to obtain
convictions by broadening the charges. In light of these circumstances,
it is likely that Florida prosecutors would have joined with the Rosen-
berg1 trial judge's appeal for a "comprehensive and up-to-date narcot-
ics paraphernalia statute. '3 2 The inadequacy of implements of crime
statutes in dealing with non-traditional narcotics paraphernalia meant
the struggle was not over.
Analysis of Florida's New Drug Paraphernalia Statute
The Drug Enforcement Administration presented the MDPA to
states and local communities as the next strategy in the fight against
drug abuse.3 3 In adopting a modified version of the act, Florida endeav-
25. Id. at 595.
26. 371 So. 2d 721.
27. Id.; 329 So. 2d 360; 342 So. 2d 993.
28. 275 So. 2d 308; 245 So. 2d 282; 324 So. 2d 97.
29. 324 So. 2d at 98.
30. 245 So. 2d 282; 307 So. 2d 505; 324 So. 2d 993; 324 So. 2d 97.
31. 297 A.2d 763.
32. Id. at 766.
33. MDPA, supra note 2, at Prefatory Note.
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ors to go far beyond the short statutory paragraph34 which formerly
dealt with drug paraphernalia. The new statute includes a definition of
drug paraphernalia and gives common examples, provides a procedure
for determining whether the object is drug paraphernalia, and prohibits
possession, manufacture, delivery, and advertisement of drug parapher-
nalia.3 5 It also amends two current sections of Florida Statutes to pro-
vide for the forfeiture of drug paraphernalia and to delete provisions
relating to drug paraphernalia respectively.36 Penalties, 7 a severance
clause,38 and an effective date3 9 complete the law. Florida's new statute
differs, however, from the original language of the MDPA,' 0 particu-
larly, in one critical area.41 The section prohibiting possession of drug
paraphernalia does not include the intent element embodied in the orig-
inal language "to use, or to possess with intent to use . . . in violation
of this act."'42
At this point, two crucial inquiries must be presented for consider-
ation. First, can the new statute survive challenges that it violates con-
stitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection? Second, will
the new statute be an effective tool in controlling drug abuse?
In response to these questions, MDPA proponents contend that it
contains all the elements necessary to succeed where other statutes and
ordinances have failed.4 In support of this, they refer to Record
Revolution, No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma"" and World Imports, Inc. v.
Woodbridge Township, 5 where MDPA-based ordinances nearly identi-
34. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(3)(a)(4) (1969).
35. FLA. STAT. § 893.145-47 (Supp. 1980).
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.12(2), 13(3)(a) (1969).
37. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(3)(a) (Supp. 1980).
38. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(6) (Supp. 1980).
39. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7) (Supp. 1980) (effective date October 1, 1980).
40. MDPA, supra note 2.
41. Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. Florida, No. TA 80-0954, slip op.
at 6 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
42. Cf. text of FLA. STAT. § 893.146(11) (Supp. 1980) cited in note 1 supra
(deletion of the intent requirement).
43. See MDPA, Prefatory Note and comments at 6; Florida Prosecutor, Aug.
1980, at 1.
44. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980), currently on appeal to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
45. No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 8, 1980).
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cal to Florida's new statute were held constitutional.
While there has been a rash of current cases46 challenging drug
paraphernalia statutes and ordinances, most of these statutes have not
been MDPA-based. Again, however, the lack of intent in the possession
section of the Florida statute distinguishes it from the statutes dealt
with in those cases.47 The arguments presented in these cases, however,
have relevance in challenges to MDPA-based laws, such as Florida's.
The success of the new law can be predicted to some extent from the
experience of other jurisdictions, and from the experience of some Flor-
ida cities and counties' 8 which enacted drug paraphernalia laws prior
to and contemporaneous with state adoption of the MDPA.49
The primary grounds for the challenge of most drug paraphernalia
laws have been similar, i.e. (1) violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment by being both vague and overbroad, (2) de-
nial of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
(3) impermissible burden on interstate commerce.50 It was on the first
basis that Indiana's statute" was found invalid.52 Not only did it un-
46. Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26, 28 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) gives a list of
such cases:
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, No. 78-C-2114
(N.D. I11. Feb. 11, 1980); Indiana Chapter NORML v. Sendak, No. TH 75-142-
C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980) (en banc); Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Ass'n v.
Prince George's County, No. B-79-2385 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 1979); Record Mu-
seum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979); Tobacco Road,
Inc. v. City of Norre, No. 70-71000 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 1979); Cardarella v.
City of Overland Park, No. 86246 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 1980); Weingart v.
Town of Oyster Bay, No. 79-C-2932 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1979).
47. No. TA 80-0954, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
48. See Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, No. 80-
6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980); Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v.
Pinellas County, No. 80-482 Civ-T-H (M.D. Fla. May 18, 1980). See also FBFFE,
Florida Newsletter, Apr. 15, 1980, at 1.
49. Id.
50. No. C-80-38, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
51. IND. CODE §§ 35-24.1-4-8 (1971) (repealed 1975); 35-48-4-8 (1971)
(amended 1977). For an article discussing Indiana's experience prior to 1976, as well
as a discussion of Florida's statute, see Note, Paraphernalia for Marijuana and Hash-
ish Use; Possession Statutes and Indiana's Pipe Dream, 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 353 (1975-
76).
52. No. TH-75-142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980) (en banc).
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constitutionally fail to meet due process requirements of definiteness
and notice to those subject to the sanction, it also provided insufficient
guidelines to those charged with enforcing the law.53
Vagueness and overbreadth existed because many objects arguably
within the scope of the statute included instruments which could be
used for legitimate purposes as well as for the administration of
drugs.' This reasoning also played a role in Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gib-
son,55 where a major distributor of cigarette papers obtained a declara-
tory judgment. While the ordinance challenged in Bambu was specific
rather than vague, it was overbroad since it included articles with
"overwhelmingly lawful uses."'5' Alternatively, in the challenge to
Florida's new statute, vagueness was found to be the only meritorious
argument.5 7
These same contentions can arguably be applied to section 893.145
of Florida's new statute.5 8 However, 59 in Record Revolution, No. 6 and
World Imports, ° the specific definition of drug paraphernalia accom-
panied by the pivotal mens rea requirement save the law from vague-
ness and overbreadth.
Defendants argued in Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v.
State"1 that the three tests of intent in the definition of drug parapher-
nalia, "used, intended for use, or designed for use," 62 established the
intent requirement for the entire statute.6 s Both sides of the controversy
agreed that a statute requiring proof of use, intent to use, or knowledge
that an item would be illegally used would meet the standard necessary
to uphold the law as constitutional." The court there did not find the
definition of drug paraphernalia as dispositive in establishing the intent
53. Id., slip op. at 12-14.
54. Id..
55. 474 F. Supp. 1297 (D.N.J. 1979).
56. Id. at 1305.
57. No. TA 80-0954, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
58. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
59. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
60. No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 8, 1980).
61. No. TA 80-0954 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
62. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
63. No. TA 80-0954, slip op. at 6 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
64. Id., slip op. at 6.
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requirement for the possession offense.6 5 "Nothing in the definition can
be fairly said to link the use, intent, or design to the person charged
with a paraphernalia crime." 66 Consequently, the possession offense
was found to be an unconstitutionally defined crime and was struck
down. 7
An examination of the definition itself may show some weakness in
its language. The "used" test is clear, e.g. if an individual actually uses
an item with a controlled substance, then that item is drug parapherna-
lia.68 However, even here intent cannot be bootstrapped from mere pos-
session. There must be sufficient circumstantial evidence to support this
presumption, 9 such as statements and attendant circumstances. Failure
to include the intent element in the possession offense renders moot this
"used" test in Florida's new statute.
The other two intent tests do not share the clarity of the "used"
test. "Intended for use"70 is susceptible of several interpretations. Is
this the intent of the purchaser, retailer, or manufacturer? If it is the
former, then there is undue burden on both the retailer and the manu-
facturer to determine the subjective intent of the purchaser.7 1 In addi-
tion, they face prosecution for the use of an item far beyond their
control.
Problems of transferred intent may also arise if the "intended for
use ' 7 2 element is considered that of the seller. Either purchaser or
manufacturer could be prosecuted on the basis of the seller's intent.
Finally, if the intent is considered to be that of the manufacturer, both
purchasers and retailers may be subject to prosecution even though
they may lack any criminal intent. These problems were recognized in
a recent challenge to an MDPA-based city ordinance, Florida Busi-
nessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood,7 8 where the court
65. Id.
66. Id., slip op. at 8.
67. Id., slip op. at 9, 12.
68. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
69. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945).
70. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
71. Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F. Supp. 990, 993 (D.N.J. 1980).
72. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
73. No. 80-6157 Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
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found that these interpretations would not survive judicial scrutiny.74
Rather, the court supported the DEA'S view of intent that each defen-
dant "must have general criminal intent with respect to the offenses
alleged."175
The court in Indiana Chapter of NORML, Inc. v. Sendak 8 also
found the last intent test, "designed for use,""7 insufficiently clear. In
contrast, the Record Revolution 8 court dismissed concerns over the
latter two tests of intent by construing the definition of drug parapher-
nalia in terms of the intent of the individual or entity charged with
violation of the law."17 The court noted that a blanket prohibition of
every item used with drugs would be imprecise and lead to selective
enforcement.80 By defining drug paraphernalia in terms of the intent of
the individual or entity in control, MDPA-based laws have purportedly
avoided this problem. The law supposedly would not affect first amend-
ment rights or innocently held property of individuals who lack guilty
intent."1
For an item to be classified as drug paraphernalia, one of the
three types of intent must be present. 2 Without proof of the requisite
intent, there can be no conviction for the sale or manufacture of drug
paraphernalia because the item in question would not be drug
paraphernalia.
The Drug Enforcement Administration contends that a statute
which "embodies a specific intent to violate the law"'88 is not unconsti-
tutionally vague. Alternatively, it can be argued that this statute is not
vague only to those who do intend to violate the law. Other innocent
individuals without guilty intent are left with only their own subjective
understanding of what the law requires. Further, the intent standard
74. Id., slip op. at 7.
75. Id.
76. No. TH 75-142-C (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 1980).
77. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
78. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. at 8, citing United States v. Brunnet, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D. Mo. 1931).
81. MDPA, supra note 2, at 9, 12.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 7, citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337
(1952); 325 U.S. 91, 101.
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seems to be contradicted by the latter portion of section 893.146(5),8"
which gives one of the factors to be used in determination of drug para-
phernalia: "The innocence of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
object, as to a direct violation of the act shall not prevent a finding that
the object is intended for use, or designed to use, as drug parapherna-
lia."85 If the owner or one in control of an object is innocent, e.g., does
not have the guilty intent or knowledge, then the item is not drug para-
phernalia under a "used for, intended for use, or designed for use"8 6
standard.
An additional problem exists with the necessary element of intent.
It can only be proven at the trial level. Prior to that, law enforcement is
free to selectively enforce the law, posssibly rendering Florida's statute
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In fact, the new statute may have been designed for this purpose. A
Florida Senate Staff analysis and economic impact statement indicates
that the intent of the legislature was to affect the retail sales of "head
shops."'8 7 As in Record Museum v. Lawrence Township,88 the law can-
not be lawfully applied only to head shops. Advocates of Florida's new
law argue that it does apply to all individuals, as did the court in Re-
cord Revolution.89 Nonetheless, factors to be used in the determination
of what is drug paraphernalia suggest otherwise. Specifically, section
893.146(10) states: "Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the
object is a legitimate [emphasis added] supplier of like or related items
to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer or tobacco
products."' 0 This section seems to indicate that a licensed distributor or
dealer of tobacco products can sell items that might otherwise be
deemed drug paraphernalia while a retailer not in this category may
not. The court in Record Revolution found the undefined term "legiti-
mate" to also fail the test of vagueness by creating a danger of arbi-
84. FLA. STAT. § 893.146(5).
85. FLA. STAT. § 893.146(5) (Supp. 1980).
86. FLA. STAT. § 893.145 (Supp. 1980).
87. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, Apr. 17, 1980
(Bill No. and Sponsor: S.B. 291, Senator Poole).
88. 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979).
89. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
90. FLA. STAT. § 893.146(10) (Supp. 1980).
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trary and discriminatory enforcement."1 On the other hand, the court
in Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood 2
found no vagueness either in the indicia of what may be considered
drug paraphernalia, or on the issue of legitimacy.93
The "reasonably should have known" phraseology 94 in Florida's
new statute at section 893.147(2) 95 and section 903.147(4)96 has also
been an issue in other cases challenging MDPA-based laws. The court
in Record Revolution 7 found that the element of actual knowledge
would protect the due process rights of criminal defendants, while the
constructive knowledge standard would not.98 The Record Revolution
court cited Knoedler v. Roxbury's99 discussion of the problems:
[T]he seller faced with the Roxbury Ordinance has to . . . deter-
mine what the customer intends to do with the items of purchase. Cer-
tainly in a case where the purchaser announces his or her intention to
utilize the paraphernalia purchased for an illegal purpose, the seller
would be placed in no dilemma; however, the question arises as to what
would create a reasonable belief in the mind of the seller in the absence
of such an unlikely announcement by the purchaser. Does the pur-
chaser's age, sex, mannerism or dress afford to a seller reason to believe
that the paraphernalia will be used for an illegal purpose. Or should the
nature of the purchaser's companions or the items he or she carries be
determinative? These questions indicate the difficulty that a merchant,
as well as a law enforcement officer, would have, in the absence of an
admission by the purchaser, in determining what gives rise to a reason-
able belief that a purchaser intends to utilize the paraphernalia for an
illegal purpose. An additional concern is whether it is proper to charge
an owner of a department store, or any other store, with responsibility
for a sales clerk's determination as to whether the person purchasing an
item, especially an innocuous one such as a weight scale or a spoon, in-
91. No. C-80-38, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ohio April 14, 1980).
92. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
93. Id. at 6.
94. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.147(2), 893.147(4) (Supp. 1980).
95. FLA. STAT. § 893.147(2) (Supp. 1980).
96. FLA. STAT. § 893.147(4) (Supp. 1980).
97. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio April 14, 1980).
98. Id., slip op. at 15.
99. 485 F. Supp. 990.
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tends to utilize it for some improper and illegal purpose."0
In light of this discussion, the court in Record Revolution noted
that "defining the offense of knowingly distributing drug paraphernalia
in terms of the weakness of an individual's ability to perceive"1 1
provided insufficient guidelines to both sellers and law enforcement
officials. World Imports Inc. v. Woodbridge Township,0 2 and Florida
Businessmen For Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood °3 stand in op-
position to this reasoning,' 04 holding that the "reasonably should have
known" 1' 0 5 standard does not significantly differ from the actual knowl-
edge standard.'" In their view, there would be no difference between
the two standards in practical application.07
In addition to the possibility of selective enforcement against re-
tailers, there is an issue which current cases have not discussed, e.g.,
the strong probability of selective enforcement against individuals.
Current jewelry fashions include small spoon or razor blade necklaces
which law enforcement may consider drug paraphernalia, and for
which an individual could be arrested regardless of his or her intent.
The same is true of possession of ornamental water pipes, bowls, sifters,
alligator clips, scales, mirrors with "cocaine" imprinted on them, and a
myriad of other objects. Display of these items may be considered sym-
bolic speech since that action may be a non-verbal expression of sup-
port for reform of drug laws or as a protest to current drug laws.
"Where a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First
Amendment freedoms it operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] free-
doms. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of
the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas
were clearly marked."'x0 8 With the threat of arrest, individuals may
avoid conduct which is privileged under the first amendment.
100. No. C-80-38, slip op. at 15 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
101. Id., slip op. at 15.
102. No. 80-1414 (D.N.J. June 8, 1980).
103. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
104. No. TA80-0954 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
105. FLA. STAT. § 893.14 (Supp. 1980).
106. No. 80-1414, slip op. at 6; No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR, slip op. at 6.
107. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR, slip op. at 6.
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Prohibitions on advertisement of drug paraphernalia, such as sec-
tion 893.147(4),109 have also been challenged on grounds of vagueness,
overbreadth and undue interference with first amendment protected
commercial speech. In Record Museum v. Lawrence Township,110 de-
claratory and injunctive relief was granted on these grounds. The court
noted that even speech which has only a commercial purpose warrants
first amendment protection."-" Further, seeking out speech of particular
content and preventing its dissemination completely, exceeds legitimate
restrictions on commercial speech. 12 These arguments were dismissed
in Record Revolutionl l' and in Florida Businessmen for Free Enter-
prise v. State11 4 when the court held that if the speech solicited illegal
activity it was not protected.11  However, some courts set standards for
a first amendment exception higher than these courts. For an exception
to apply, the speech must be directed to "inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and likely to incite or produce such action." 11 6
Arguably, the purpose of advertisements for items that may be used as
drug paraphernalia is not to advocate illegal acts, but rather to present
availability of goods for sale. Alternatively, if instructions or statements
are included as to the use of controlled substances or encouraging their
use, this would fall under the exception to protected speech. Advertise-
ments of availability of goods do not, unless it can be shown that the
advertiser actually possessed the guilty knowledge or intent required.
Nor could advertisements from other states be prohibited. Interstate
dissemination of information by the citizen of a state in which an activ-
ity is legal may not be barred under the guise of state police power117
Contrary to these arguments, the court in Florida Businessmen for
109. FLA. STAT. § 893.147(4) (Supp. 1980).
110. 481 F. Supp. 768.
111. Id. at 774.
112. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
113. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
114. No. TA 80-0954 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1980).
115. Id., slip op. at 11; No. C-80-38, slip op. at 21 (N.D. Ohio April 14, 1980).
116. High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (1978), citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood118 reasoned that the "free flow of
information concerning drug paraphernalia has a potentially deleterious
effect upon the community." 119 The court concluded that the chal-
lenged ordinance was valid and that possession, manufacture, and de-
livery of drug paraphernalia could be proscribed. It then reasoned that
"advertising intended to 'promote the sale of objects designed or in-
tended for use as drug paraphernalia' [could also] be prohibited."' 1 0
The advertising restriction in High 0l' Times, Inc. v. Busbee"2'
also failed for lack of either a compelling state interest or a significant
state policy to be effected. 22 Commercial speech cannot be banned on
the basis of an unsubstantiated belief that its impact is detrimental.223
Inability to demonstrate that the chosen statutory course would lead to
the desired result invalidated the proposed restriction in High 0l'
Times.' 24 However, Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of
Hollywood 25 held that the community's interest was validly served by
preventing proliferation of drug paraphernalia.
In the wake of that decision it is interesting to examine the under-
lying purpose of drug paraphernalia laws. Such an examination raises a
chicken-egg debate: Does possession, sale, and manufacture of items
which could be used as drug paraphernalia contribute to drug abuse,
or, does drug abuse foster the possession, sale, and manufacture of drug
paraphernalia? To mix metaphors, the proverbial horse is out of the
barn on the latter question as it appears that the development of the
accessories industry is a recent phenomenon growing out of the popu-
larity of recreational drug use. With adoption of the MDPA, 26 Florida
is attempting to close the door to an already empty stall. The new stat-
ute will affect the manufacture and sale of some items which may be
used as drug paraphernalia, but it will not affect drug abuse. The rate
of recreational drug use combined with the easy availability of common
118. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
119. Id., slip op. at 9.
120. Id.
121. 456 F. Supp. 1035.
122. Id. at 1043.
123. Linmark Assoc., Inc., v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977).
124. 456 F. Supp. at 1043.
125. No. 80-6157-Civ-NCR (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1980).
126. MDPA, supra note 2.
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substitutes for paraphernalia assures this.
The final grounds of challenge to MDPA-based laws has been un-
constitutional infringement on the commerce clause by impermissable
burden on interstate commerce. 127 Using the three part test of Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.,128 the court in Record Revolution 29 found the
ordinance served a legitimate concern, the intent elements limited the
scope of the ordinance, and the impact on interstate commerce was
thus minimized. 80 In contrast, the court in Bambu"31 ruled that the
plaintiff's constitutional rights included the right to own and deal in
property, e.g., cigarette papers, and to engage in interstate commerce
of them. Infringement of those rights caused the ordinance to be over-
broad and unenforceable as to the manufacturer and distributors.1 32
Section 893.147(2) could arguably fall on either of these opposite sides.
Conclusion
Due to problems of vagueness and overbreadth, the section
893.145(1) standard of "intended for use, or designed for use" should
be deleted from Florida's new drug paraphernalia statute. For the same
reasons so should section 893.146(5) and section 893.146(1) and the
"reasonably should know" standard of section 893.147(2) and section
893.147(4). In adopting a modified version of the MDPA, Florida may
only have succeeded in making the symptoms of drug abuse illegal
without addressing the problem of drug abuse itself. The legitimate
purpose of protecting children from undue influence and encourage-
ment to abuse drugs may be better served by more effective drug abuse
education and prevention programs, demonstration of family and socie-
tal attitudes discouraging drug abuse, and laws prohibiting sale and
distribution to minors of items most commonly used as drug parapher-
nalia. It is not necessary to go to the lengths of Florida's new statute to
achieve this result.
Faye Jones
127. No. C-80-38, slip op. at 25 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
128. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
129. No. C-80-38 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 1980).
130. Id., slip op. at 26.
131. 474 F. Supp. 1297.
132. ld. at 1305-06.
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1980 Florida Legislature-Denial of Bail to Drug
Felons: Florida Statute 903.133.
On June 6, 1980, Governor Graham signed House Bill 1749,1 cre-
ating Florida Statute §903.133,2 which prohibits bail on appeal to any
person found guilty of a first degree felony drug offense.3
The enactment of this law raises several questions which require
examination: (1) is there a constitutional right to bail subsequent to
conviction?; (2) has the legislature, in creating a law denying such bail,
infringed upon the powers of the judiciary?; (3) is such a law tanta-
mount to harsh, cruel, and unusual punishment?; and (4) are persons
affected by the law deprived of equal protection and due process of
law?
The Legislature had three primary reasons for adopting this law:
(1) first degree felony drug offenses have had a severely adverse affect
on the citizenry of the state; (2) persons who commit these offenses use
the proceeds obtained therefrom to further the existence of the drug
trade in the state; and (3) a person adjudged guilty of such an offense
has committed a serious crime and, consequently, is likely to flee justice
1. This bill passed the House by a vote of 103-3 and the Senate by a vote of 27-
1.
2. Section 903.133 provides:
Bail on appeal; absolute prohibition: first degree felony adjudication under the
Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. -Notwith-
standing the provision of s. 903.132, no person adjudged guilty of a first degree
felony for a violation of s. 893.13 or s. 893.135 shall be admitted to bail pending
appellate review.
3. A first degree felony under section 893.13, Florida Statutes, is the sale, deliv-
ery, or possession of more than 10 grams of certain Schedule I drugs or the delivery by
a person over 18 to a person under 18 of certain Schedule I and II drugs. Fla. Stat. §
893.13 (1979).
A first degree felony under section 893.135, Florida Statutes, is the sale, manufac-
ture, delivery or possession of: "(1)(a) ... an excess of 100 pounds of cannabis. .. ,
(b)(1) . . . 28 grams or more of cocaine or of any other mixture containing co-
caine. . ., [or] (c) ... 4 grams or more of any morphine, opium, or any salt, isomer,
or salt of an isomer thereof, including heroin. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1979).
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and disappear upon conviction.4 The Legislature determined that "the
mere forfeiture of bond on appeal does not serve the ends of justice."5
(1) CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Although there is a Florida constitutional provision that all per-
sons "shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail with sufficient
surety unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is
great,"' this provision has long been held to have no application to a
defendant's right to bail after conviction. The reasoning used by the
courts in reaching this conclusion is clearly expressed in the United
States Supreme Court decision of Stack v.Boyle.8 There, the Court
ruled that once a defendant has been found guilty, the reasons for
granting bail, such as the opportunity thereby afforded the defendant
to actively participate'in the preparation of his defense and the post-
ponement of imprisonment until conviction, are no longer applicable.9
Therefore, it was early settled in Florida 0 that "admission to bail,
after conviction, is not a matter of right but rests in the sound judicial
discretion of the trial court."11 The state supreme court established a
fair and reasonable standard to be applied by trial courts in making
their decisions on this issue.1 2 If an appeal is taken merely for delay,
bail should be refused; but if the appeal is taken in good faith, on fairly
arguable and non-frivolous grounds, bail should be granted.13 Recog-
nizing that the purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the defen-
dant to answer the charge against him, it was decided that if there are
situations that indicate the accused will flee and thus elude punishment
if his conviction is affirmed, the trial judge may correctly use his discre-
4. Chapter 80-72, 1980 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 284 (West).
5. Id.
6. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1968), amending prior § 9.
7. De Conongh v. City of Daytona Beach, 103 So. 2d 233, 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958); Greene v. State, 238 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 1970).
8. 342 U.S. 1 (1954).
9. Id. at 4.
10. See Younghans v. State, 90 So. 308 (Fla. 1956).
11. Id. at 309.
12. Id. at 310.
13. Id.
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tion against the granting of baij.'4 One such situation is the harshness
of the sentence imposed for the crime, this being pertinent to the issue
of whether the person would be incited to flee the jurisdiction of the
court.
15
In light of the severe penalties incurred upon conviction of a first
degree felony,16 the presumed availability of large sums of money to
persons convicted of drug offenses,17 and the consequent likelihood of
their flight to avoid justice, 8 it would seem that a trial judge could
deny bail in such a case. However, in some cases, judicial discretion
may dictate that the availability of bail is necessary for the ends of
justice to be met.
(2) SEPARATION OF POWERS
This raises the question of whether the removal of bail from judi-
cial purview by statutory regulation is a proper function of the state
Legislature. In Greene v. State,19 the Supreme Court of Florida had to
determine whether a statute denying bail upon appeal from a convic-
14. Id.
15. Sims & Wainwright, 307 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
16. FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (1979) provides:
Penalties. -
(3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be
punished as follows:
(b) For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30
years, or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of
years not exceeding life imprisonment. ...
FLA. STAT. § 775.083 (1979) provides:
Fines. -
(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense other than a capital felony
may be sentenced to pay a fine in addition to any punishment described in sec-
tion 775.082 .... Fines for designated crimes and for noncriminal violations
shall not exceed:
(b) $10,000, when the conviction is of a felony of the first or second degree.
17. See note 4 supra.
18. Id.
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tion of a felony, to persons previously convicted of a felony, 0 repre-
sented a legislative encroachment upon the powers of the judiciary. 1
Analogizing this question to the wide discretion trial courts historically
exercised in deciding the severity of punishment given to the convicted
offender, it was pointed out that the boundaries of this discretion were
changed whenever the Legislature increased or decreased the minimum
or maximum punishment allowable for a particular crime.2 In addi-
tion, the court stated that the Legislature long ago superseded judicial
discretion when it fixed compulsory life imprisonment or death
sentences for rape and first degree murder 2 and said that the Legisla-
ture has gone no further in enacting the statute under attack in this
case. 24 The court held that the statute did not encounter the infirmity
of encroaching upon the separation of powers doctrine. 5
The federal courts' stance was also discussed by the state supreme
court in Greene. The court stated that generally the federal courts have
agreed that there is no absolute constitutional right to bail after convic-
tion guaranteed by the eighth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.21 The court went on to say:
20. Fla. Stat. § 903.132 (1979) provides:
Bail on appeal; conditions for granting; appellate review. -
(1) No person may be admitted to bail upon appeal from a conviction of a felony
unless the defendant establishes that the appeal is taken in good faith, on
grounds fairly debatable, and not frivolous. However, in no case shall bail be
granted if such person has previously been convicted of a felony, the commission
of which occurred prior to the commission of the subsequent felony and such
person's civil rights have not been restored or if other felony charges are pending
against him and probable cause has been found that the person has committed
the felony or felonies at the time the request for bail is made.
21. 238 So. 2d at 299.
22. Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 794.01 (1969) provided: "imprisonment in the state prison for
life, or for any term of years within the discretion of the judge" for rape.
FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1969) provided the death penalty for murder in the first
degree (i.e., premeditated murder or murder "committed in the perpetration of or in
the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, abominable and detesta-
ble crime against nature or kidnaping ..
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Even those federal courts that have expressly held or assumed, arguendo,
that the bail provision of the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution applies directly to state action, have recognized that a state
may constitutionally by statute or exercise of judicial discretion grant
release on bail in some cases and deny it in others, as long as the state
acts reasonably and not arbitrarily or discriminatorily.2 7
This presents the question of whether the Legislature acted in a
reasonable and non-arbitrary manner in creating section 903.133. It
would seem the Legislature did act in such a manner since the Legisla-
ture's motive, the prevention of flight by an accused free on bail subse-
quent to a conviction,28 was accepted earlier by the state supreme court
in Greene. There, the court held that the statutory denial of bail after
conviction pending appeal, because of the likelihood that the accused
would be a poor bail risk, could not be said to be an arbitrary or unrea-
sonable action on the part of the state. 9
(3) CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Could the constitutionality of section 903.133 be successfully chal-
lenged on the ground that denial of bail is tantamount to harsh, cruel,
and unusual punishment? This constitutional claim was examined in
the Louisiana case of State v. James.30 James was convicted of unlaw-
ful possession of a narcotic drug (one morphine tablet). According to a
Louisiana statute,3 1 bail pending appeal was denied to offenders who
had received a sentence of five years or more in a felony case. Under
another statute,3 2 the minimum sentence for the illegal possession of
narcotics was five years. Therefore, the defendant was denied bail
pending appeal. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the denial
of bail pending appeal to a narcotic offender based upon the length of
his sentence did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Conse-
quently, the defendant's attack upon the constitutionality of the state's
27. Id.
28. See note 4 supra.
29. 238 So. 2d at 299.
30. 246 La. 1053, 169 So. 2d 89 (1964), revd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 36
(1965).
31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:85 (West 1964).
32. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §40:981 (West 1964).
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Uniform Narcotic Act failed.3 3 If the reasoning of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court is followed, a similar attack on section 903.133 would be
equally unsuccessful.
(4) EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Could section 903.133 be held unconstitutional on the grounds
that it denies a person convicted of a first degree felony equal protec-
tion and due process of law as guaranteed by the constitutions of the
United States and Florida? 4 Such a result would seem unlikely in light
of the Supreme Court of Florida's response to this question in Gallie v.
Wainwright35 and Kelly v. State.36 These two cases follow Greene7 in
supporting section 903.13238 a law similar to section 903.133 in its ef-
fect on a specialized group of offenders. The defendants in these cases
challenged the constitutionality of section 903.132 on due process and
equal protection grounds. Gallie also argued that he had a fundamental
right to be heard on the issue of bail risk. The court declared he had no
such right since it was well settled that there is no absolute constitu-
tinal right to bail pending appeal of any state criminal conviction,
whether first or subsequent, misdemeanor or felony.3 9 Since no funda-
mental right was affected, and the defendant conceded the state's inter-
est in assuring the attendance of the defendant at the end of the appeal
was a compelling interest, it was clear that section 903.132 did not run
33. 169 So. 2d at 92.
34. U.S. CONST., amend XIV, §1 provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides: "[a]ll natural persons are equal before the law
and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and
liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and
protect property. .. ."
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 provides: "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. .. ."
35. 362 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1978).
36. 362 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1978).
37. 238 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1970).
38. See note 20 supra.
39. 362 So. 2d at 941.
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counter to any constitutional ideas of equal protection.40
Further authority for the proposition that a statute may specifi-
cally enumerate classes of defendants not entitled to bail on appeal
may be found in State v. Flowers41 and Swain v. State.42 In Flowers43
the defendant was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver her-
oin in violation of a state statute.44 After trial and pending a pre-sen-
tence investigation he was released on bail.45 The state then moved to
revoke the bail on the basis of an amendment to the Delaware Consti-
tution4" which provided that in the case of an investigation for an of-
fender convicted of such a narcotic violation, the offender would imme-
diately be remanded to the Delaware Correctional Center during the
time the investigation was being conducted. The trial court granted the
state's motion and the defendant then filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, contending his confinement was unlawful because the
statute was unconstitutional. 7 The Delaware Supreme Court held that
the statute was constitutional since there was no constitutional right to
bail in the period subsequent to conviction but prior to sentencing. 48
Rather, bail during that interim period was a matter of discretion with
the court which the state legislature could limit or eliminate by
statute.49
Likewise, in Swain,50 the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a stat-
ute51 which denied the petitioner bail pending appeal from his convic-
tion for selling a controlled substance (phencyclidine). Here again, it
was recognized that the constitutional assurance of bail for criminal
defendants prevails only prior to conviction and there is no federal as-
surance of bail subsequent to conviction.5 2 The court noted that a de-
40. Id.
41. 330 A.2d 146 (Del. 1974).
42. 527 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. 1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1975).
43. 330 A.2d at 147.
44. DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 4751 (1978).
45. 330 A.2d at 147.
46. DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 4331(a) (1979).
47. 330 A.2d at 147.
48. Id. at 148.
49. Id. at 149.
50. 527 S.W.2d 119.
51. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3406 (1980).
52. 527 S.W.2d at 120.
87 115:1980
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fendant convicted of unlawful possession of heroin under a New York
criminal procedure law could not be admitted to bail.53
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Miranda," the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida pointed out the need for a law such as section
903.133 of the Florida Statutes. The court noted that "substantial drug
trafficking is itself a sufficient danger to the community to justify deny-
ing bond pending appeal to a defendant found guilty of being a dealer
in drugs."55 And "if any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify
the law, the court's power of inquiry ends. Questions as to wisdom,
need or appropriateness are for the legislature."5
Since there is no constitutional right to bail subsequent to a con-
viction, and bail at that time is a matter of judicial discretion which the
state may limit or eliminate by statute as long as it acts reasonably, it
appears that section 903.133, Florida Statutes, should be able to with-
stand any constitutional challenge.
James P. McLane
53. Id. at 121.
54. 442 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
55. Id. at 792.
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Attorney's Fees: Florida Statute 57.105
In the United States "absent statute or enforceable contract, liti-
gants pay their own attorney's fees."' Thus, the "American rule" is
that attorney's fees are not ordinarily among the costs a winning party
may recover.2
The Florida Legislature became disenchanted with the results ef-
fectuated by this rule in the Florida judicial system, and perhaps un-
knowingly it leaned toward the system favored by the English. Their
courts are authorized to award attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs in
litigation and "to defendants in all actions where such awards might be
made to plaintiffs."3 The adoption of the English system in the United
States, however, could have a chilling effect on parties who think they
have a genuine controversy, at law or in fact, in need of resolution but
who do not want, or cannot afford, the additional expense of paying
their adversary's attorney's fees in the event of a loss.
Florida courts have held in some cases that "irrespective of stat-
ute, contract, stipulation, or fund, in exceptional circumstances, where
justified by inequitable conduct, attorney's fees may be assessed as
costs against the losing party."4 Although a statute to that effect did
not exist, the Florida Legislature periodically had enacted statutes
awarding reasonable attorney's fees under certain circumstances, such
as in actions for unpaid wages,5 divorces,6 and mechanics liens,7 among
1. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975).
2. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 48 U.S.L.W. 4836, 4838 (June 23, 1980).
The Supreme Court held 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1966), which provides that counsel "who
so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexa-
tiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally such costs," was not intended
to include attorneys fees as costs. The Court upheld the "American rule," that each
party pays his own attorney's fees, but upheld the assessing of attorney's fees as
costs-in federal court-against counsel who has willfully abused the judicial processes
and/or against a party who has instituted and/or litigated a lawsuit in bad faith.
3. 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS FEES 479 (1973).
4. Wahl, Attorney's Fees Taxed Against Opposing Party, 37 FLA. B.J. 220
(1963) (emphasis supplied) (citing unreported Florida cases).
5. FLA. STAT. § 448.08 (1979).
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others. It is evident that the Legislature was biting off pieces of the
American rule a little at a time from the body of Florida common law.
I. Legislative History and Intent. Florida Statute § 57.105
In 1978,8 the Legislature enacted section 57.105 of the Florida
Statutes, in derogation of the common law.9 Only applicable to civil
litigation,10 the statute in its entirety reads: 57.105 Attorney's fee
The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing
party in any civil action in which the court finds that there was a com-
plete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the
losing party.11
This section of the Florida Statutes has a short but interesting leg-
islative history. In the House of Representatives it carried the nomen-
clature House Bill 1062.12 Representative Barry Richard (District 112,
Democrat, Miami), the bill's sponsor,13 read it for the first time by title
and referred it to the Committee on Judiciary on April 5, 1978.14 The
pertinent portion of the bill read as follows:
An act relating to civil litigation . . . providing that the court shall
award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in any civil
action in which the court finds that there are no genuine issues of law or
6. FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (1979).
7. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1979).
8. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1979).
9. Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, Employees Serv. Corp., 277 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1973);
Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1968).
10. State v. LoChiatto, 381 So. 2d 245, 246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). The
court held section 57.105 does not authorize an assessment of attorney's fees "for ap-
pellate proceedings in a criminal case for the reason that the statute pertains to appel-
late proceedings in civil cases."
11. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1979).
12. JOURNALS OF THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIAL SESSION
1977-78, REGULAR SESSION 1978 at 112 [hereinafter JOURNAL-FLA. HOUSE].
13. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT, BILL No. 1062 (Fla. House of Rep-
resentatives, 1978); JUDICIARY-CIVIL COMMITTEE, SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND Eco-
NOMIC STATEMENT, May 22, 1978, (Bill No. and Sponsor: H.B. 1062, Representative
Richard).
14. JOURNAL-FLA. HOUSE at 112.
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material fact in dispute; providing an effective date.' 5
The underscored language is quite similar to the language found in
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure designating the test for summary
judgment.16 This similarity was intentional, because, at one time, Rep-
resentative Richard had expected a blanket application of the bill to
prevailing parties in summary judgment proceedings. 17
The House Judiciary Committee debated the bill on April 20,
1978, with Representative Richard providing the majority of input.,,
Richard referred to the bill as a vehicle "to close a major loophole in
15. Id.
16. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c):
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories and administrations on file together with the
affidavits, if any, to show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled judgment as a matter of law.
This subsection to this rule was amended in 1976, "to require a movant to state with
particularity the grounds and legal authority which he will rely upon in seeking sum-
mary judgment. This amendment will eliminate surprise ... " FLA. R. CT., Commit-
tee Note at 38 (1980).
New rule 1.510(c) reads:
The motion shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is based and
the substantial matters of law to be argued and shall be served at least twenty
days before the time fixed for hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing
affidavits prior to the day of hearing ... [the body of previously quoted rule
1.510(c), prior to amendment, appears here in full and unchanged]. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone ...
FLA. R. CT., at 37.
It is curious to note the proximity in time between the addition of section 57.105
to the Florida Statutes and the amendment to rule 1.510(c) of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure. As will be indicated, the legislature's concern about victims of "frivo-
lously" filed lawsuits or defenses led to the development of section 57.105. The amend-
ment to rule 1.510(c) was designed to avoid surprise to a motion for summary judg-
ment. Both measures appear to be attempts to produce more just results in their
respective spheres.
17. Proposed Statute on Attorney's Fees: Taped Debates on H.B. 1062 (May 4,
5 & 8, 1978) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 1062-taped debates]. The Judiciary Committee
designed the bill to read the same as the previous year's bill,' which died on the
calendar.
18. Proposed Statute on Attorney's Fees: Hearing on H.B. 1062 Before the
House Judiciary Committee (April 20, 1978) (taped hearing).
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terms of the ability of the injured person to get compensation; that is,
the inability of injured persons to get attorney's fees."' 9 He referred to
it as a means by which a person against whom a frivolous suit had been
filed, or defense raised, could be recompensed.
On April 21, 1978, the Committee on Judiciary recommended the
bill pass.2" It was set on the April 26th calendar, 1 but it was not de-
bated in the House until May 4th, 5th, and 8th, 1978.22 The tape re-
corded debates23 of the bill contain more information regarding legisla-
tive intent than any available written material. 2' However, the best
method of determining legislative intent is a juxtaposition of the House
and Senate Journals with the taped debates.
The May 4th debates commenced with Representative Richard's
comments regarding the purpose of the bill: "The court in which there
is a frivolous lawsuit filed, a frivolous defense raised, it [sic] shall pro-
vide attorney's fees to the prevailing party. '25
Representative Charles C. Pappy, Jr. (District 117, Democrat,
Miami), concerned with the apparent misnomer of the proposed legisla-
tion, stated his views: "Mr. Richard, if you want to give attorney's fees
in frivolous suits, why don't you say so in your bill?"' 26 Pappy further
remarked, "there are many cases filed in which a side loses that should
not have to pay attorney's fees;" and to avoid having the bill miscon-
strued the word frivolous should be used because "we all know what
that means."'27
19. Id.
20. JOURNAL-FLA. HOUSE at 314.
21. Id. at 332.
22. Id. at 417, 428, 434; H.B. 1062-taped debates.
23. H.B. 1062-taped debates.
24. JOURNAL-FLA. HOUSE at 112, 314, 332, 417, 428, 434, 453, 665, 827, 1196;
FLA. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, SPECIAL SESSION 1977-78, REGULAR SESSION 1978 at
357, 453, 456, 564, 575 [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL-FLA. SENATE]; 1978 Fla. Laws,
ch. 78-275; JUDICIARY COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT, Bill No. 1062 (Fla. House of Rep-
resentatives, 1978); JUDICIARY-CIVIL COMMITTEE SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECO-
NOMIC STATEMENT, May 22, 1978, (Bill No. H.B. 1062); FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1979).
None of the written documents refer to H.B. 1062 or section 57.105 as having anything
to do with "frivolous" lawsuits.
25. H.B. 1062-taped debates.
26. Id.
27. Id.
1 92 5:1980 1
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After Representative Richard explained the terminology of the
bill,28 he stated his desire to have the bill made applicable to all sum-
mary judgments. Representative William C. Andrews (District 27,
Democrat, Gainesville) presented an amendment to strike the enacting
clause to keep the bill alive on the House floor for debate.2 9 Andrews'
concern was that if a suit were instituted in good faith to test the "va-
lidity or constitutionality of a statute," and the facts were not disputed,
the passage of the bill inappropriately would mandate the assessing of
attorney's fees against the losing party.30 There was further debate re-
garding the chilling effect the bill's passage would have on the basic
constitutional right of accessibility to the courts31 balanced against the
need to provide relief to victims of frivolously filed lawsuits or de-
fenses32 and constituents' demands to have that need fulfilled.33
On May 5th, Representative Andrews' first amendment was with-
drawn and a second substituted. 4 The second amendment provided for
the striking of "are no genuine issues of law or material fact in dis-
pute" and, in its stead, the insertion of "was a complete absence of a
justiciable issue of either law or fact."'35 This phrase was to eliminate
the requirement that attorney's fees be awarded to prevailing parties in
all summary judgments. However, this clause was found by Represen-
tative Richard H. Langley (District 35, Republican, Clermont) to be
inadequate in that only the defendant would be awarded attorney's fees
because the proposed language implied the plaintiff should never have
28. Id. Statement of Representative Richard.
It was precisely for the reason you suggest, Mr. Papy, that the Judiciary Com-
mittee last year changed the bill which did start with the word frivolous. They
did it because the word frivolous is not defined in the law; because they were
concerned that the judges would apply it inconsistently in one case or another;
and, because the terminology which is used here is a term of art which is well
established in the law. This way we'd have a more consistent standard.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Representative T.M. Woodruff (District 60, Republican, St. Petersburg).
32. Id. Representative Richard.
33. Id. Representative Dorothy Eaton Sample (District 61, Republican, St.
Petersburg).










filed the lawsuit. 36 The addition of the words "raised by the losing
party" after the word "fact," proposed by Representative William E.
Sadowski (District 113, Democrat, Miami) in his amendment, was an
attempt to resolve the discrepancy.37
Prior to the voting on May 8th,3 8 three pertinent questions arose.
The first mistakenly questioned the propriety of the legislature's assist-
ing attorneys in the collection of their fees.3 The second referred to
default judgments, which would require the assessing of attorney's fees
against the defaulting party, but which would not preclude the judg-
ment from being vacated.40 The third dealt with the court's dismissal of
frivolous lawsuits which would also require the assessment of attorney's
fees against the loser. 1 Nevertheless, the bill passed as amended on a
36. H.B. 1062-taped debates.
37. JOURNAL-FLA. HOUSE at 428.
38. Id. at 434.
39. H.B. 1062-taped debates.
Representative William R. Conway (District 29, Democrat, Ormond Beach) ques-
tioned: "Why does the legislature have a right or a responsibility to guarantee attor-
neys that they'll be able to collect their fees when they don't do that for anyone else?"
Representative Richard replied:
Mr. Conway, that's not what the bill really does at all .... The attorneys are
going to get their fees one way or the other. The only question that this bill
addresses is who's to pay them. . . .There's a familiar maxim in the law that
says that for every wrong there's a remedy. The only difficulty with that maxim
is that there is one wrong for which there is no remedy, and that is when a
person sues you for no reason whatsoever. If I walk up to you in the street and I
punch you in the face and if it costs you $1000 for dental care to correct the
damage, you can sue me for that $1000. But if I file a lawsuit against
you-which anyone of us in this room and any person in the State of Florida can
do, anybody can file a lawsuit against any other person-and I have absolutely
no basis whatsoever for it, and it costs you $5000 to hire a lawyer to defend
yourself, and you win, you have no basis whatsoever in the law today to get that
money back from me and the judge can't entitle you to get it back from me. So,
what this bill says is that if I sue you without justification, that you can get the
attorney fees you have to pay your lawyer back from me, because I never should
have sued you in the first place.
40. H.B. 1062-taped debates.
41. Id.
Representative R. Ed. Blackburn, Jr. (District 64, Democrat, Temple Terrace):
"Is it not true that under your bill if someone brings a frivolous and completely unwar-
ranted suit against me, the court dismisses it, then would not that plaintiff have to pay
5:98
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sixty-four to forty vote and was certified to the Senate.42
The Senate requested and received a staff analysis of the bill,'48
and the Committee on Judiciary-Civil, recommended it pass.44 On May
29th, 1978, on a thirty-seven to zero vote, proposed statute section
57.105 passed the Senate and subsequently became law.45
I. Case Law Interpreting Florida Statute § 57.105
The first court to deal with section 57.105 was the Circuit Court
of Palm Beach County in Morgan v. Boca Raton Community Hospital,
Inc.4' The defendant had been rendered a favorable decision by a medi-
cal mediation panel47 and sought attorney's fees. The case revolved
around "whether a medical mediation proceeding [was] a 'civil action'
within the meaning of Florida Statute 57.105."48 The court held it was
not, after extrapolating pertinent data from cases that focused on the
statutory construction of section 768.44 of the Florida Statutes49 from
which medical mediation panels derived their existence. Although it
may bear consideration in the determination of "quasi-judicial" pro-
my defense attorney?"
Representative Richard: "Absolutely, Mr. Blackburn, because I think that's only
right .... "
42. JOURNAL-FLA. HOUSE at 434.
43. JUDICIARY-CIVIL COMMITTEE, SENATE 'STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
STATEMENT, May 22, 1978, Bill No. H.B. 1062:
A. Economic Impact on the Public:
This bill would have the effect of discouraging much litigation; especially that
instituted with the intent of securing a settlement rather than actually securing a
judgment on the merits of a cause of action. In many instances cases are settled
only to avoid the inconvenience and costs of defending a suit, not because one
party is clearly at fault.
B. Economic Impact on State or Local Government:
This bill would result in some savings io the judicial branch, by lessening the
number of cases the system must handle.
44. JOURNAL-FLA. SENATE at 453.
45. Id. at 475.
46. 49 Fla. Supp. 46 (1979).
47. See FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (Supp. 1980).
48. 49 Fla. Supp. at 47.
49. As it was being administered, the medical mediation statute, FLA. STAT. §
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ceedings,50 the question in Morgan is now moot, due to the recent abo-
lition of medical mediation panels in Aldana v. Holub.51
Soon after the Morgan decision, Southeast Growers, Inc. v.
Designed Facilities, Inc.,52 was decided by a Broward County Court
Judge. The case was ripe for summary judgment since the issue of fact,
whether there had been an oral representation made, was "covered by
the Statute of Frauds, Florida Statute § 725.01 (1975)."1 3 The defen-
dant's attorney counterclaimed for attorney's fees under section 57.105
and the judge elected to treat the counterclaim as an "affirmative de-
fense" rather than as an independent motion. He made a determination
that section 57.105 "is not the subject of a separate and independent
cause of action."" The section is triggered by a reaction to a frivolous
claim or defense. The judge ruled that "where a claim is asserted by
plaintiff and defeated as a result of an affirmative defense raised by
defendant, attorney's fees cannot be awarded to defendant under §
57.105."1 5
The finding that the award of attorney's fees is an affirmative de-
fense is contrary to the legislative intent.56 In order for attorney's fees
to be assessed against the losing party the court must make a "finding"
of "a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised
by the losing party. ' 57 The judge distinguished the standards for sum-
mary judgment and the requisites for the application of 57.105, and did
not make a finding as to the validity of defendant's request for attor-
ney's fees. He avoided the question. Had the judge ruled that an oral
representation falling under the Statute of Frauds was a valid issue,
and not a frivolous question, he would have arrived at the same result,
i.e., the denial of attorney's fees.
Subsequently, the Third District Court of Appeal decided McBain
50. 49 Fla. Supp. at 47.
51. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
52. 49 Fla. Supp. 160 (1979).
53. Id. at 162.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 163.
56. H.B. 1062-taped debates.
57. City of Miami Beach v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 380 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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v. Bowling.58 The court authorized the award of attorney's fees follow-
ing the finding of a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or
fact even if the suit is voluntarily dismissed. This holding covers a situ-
ation implied, but not addressed, during the legislative debates fourteen
months earlier.59
The McBain court referred to Randle Eastern Ambulance Service,
Inc. v. Vasta6" to demonstrate the effect of section 57.105. In writing
the Randle opinion, Justice England, addressed the central issue that
"a plaintiff's volitional dismissal divests a trial court of jurisdiction to
entertain a later request to be relieved from the dismissal."81l
In the presence of existing law, a plaintiff is prevented from sever-
al filings and dismissals of the same claim62 and the defendant can
"recoup. . . court costs when a voluntary dismissal has been taken.""3
Yet, the Randle court recognized that:
There is no recompense . . . for a defendant's inconvenience, his
attorney's fees, or the instability to his daily affairs which are caused by
a plaintiff's self-aborted lawsuit. Nor is there any recompense for the
cost and inconvenience to the general public through the plaintiff's pre-
cipitous or improvident use of judicial resources."
This is precisely the view held by the majority of legislators who
voted on the bill which became section 57.105 at approximately the
same time Randle was decided.6 5 It is obvious that not all voluntarily
dismissed claims are frivolously filed. However, the defendant now has
some recourse to dissuade the oceurence of frivolous claims.
The court in McBain looked also to Gordon v. Warren Heating &
Air Conditioning, Inc.66 as support for its decision to award attorney's
58. 374 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
59. See note 41 supra, where the discussion referred to "court dismissals," but
not to voluntary dismissals.
60. 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978).
61. Id. at 68-69.
62. Id. at 69, citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1) (voluntary dismissals).
63. Id., citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d) (costs).
64. Id.
65. Randle was decided May 18, 1978. The House of Representatives voted May
8, 1978, and the Senate May 29, 1978, on what ultimately became section 57.105.
66. 340 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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fees. The Gordon court interpreted Florida Statutes § 713.29,67 which
deals with the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in
actions enforcing mechanics liens.
Two issues resolved by the Gordon court were similar to those
presented in McBain regarding section 57.105. First, whether a party
against whom an action has been dismissed is entitled to attorney's
fees. Second, "whether a judgment for those fees and costs must be
entered as soon as the original action is dismissed rather than as part of
the new action."68
The Gordon court held that "where a mechanic's lien claim [was]
voluntarily or involuntarily dismissed, the party against whom the
claim was brought is the "prevailing party," and is entitled to recover
attorney's fees and costs . . .. [and the prevailing party] should [be]
awarded costs and attorney's fees immediately following dismissal of
the first action. °7 0 Thus, McBain supports the rationales of both Ran-
die and Gordon.
No other case in Florida has so painstakingly analyzed section
57.105 as Allen v. Estate of Dutton.71 The facts in Allen revolve
around three wills: 1) a will by the husband, appellant's natural father,
2) a will by the wife, appellant's stepmother, executed on the same day,
May 27, 1969, as the husband's will, before the same witnesses, and
containing a provision declining to exercise the power to appoint the
corpus of the "Ellen C. Dutton Trust", so that, at her death, the corpus
would be added to the "Dutton Family Trust;" and 3) a revoking will
by the wife-stepmother, executed June 22, 1971, after the husband-
father's death, specifically exercising the power to appoint given to her
by her husband's will, but not appointing the corpus of the trust to the
"Dutton Family Trust," of which appellant was a substantial benefi-
ciary.7 2 The wife-stepmother died on April 15, 1978 and her 1971 will
67. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1975).
68. Id. at 1235.
69. The court cited Mardan Kitchen Cabinets, Inc. v. Bruns, 312 So. 2d 709
(Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Jackson v. Hatch, 288 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974); and Lion Oil Co., Inc. v. Tamarac Lakes, Inc., 232 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1970). See also Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 1087 (1975).
70. 340 So. 2d at 1235.
71. 384 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
72. Id. at 172.
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was admitted to probate.73 Appellant contested the validity of the 1971
will but the lower court granted appellee's motion for judgment on the
pleadings and awarded appellee's attorneys "$23,000 under the provi-
sions of Section 57.105." '
Appellant's contention was "that since the statute [was] silent as
to contracts not to revoke a will, (emphasis in original) such contracts
need not be in writing. ' 75 The statute referred to is Florida Statute §
731.051.76 "[Sjection 732.701 Florida Statutes (1975) . . . [which pro-
vides] that an agreement not to revoke a will must be in writing and
signed by the agreeing party in the presence of two attesting witnesses,
* * . was not in effect at the time the will in question was executed,"
and was therefore inapplicable.
The court looked to other jurisdictions for clues,78 and came to the
conclusion that the lower court properly awarded judgment in favor of
appellee.79 However, the court did not conclude likewise for attorney's
fees.
The appellate court determined that since "[tihe heading of chap-
ter 57 in the statute books is 'Court Costs' it is obvious that the Legis-
lature intended to treat this award as part of the only subject matter
therein, court costs." 80 Had an award of attorney's fees been proper,
the lower court would have been justified in awarding them under sec-
tion 57.105 as "costs not included in the final judgment even after a
notice appealing the final judgment has been filed."8"
Allen, like McBain, treated attorney's fees as "costs. ' 82 Although,
under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure rule 1.420(d), costs did not
include attorney's fees at the time of the Randle decision (one of the
cases to which McBain referred), once section 57.105 was enacted, at-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 172-73.
75. Id. at 173.
76. Id., citing FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1957).
77. Id.
78. Id. The Court reviewed West v. Day, 328 Mass. 381, 103 N.E.2d 813
(1952), which cited cases from its own and other jurisdictions.
79. Id. at 175.
80. Id. at 174.
81. Id.
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torney's fees became "costs" if they fell within the statute's purview 83
The Allen court, to determine the propriety of the attorney's fees
which were awarded, chose legislative intent as a method of statutory
interpretation to find the prerequisites for the invocation of section
57.105. In an analysis which parallels that of the House of Representa-
tives, the court concluded that a finding of "complete absence" of a
justiciable issue of law or fact was akin to a "total or absolute lack"
thereof, and "tantamount to a finding that the action is frivolous.""
The court analogized the case at bar to Treat v. State ex. rel. Mitton. 5
The Allen court used Treat's definition of a frivolous appeal:
A frivolous appeal is not merely one that is likely to be unsuccessful. It is
one that is so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the
record that there is little, if any, prospect whatsoever that it can ever
succeed. . . one so clearly untenable, or the insufficiency of which is so
manifest. . . that its character may be determined without argument or
research. An appeal is not frivolous where a substantial justiciable ques-
tion can be spelled out of it, or from any part of it, even though such
question is unlikely to be decided other than as the lower court decided
it. .... 8
Since the Allen court found that a justiciable issue of law was
raised, it reversed the lower court's assessment of attorney's fees. 7 It
also held that "[m]erely losing, either on the pleadings or by summary
judgment, is not enough to invoke the operation of the statute. . . that
the action [has to be] so clearly devoid of merit both on the facts and
the law as to be completely untenable."'8 Perhaps the court went
slightly further than the Legislature intended by stating that both the
facts and the law presented must be completely untenable. However,
the analysis and holding more accurately reflect the legislative intent of
the statute than any other Florida case.
There is yet another variation to the assessment of attorney's fees.
83. Id.
84. 384 So. 2d at 175.
85. 121 Fla. 509, 163 So. 883 (1935).
86. 384 So. 2d at 175.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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In Department of Revenue v. Gurtler,9 the appellate court made the
finding that a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact
existed at the trial level and assessed "[o]ne thousand (1,000) dollars in
attorney's fees in favor of the appellant," 90 pursuant to section 57.105.
In the lower court, Gurtler, the appellee, had been successful but the
appellate court required that the record be corrected and supple-
mented. Ultimately, Gurtler conceded at the appellate level that his
position at trial had been "baseless." 91 The appellate court reversed
and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the ap-
pellant, Department of Revenue, and award it attorney's fees.
In the same light, if the trial record indicates an adequate legal
and factual basis has been layed as a foundation92 for a claim or de-
fense, an appellate court will find a motion under section 57.105 unten-
able.93 If attorney's fees are awarded, but the order "contains no find-
ing, as required by statute, that 'there was a complete absence of a
justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party,'" the
order is technically deficient." The case would need to be "remanded
to the trial court with directions to make an appropriate finding...
and thereafter to assess or deny attorney's fees depending on the find-
ing entered. .... ,,95
III. Other Jurisdictions With Statutes Similar to 57.105
Illinois, has had a statute authorizing the award of reasonable at-
torney's fees in effect since 1955." Within the past five years, six other
89. 381 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Michigan Nat'l Bank of Detroit v. Maierhoffer, 382 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
93. Id. at 322.
94. City of Miami Beach, 380 So. 2d at 1112.
95. Id. at 1114.
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 41, Historical and Practical Notes (1968). Cur-
rent legislation, effective November 23, 1977, reads:
§ 41 (Civil Practice Act § 41) Untrue statements.
Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and found to be
untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the payment of reasonable ex-
penses, actually incurred by the other party by reason of the untrue pleading,
together with a reasonable attorney's fee, to be summarily taxed by the court
1[Attorney's Fees. 57.1051 5:1980
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states have adopted or amended existing statutes similar to section
57.105.
upon motion made within 30 days of the judgment or dismissal.
The State of Illinois or any agency thereof shall be subject to the provisions
of this Section in the same manner as any other party.
Where the litigation involves review of a determination of an administrative
agency, the court shall include in its award for expenses an amount to compen-
sate a party for costs actually incurred by that party in contesting on the admin-
istrative level an allegation or denial made by the state without reasonable cause
and found to be untrue.
Id. (Supp. 1980-81).
97. MiNi.. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West 1978):
Reimbursement for certain costs in civil actions.
Upon motion of a party prevailing as to an issue, the court in its discretion
may award to that party costs, disbursements, reasonable attorney fees and wit-
ness fees relating to the issue if the party or attorney against whom costs, dis-
bursements, reasonable attorney and witness fees are charged acted in bad faith
as to that issue. To qualify for an award under this section, a party shall give
timely notice of intent to claim an award, which notice shall in any event be
given prior to the resolution of the issue. An award under this section shall be
without prejudice and as an alternative to any claim for sanctions that may be
asserted under the rules of civil procedure. Added by Laws 1978, c. 738 § 5, eff.
April 5, 1978.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.025 (West Supp. 1980-81):
814.025 Costs upon frivolous claims and counterclaims.
(1) If an action or special proceeding commenced or continued by a plain-
tiff or a counterclaim, defense or cross complaint commenced, used or continued
by a defendant is found, at any time during the proceedings or upon judgment,
to be frivolous by the court, the court shall award to the successful party costs
determined under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney fees.
(2) The costs and fees awarded under sub. (1) may be assessed fully
against either the party bringing the action, special proceeding, cross complaint,
defense or counterclaim or the attorney representing the party or may be as-
sessed so that the party and the attorney each pay a portion of the costs and fees.
(3) In order to find an action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or
cross complaint to be frivolous under sub. (1), the court must find one or more of
the following:
(a) The action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross com-
plaint was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of
harassing or maliciously injuring another.
(b) The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have known, that the
action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint was without
any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith
103
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
1 5:1980
Attorney's Fees: S7.105 103
A. ILLINOIS
The Illinois statute has been interpreted by their courts as an at-
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, §§ 6E-6G (West 1976). 6E provides definitions
applicable to sections 6E-6G, and section 6G applies to appeals.
§ 6F. Cost, Expenses and interest for insubstantial, frivolous or bad faith claims
or defenses
Upon motion if any party in any civil action in which a finding, verdict,
decision, award, order or judgment has been made by a judge or justice or by a
jury, auditor, master or other finder of fact, the court may determine, after a
hearing, as a separate and distinct finding, that all or substantially all of the
claims, defenses, setoffs or counterclaims, whether of a factual, legal or mixed
nature, made by any party who was represented by counsel during most or all of
the proceeding, were wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good
faith. The court shall include in such finding the specific facts and reasons on
which the finding is based.
If such a finding is made with respect to a party's claim, the court shall
award to each party against whom such claims were asserted an amount repre-
senting the reasonable counsel fees and other costs and expenses incurred in de-
fending against such claims . . . [provisions made for those not represented by
counsel omitted].
Apart from any award made pursuant to the preceding paragraph, if the
court finds that all or substantially all of the defenses, setoffs or counterclaims to
any portion of a monetary claim made by any party who was represented by
counsel during most or all of the proceeding were wholly insubstantial, frivolous
and not advanced in good faith, the court shall award interest to the claimant on
that portion of the claim according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
In any award made pursuant to either of the preceding paragraphs, the
court shall specify in reasonable detail the method by which the amount of the
award was computed and the calculation thereof.
No finding shall be made that any claim, defense, setoff or counterclaim was
wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good faith solely because a
novel or unusual argument or principle of law was advanced in support thereof.
No such finding shall be made in any action in which judgment was entered by
default without an appearance having been entered by the defendant. The au-
thority granted to a court by this section shall be in addition to, and not in limi-
tation of, that already established by law.
If any parties to a civil action shall settle the dispute which was the subject
thereof and shall file in the appropriate court documents setting forth such settle-
ment, the court shall not make any finding or award pursuant to this section with
respect to such parties. If an award had previously been made pursuant to this
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tempt on the part of "the legislature to penalize the litigant who pleads
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101 (1977) (Subsections (2) and (4) omitted):
Frivolous or Groundless Actions
13-13-101. Attorney fees. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and
(3) of this section, in any suit involving money damages in any court of this
state, the court shall award, except as this part 1 otherwise provides; as part of
its judgment and in addition to any costs otherwise assessed, reasonable attorney
fees.
(3) The court shall not award attorney fees among the parties unless it
finds that the bringing, maintaining, or defense of the action against the party
entitled to such award was frivolous or groundless. The court must make findings
either affirmative or negative as to the matters set forth in this subsection (3).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-01 (1977):
28-26-01. Attorney's fees by agreement-Exceptions-Awarding of costs and at-
torney's fees to prevailing party.
1. Except as provided in subsection 2, the amount of fees of attorneys in civil
actions must be left to the agreement, expresss or implied, of the parties.
2. In civil actions the court may, in its discretion, upon a finding that a claim
for relief was frivolous, award reasonable actual or statutory cost, or both, in-
cluding reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Such costs may be
awarded regardless of the good faith of the attorney or client making the claim
for relief if there is such a complete absence of actual facts or law that a reason-
able person could not have thought a court would render judgment in their favor,
providing the prevailing party has in responsive pleading alleged the frivolous
nature of the claim.
IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (1976):
12-121. Attorney's fees.
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees.
The following two states also regulate attorney's fees but are not discussed in this
article:
NEV. REV. STAT. § 18.010 (1979).
18.101 Award of attorney's fees.
1. The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his services is gov-
erned by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law.
2. The court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to:
(a) The plaintiff as prevailing party when the plaintiff has not recovered
more than $10,000; or
(b) The counterclaimant as prevailing party when he has not recovered
more than $10,000; or
(c) The defendant as prevailing party when the plaintiff has not sought re-
covery in excess of $10,000.
1 104 Nova Law Journal
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frivolous or false matters or brings a suit without any basis in law and
thereby puts the burden upon his opponent to expend money for an
attorney to make a defense against an untenable suit."'98 An Illinois
court dismissed an action on a pre-trial motion, stating that "[o]ne of
the purposes of [the Illinois statute] is to prevent litigants from being
subjected to harassment by the bringing of actions against them which
in their nature are vexations, based upon false statements, or brought
without any legal foundation."1' 9
The Illinois Statute, designed to prevent abuse of the judicial pro-
cess, 100 has been in existence longer than any similar statute in other
jurisdictions. This has given Illinois courts greater experience in dealing
with, and exposure to, problems arising under statutes comparable to
section 57.105. Although, it is the most comprehensive law in its cate-
gory in scope,101 it is more limited than the Florida Statute since its
application is discretionary with the trial court.1 02 Unless there is clear
3. In awarding attorney's fees the court may pronounce its decision on
such fees at the conclusion of the trial or special proceeding without written mo-
tion and with or without presentation of additional evidence.
4. No oral application or written motion for attorney's fees alters the effect
of a final judgment entered in the action or the time permitted for an appeal
therefrom.
5. Subsections 2 to 4, inclusive, do not apply to any action arising out of
written instrument or agreement which entitles the prevailing party to an award
of reasonable attorney's fees.
MD. R.P. 604(b) (1957).
b. Bad Faith-Unjustified Proceeding-Delay.
In an action or part of an action, if the court finds that any proceeding was
had (1) in bad faith, (2) without substantial justification, or (3) for purposes of
delay the court shall require the moving party to pay to the adverse party the
amount of the costs thereof and the reasonable expenses incurred by the adverse
party in opposing such proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees.
98. Ready v. Ready, 33 Ill. App. 3d 145, 178 N.E.2d 650, 658 (1961).
99. Id.
100. Murezek v. Powers Label Co., 31 111. App. 3d 939, 335 N.E.2d 172, 176
(1975).
101. Compare note 96 supra with note 97 supra. Attorney fees may be assessed
against the State of Illinois.
102. Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 342, 383 N.E.2d 185, 196
(1978); Ascardis v. Russis, 78 Ill. App. 3d 375, 397 N.E.2d 14, 16 (1979); Howell v.
Edelin, 66 11. App. 3d 437, 383 N.E.2d 1224, 1234 (1978); Laff v. Chapman Perform-
ance Prods., Inc., 63 Ill. App. 3d 297, 379 N.E.2d 773, 785 (1978). Brandenberry Park
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abuse of discretion the lower court's decision will not be disturbed on
review.10 3
In order for the trial court to award or deny attorney's fees in
Illinois there must be a hearing on the matter.104 At the hearing, the
burden of proof is on the movant to "prove that the allegations against
him: (1) were made without reasonable cause; (2) not in good faith;
and (3) are untrue. ' 10 5 Currently, the test does not require that the
movant prove a lack of good faith."0"
There is Illinois case law wherein the award of attorney's fees has
been reversed because the movant failed to fulfill his burden,0 7 and
that burden cannot be fulfilled, if the only evidence offered at the hear-
ing pertains to the amount of the fees.108 An Illinois appellate court
will not find abuse of discretion if an award of attorney's fees is well
documented in the record;109 nor will it review a denial of attorney's
fees absent abuse of discretion.110 Yet in Illinois, as in Florida, a pre-
vailing party is not automatically awarded attorney's fees-especially if
there is a finding that a genuine dispute existed, although it may not
have been an issue at the trial.1"
The allowance of attorney's fees "is an attempt to penalize any
East Apts. v. Zale, 63 Ill. App. 3d 253, 379 N.E.2d 674, 681 (1978). Farwell Constr.
Co. v. Ticktin, 59 II1. App. 3d 954, 376 N.E.2d 621, 626 (1978); Bainerd v. Flannery,
59 I11. App. 3d 991, 373 N.E.2d 26, 29 (1978); Morton v. Environmental Land Sys.,
Ltd., 55 Ill. App. 3d 369, 370 N.E.2d 1106, 1111 (1977); Dudanas v. Plate, 44 Ill.
App. 3d 901, 358 N.E.2d 1171, 1179 (1976); Village of Evergreen Park v. Spangler, 40
Ill. App. 3d 947, 353 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1976); Murezek v. Powers Label Co., 335
N.E.2d at 176.
103. 376 N.E.2d at 626; 370 N.E.2d at 1111.
104. 303 N.E.2d at 1234.
105. 335 N.E.2d at 176. See also Couri v. Home Ins. Co., 53 111. App. 3d 593,
368 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (1977); 373 N.E.2d at 29; 383 N.E.2d at 196.
106. 397 N.E.2d at 16.
107. Medical Modalities Assoc., Inc. v. Quick, 65 II. App. 3d 300, 382 N.E.2d
620, 623 (1978); Meeker v. Beeson, 76 I11. App. 3d 940, 395 N.E.2d 698, 701 (1979).
108. 383 N.E.2d at 196.
109. 379 N.E.2d at 681; In re Estate of Knutson, - I11. App. 3d -, 404
N.E.2d 1003 (1980).
110. 370 N.E.2d at 1111.
111. Farnot v. Irmco Corp., 73 Ill. App. 3d 851, 292 N.E.2d 591, (1979). (A
dispute had existed as to whether an individual was employed by a certain party, how-
ever, that question was not made an issue at trial due to mutual stipulation).
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litigant who pleads false matters and thereby puts undo burden on an
opponent to expend money in order for his attorney to disprove such
pleadings." 112 Since the statute is penal in nature, Illinois courts limit
its scope to "those cases falling strictly within its terms. ' 113
In Florida, the court must make a finding of a complete absence of
justiciable issue of law or fact before attorney's fees can be assessed
against the losing party.114 If such a finding is made in Illinois, it is
discretionary with the court whether attorney's fees will be awarded 11,5
This interpretation places a double burden on the movant. He must
overcome the burden of proof at a special hearing, and if his motion is
denied, the movant must prove at the appellate level, abuse of discre-
tion on the part of the trial court-an inherently difficult burden to
overcome.
B. NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota's statute is equivalent to Illinois' and its courts have
looked to Illinois case law for guidance in interpreting it.118 The stat-
ute, authorizes a court, at its discretion, to award "costs" to the pre-
vailing party in a civil action by way of indemnity for his expenses in
the action.111 It was recently amended to include attorney's fees. 1 8
However, attorney's fees will not be "allowed to a party who has
successfully defended against an action unless the action was frivo-
lous. ''119 The finding of frivolousness is initially made at the trial
court's discretion.120 Reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to the
112. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Antioch Theatre Co., 52 Ill. App. 3d 122,
367 N.E.2d 247, 257 (1977).
113. 335 N.E.2d at 176. See also 372 N.E.2d at 946; 370 N.E.2d at 1111; 358
N.E.2d at 1179.
114. 384 So.2d at 174.
115. See note 102 supra.
116. Matter of Estate of Nelson, 281 N.W.2d 245, 247 (N.D. 1979).
117. N.D. CENr. CODE § 28-26-01 (1943).
118. See note 97 supra.
119. Conrad v. Suhr, 274 N.W.2d 571, 579 (N.D. 1979). See also Peterson v.
Hart, 278 N.W.2d 133, 136 (N.D. 1979).
120. Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Winchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d
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prevailing party once such a finding is made.121
C. MINNESOTA AND IDAHO
Minnesota 122 and Idaho 2s also have discretionary statutes. The
statute in Minnesota is considered an enactment of the exception to the
general rule, i.e. "[g]enerally attorney's fees may not be awarded to a
successful litigant absent specific contractual or statutory authority
[except] where the unsuccessful party has acted in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason. 124
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the trial court is in
the best position to determine bad faith and other factual issues. 25 The
court gave significant weight to the statute's legislative history by quot-
ing its author, who "stated to the [Minnesota] Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee that this section forces more responsible litigation by imposing
costs including attorney's fees on a party or his lawyer who presses an
issue not in good faith-so people have to search through their lawsuits
more effectively for what really ought to be litigated."' 26
Idaho cases on point, deal with the "technical" aspects of the ap-
plication of its statute. Since the statute is not substantive, but reme-
dial and procedural, retroactive application was proper to a claim aris-
ing prior, but tried subsequently, to the statute's enactment. 2 7
However, it is incumbent upon the movant to establish the claim or
defense "was being maintained frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation."'1 8 If the movant seeks attorney's fees under an improper
statute, but has established his adversary's claim is devoid of merit, the
121. Id.
122. Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Wantonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n,
294 N.W.2d 297, 311 (Minn. 1980).
123. See note 97 supra and Palmer v. Idaho Bank & Trust of Kooskia, 100
Idaho 642, 603 P.2d 597, 600 (1979); Furtrell v. Martin, 100 Idaho 473, 600 P.2d 777,
783 (1979); Cunningham v. Bundy, 100 Idaho 456, 600 P.2d 132, 135 (1979).
124. Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 96 (Minn.
1979).
125. Id. at 97.
126. 294 N.W.2d at 311 n.1.
127. Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d 1276-78 (1978). See also Buck-
alew v. City of Orangeville, 100 Idaho 460, 600 P.2d 136, 139 (1979), citing Jensen.
128. Matter of Estate of Bowman, - Idaho -, 609 P.2d 663, 669 (1980).
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court may affirm the award if it is proper under another statute.129 The
assessment of attorney's fees against two or more parties must be pro-
rated against each of them, otherwise the case will be remanded for
such a determination.'30
D. COLORADO
The Colorado statute, whose application is discretionary with the
trial court,' 3' restricts attorney's fees awards to suits involving money
damages. 32 It is clear, however, that a party who "asserts claims in a
subsequent action which were compulsory counterclaims in a former
proceeding . . ." has asserted frivolous claims3 3 and attorney's fees
would be awarded to the prevailing party.
E. MASSACHUSETTS AND WISCONSIN
Massachusetts and Wisconsin are the two states whose statutes
most resemble Florida's. Their statutes also use the word "shall" in-
stead of "may," mandating the assessment of attorney's fees upon a
finding of frivolousness. Massachusetts courts have not enforced the
statute,TM although they have provided a warning of their authority to
do so in the future.'3 5
129. Torix v. Allred, 100 Idaho 905, 606 P.2d 1334, 1340 (1980).
130. 585 P.2d at 1278.
131. Wood v. Jensen, - Colo. App. -, 585 P.2d 309, 310 (1978).
132. In re Marriage of Erickson, - Colo. App. .__, 602 P.2d 909, 911 (1979);
People v. Freeman, 196 Colo. 238, 583 P.2d 921, 923 (1979).
133. 585 P.2d at 310.
134. In Hosford v. Rei, - Mass. , 377 N.E.2d 427 (1978), judgment was
entered prior to the effective date of the statute. "Substantial questions of first impres-
sion" prevented the statute from being applicable in Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v.
Nousis, __ Mass. App. Ct. , 366 N.E.2d 38, 44 (1977). In Glynn v. City of
Gloucester, - Mass. , 401 N.E.2d 886, 888 n.1 (1980), the city "waived" its "ap-
peal from denial of its motion for attorney's fees and costs ... [because it had] not
briefed or argued . . ." the matter. If a party simply presents no evidence before a
master, whose findings are not final, attorney's fees cannot be assessed against the
party. Vaught Constr. Co. v. Bertonazzi Buick Co., Inc., 371 Mass. 553, 359 N.E.2d
286, 290-91 (1976).
135. Pollack v. Kelley, 372 Mass. 469, 362 N.E.2d 525, 530 (1977). "The plain-
tiff has now been delayed more than three years in obtaining a trial on his claim. The
1091Attorney's Fees. 57.105
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Recently, a Wisconsin appellate court was presented with factual
circumstances that one would imagine to be the basis of a typical frivo-
lous lawsuit.136 An individual, who drove an automobile owned by an-
other, was covered by Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance
Company.137 The driver was also covered by Sentry Insurance Com-
pany, but the Sentry policy unambiguously indicated that the individ-
ual was not covered in the particular instance.13 8 "Prudential pursued a
third-party action against Sentry after Sentry [had] provided Pruden-
tial with all the material necessary to demonstrate . . . the action was
frivolous."13 9 The trial court denied Sentry's motion for costs and rea-
sonable attorney's fees.140
In its analysis the appellate court noted the weight of the evidence
required a finding that Prudential's claim was frivolous. 141 It did not
have to find abuse of discretion on the lower court's part because "[u]se
of the word "shall" creates a presumption that the statute is
mandatory.1' 42 Therefore, Sentry's motion was well taken and the case
was remanded for a determination of the amount of reasonable attor-
ney's fees to be awarded. 43
IV. Conclusion
As individuals become more conscious of accessibility to the courts
and exercise their legal rights, the possibilities of frivolous or ground-
less lawsuits increases as does the need to provide relief to their "vic-
tims." The common law torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of
process are insufficient remedies because they require the wronged
two premature attempted appeals have produced nothing for the defendant, and the
resulting delay to the plaintiff can serve no purpose but to contribute to the loss of
confidence in the courts as the avenue for adjudication of private disputes with reasona-
ble dispatch. The continued use of such delaying tactics in the face of settled law
against the presentation of interlocutory appeals may result in sanctions against offend-
ers in appropriate cases in the future." Id.
136. Sommer v. Carr, 95 Wis. 2d 651, 291 N.W.2d 301 (1980).
137. Id. at 302.
138. Id. at 303-04 n.2.
139. Id. at 301.
140. Id. at 302.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 302 n.l.
143. Id. at 304.
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party to institute an entirely new lawsuit. The trendsetter states men-
tioned in this article, provide statutes in which "a party who is put to
the defense of a groundless lawsuit has available the remedy of a mo-
tion in the original action for an award of attorney's fees."'1 44
The American rule remains intact in Florida: "attorney's fees may
be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1)
where authorized by contract; (2) where authorized by a constitutional
legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded for services performed by
an attorney in creating or bringing into court a fund or other prop-
erty. ' 14 5 Section 57.105, falling under the second category, is yet an-
other statute under which attorney's fees can be awarded.
By not making the application of section 57.105 discretionary the
Legislature endeavored to create uniformity. The results, the assess-
ment of attorney's fees, would also serve as an admonishment to par-
ties who, but for the statute, would abuse court processes. It is obvious
that not all settlements, nor all dismissals, voluntary or otherwise, have
groundless foundations. Therefore, a well-documented hearing on the
matter will preclude a chilling effect on court accessibility.
The Florida Legislature was concerned that lawsuits were insti-
tuted to either force a settlement or gamble with court processes."4 6 A
party opposing a frivolous claim had to weigh two unpleasant alterna-
tives: to defend his position, or to accept a settlement which ultimately
might have been less costly than litigation. A party thrust into this po-
sition could only lose confidence in the courts as adjudicators of private
conflicts and feel frustrated at such injustice. In this sense section
57.105 is a remedial statute. Although section 57.105 is not a panacea
for all court system abuses, it may serve to curtail frivolous claims and
defenses.
Bertha P. Sanchez
144. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 I11. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1978).
145. Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Constr. Co., 341 So. 2d 759, 761
(Fla. 1977), citing Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1967).
146. H.B. 1062-taped debates.
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Criminal Law: "Prepare For Boarding:" Coast Guard
Authority On The High Seas. United States v.
Williams.
"Like the seas where the vessel was boarded, the problem is deep
and shark-infested. Unlike them, the answer is not clearly charted. We
voyage toward a conclusion. . . ."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently attempted to "harmonize
the discordant precedent that has evolved"1 in the circuit with regard
to high seas searches and seizures conducted by the United States
Coast Guard. The resulting en banc decision has reinforced the plenary
authority of the Coast Guard to stop vessels on the high seas which are
suspected of smuggling, or attempting to smuggle, contraband into the
United States.2 Judge Alvin B. Rubin, who concurred in the result in
* United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1255 (5th Cir. 1978) (Rubin, J.).
1. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
2. The United States Coast Guard has the authority to stop and board a vessel of
any nationality in international waters when a reasonable suspicion of a violation of
United States laws exists. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976); 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976). The
applicable provisions of the statutes are as follows:
§ 89. Law enforcement
(a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the
United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of
violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, war-
rant, and petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the
jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquir-
ies to those on board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine,
inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it appears that a
breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is
being, or has been committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if
escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other
lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a breach
of the laws of the United States has been committed so as to render such vessel,
or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United
113
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Williams, criticized the majority for misusing the case "to expound a
mini-treatise on the subject of offshore law enforcement."'3 An addi-
tional concurrence notes that Williams' conviction could have been up-
held on basic principles of international law due to Panamanian con-
sent, the country in which the seized ship was registered.4
This comment will discuss the analyses employed by the en banc
panel in light of the precedent in the Fifth Circuit which led to Wil-
liams. The discussion is divided into four areas: the jurisdictional au-
thority of the Coast Guard, the seizure and subsequent search of the
vessel, the effect of Panama's consent to the boarding, and finally, the
international legal ramifications of the decision.
States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture or so as to render such vessel liable to a
fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such fine and penalty, such vessel or
such merchandise, or both, shall be seized.
(b) The officers of the Coast Guard insofar as they are engaged, pursuant
to the authority contained in this section, in enforcing any law of the United
States shall:
(1) be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular executive depart-
ment or independent establishment charged with the administration of the
particular law; and
(2) be subject to all the rules and regulations promulgated by such de-
partment or independent establishment with respect to the enforcement of
that law.
(c) The provisions of this section are in addition to any powers conferred
by law upon such officers, and not in limitation of any powers conferred by law
upon such officers, or any other officers of the United States. Aug. 4, 1949, c.
393, § 1, 63 Stat. 502; Aug. 3, 1950, c. 536, § 1, 64 Stat. 406.
§ 1581. Boarding vessels
Customs officers
(a) Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel
or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as
he may be authorized, within a customs-enforcement area established under the
Anti-Smuggling Act, or at any other authorized place, without as well as within
his district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and ex-
amine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any
person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop
such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
3. 617 F.2d at 1094 (concurring opinion).
4. Id. at 1092.
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On January 30, 1978, the Panamanian merchant vessel "M/V
PHGH" was sighted in international waters by the United States Coast
Guard Cutter "ACUSHNET. 1 5 Commander A.C. Peck, Captain of
the ACUSHNET, identified the PHGH as one of a number of vessels
suspected of being involved in drug trafficking. As the ACUSHNET
approached the PHGH, the latter vessel hoisted a distress signal flag.
The Coast Guard then requested by radio that the PHGH state its
origin, destination, cargo and reason for flying the distress flag.8 The
5. The PHGH was spotted five days earlier by John Stevenson, a Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) pilot, who was flying a mission to look for drug trafficking
vessels. The PHGH was anchored about one and a half miles off the coast of Colombia,
with several smaller craft rendezvousing with her. Stevenson identified the vessel as the
PHGH and reported the observation to DEA Intelligence in El Paso, Texas.
Testimony at Williams' bench trial revealed that the PHGH had taken on a cargo
of sulphur in Venezuela, at which time the ship's owner, Emanual Karavias, was
aboard. The ship's captain informed crew members of plans to pick up cargo off the
coast of Colombia and deliver it somewhere in the Gulf of Mexico. The vessel pro-
ceeded to the coast of Colombia and anchored offshore, at which time several smaller
vessels came alongside the PHGH. As the loading of cargo onto the PHGH began,
defendant Williams came on board the vessel. Karavias had previously departed the
vessel in Aruba.
6. This procedure followed by the Coast Guard was best described in United
States v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 388-89 (S.D. Tex. 1979), in the district court's
findings of fact in support of denials of motions to suppress and motions to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. These facts were developed during a final pre-trial hearing from
evidence and testimony elicited from five Coast Guard officers. The relevant findings
are as follows:
When a Coast Guard vessel is on patrol and encounters another vessel, it is stan-
dard operating procedure for the patrol vessel to attempt to determine the na-
tionality of the encountered ship. Indeed, it is a common practice in the military
to identify all surface traffic in the patrol area by name, home port and national-
ity. If the vessel is not properly identified, the Coast Guard vessel will check with
the country of the flag being flown by the ship being investigated to determine if
the ship is in fact registered to that country. If the ship is flying the proper flag
and there is no indication or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, then the ship
is passed on. If, however, there is evidence of illegal activity, especially of illegal
drug activity, the information is passed along by the patrol vessel through the
chain of command to the country of the ship being investigated, and a request is
made for permission to take action as agent of that country. If the ship is not
flying the correct flag, the Coast Guard will continue an investigation to identify
115 1
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PHGH replied that she was enroute from Aruba to Mobile, Alabama,
carrying sulphur, and that no assistance was needed for what was ex-
plained as a generator problem.
The ACUSHNET maintained visual surveillance of the PHGH,
and at approximately five o'clock on the morning of February 1, 1978,
the crewmen of the PHGH appeared on deck waving clothes,
flashlights and giving hand signals.7 Later that day, a crewman on
the ship, which investigation will consist of boarding the ship to check its docu-
mentation. Under applicable international law, vessels on the high seas demon-
strate their nationality by the flag they fly and the documents issued by the coun-
try whose flag is being flown. In addition, all vessels have a beam number
permanently affixed to or marked into the main beam of the vessel. This beam
number is similar to an automobile's vehicle identification number, and is usually
kept by the flag country of the vessel. The beam number is also noted on the
vessel's documents; if no documents are available, other sources, such as Lloyds
of London, can be contacted in an attempt to identify the country to which the
vessel is registered. Under Coast Guard policy, the boarding personnel generally
should first check the pilothouse and the captain's cabin for the ship's docu-
ments; both of these places are usually located above the decks. In those situa-
tions where a ship suspected of being involved in illegal activity is flying the
proper flag, it has been the Coast Guard's experience that the country whose flag
is being flown will usually grant permission to the Coast Guard to board and
investigate the vessel. Panama, for example, has always granted its permission,
while Colombia is the only nation which has denied permission to board.
The Coast Guard maintains and periodically updates a list of vessels sus-
pected to be involved in illegal activities. This list is provided to Coast Guard
vessels on patrol.
... [Ilt is a fact that the names of vessels involved in transporting narcotics
are routinely and frequently changed. It is also a fact that vessels can legiti-
mately carry the flags of various countries, flying them as a courtesy when they
enter the ports or territorial waters of those nations. However, such flags are
usually flown from yardarms, not from the main mast.
The following factors are looked to by Coast Guard patrol vessels in deter-
mining whether an encountered vessel should be considered suspicious: improper
markings; no permanently attached name or home port; failure to fly a flag; fail-
ure to identify itself; the condition of the vessel; and unusual activities aboard the
vessel.
7. This activity, which continued for some six hours, was apparently for the pur-
pose of attracting the attention of the Coast Guard and averting the possibility that the
ACUSHNET would move on without further investigation. This point was argued by
the United States as elevating reasonable suspicion to the level of probable cause. Sup-
plemental Brief for Appellee on Rehearing En Banc at 13, United States v. Williams,
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board the PHGH dove overboard and swam to the ACUSHNET, re-
porting there was "dirty business" on board the PHGH. The merchant
vessel was anchored in the water at this time. The ACUSHNET re-
layed all this information to its headquarters in Miami.8
On February 2, 1978, Commander Peck received permission from
Panama to board the PHGH, search the ship, and, if contraband were
discovered, to take the ship and all those on board into United States
custody for criminal prosecution. 9 An armed Coast Guard party was
dispatched to the PHGH, whereupon one guardsman, checking for the
vessel's official registration number, discovered 21,680 pounds of mari-
juana in the ship's cargo hold. The PHGH was seized, her crew placed
under arrest, and then towed into Mobile, Alabama.10
Williams was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama of conspiring to import marijuana into
the United States, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 963.11 A panel of the Fifth
617 F.2d 1063 (1980).
8. Since the time of the original sighting of the PHGH, the Coast Guard was in
continual radio contact with its Seventh District Headquarters in Miami. It was
through this channel that the Coast Guard contacted the Panamanian Embassy, re-
questing permission to board the PHGH.
9. 617 F.2d at 1070. Authority to stop and board the vessel is derived from two
sources: first, under 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1976); which reads in part "if it shall appear that
a breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so as to render such
vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United
States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine
or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be seized." Second, generally
established princples of international law provide that "[ships] . . . shall be subject to
[the flag state's] exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." Convention on the High Seas,
September 30, 1962, Art. 6, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
10. Upon arrival in Mobile, Alabama, a DEA agent ascertained that documents
on board the vessel indicated that the PHGH was bound for Mobile, although the
legitimate cargo was destined for Peru. 617 F.2d at 1071. Regarding litigation concern-
ing the legitimate cargo, see Rayon y Celanese v. United States, 79 Am. Mar. Cases
2682 (S.D. Ala. 1979).
11. "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this
subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the
maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the ob-
ject of the attempt or conspiracy." 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976). The offense referred to
under § 963 is contained in § 952 as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful to import into the customs territory of the United
States from any place outside thereof (but within the United States), or to im-
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Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction,12 and Williams then
petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc.'s This en banc proceeding
gave rise to the thirty-seven page opinion affirming the district court's
holding, which, in author Judge Tjoflat's words, was meant to clear up
the "muddled case law" of the Fifth Circuit in this area.14
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The en banc majority employed a wide-ranging analysis encom-
passing all the issues relevant to the disposition of the case. It affirmed
the panel's decision,15 but disagreed with its analysis of the fourth
amendment issue.16 The panel had held that "before the government
may order a foreign vessel to stop, . . . reasonable suspicion that crimi-
nal activity (is) afloat must be shown."' 7 The panel then found that
this standard had been met.' 8
The en banc court disagreed, preferring not to rely on cases involv-
ing land-locked searches and seizures as had the panel. Consequently,
it set out upon the hazardous waters of prior Fifth Circuit decisions" in
order to clear up the "muddled state of (its) precedent" 20 in the area of
nautical search and seizure.
port into the United States from any place outside thereof, any controlled sub-
stance in schedule I or II of subchapter I of this chapter, or any narcotic drug in
schedule III, IV, or V of subchapter I of this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 952 (1976).
12. United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979).
13. Of the 26 judges sitting on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 23 took part
in the en banc decision. 617 F.2d at 1069.
14. 617 F.2d at 1072.
15. 589 F.2d at 210.
16. 617 F.2d at 1071.
17. 589 F.2d at 214.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, - U.S.
100 S. Ct. 61 (1979); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc); United States v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United
States v. One (1) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Fla. 1975), afd, 538
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir.
1976).
20. 617 F.2d at 1071.
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Before discussing the prior Fifth Circuit precedent in this area the
court discussed the application of the United States Supreme Court's
"Ramsey21 analysis." The two-part analysis employed in Ramsey "im-
plies that a warrantless seizure or search in the complete absence of
authority - a lawless governmental intrusion - is unconstitutional per
se."'22 Once statutory authority exists for the search or seizure, the
second issue pertains to the reasonableness of the search or seizure as
guided by the fourth amendment.23 In this light, the court divided its
discussion into three parts: statutory authority; a fourth amendment
analysis; and the effect of Panama's consent to the seizure and search.24
A. Statutory Authority Of The Coast Guard
The United States Coast Guard is charged with enforcing, or as-
sisting in the enforcement of, "all Federal laws on and under the high
seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."25 Two
federal statutes empower the Coast Guard to stop, search and seize a
vessel which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.26 14
U.S.C. § 89(a) is the only authority for search and seizures beyond the
territorial sea2 7 of the United States. Foreign vessels on the high seas
21. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
22. 617 F.2d at 1074.
23. Id. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
24. 617 F.2d at 1075.
25. 14 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp.- 1980). See also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10: Con-
gress shall have the power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, and offences against the law of nations ...."
26. 14 U.S.C. § 89; 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976).
27. There are basically three divisions of the waters of the seas: internal waters,
territorial seas, and high seas. The latter encompasses an area known as the contiguous
zone. The three-mile limit of the territorial sea is "that body of the seas which is in-
cluded with a definite maritime belt immediately adjacent to a state's coastline." Car-
michael, At Sea With the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 56 (1977).
Seaward of this three-mile limit is the high seas. However, for implementation of cer-
tain United States laws, there is a contiguous zone which extends nine miles from the
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have gradually drifted into the grasp of section 89 (a) through expan-
sive holdings in a long line of recent Fifth Circuit cases.2 8
In United States v. Warren, 9 Judge Tjoflat also wrote for the en
banc majority. Warren held that section 89(a) affords the Coast Guard
a plenary power to "apprehend and board any vessel of the American
flag . . . beyond the twelve-mile limit."30 Exercise of this plenary
power need not be founded on any particularized suspicion. Thus, in
Warren, the Coast Guard's stopping of an American vessel at a point
approximately seven hundred miles from the United States 1 was up-
held even though Coast Guardsmen and Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration agents boarded to "conduct a safety and documentation inspec-
tion and to look for obvious customs and narcotics violations."'32 The
majority rested its holding on the unusual facts surrounding the voyage
itself and the actions of the crewmen on board. 33
In United States v. Cadena,34 Judge Alvin B. Rubin (who concurs
from the coast.
28. See generally cases cited note 19 supra.
29. 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), rehearing denied, 586 F.2d 608
(1978) (en banc), rehearing granted, 589 F.2d 254 (1979) (en banc), 62 F.2d 887
(1980) (en banc), cert. denied, - U.S. ___, 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980).
30. Id. at 1064-65.
31. Id. at 1061.
32. Id. at 1065.
33. In the early evening of August 19, 1974, the Coast Guard cutter STEADFAST
sighted the American shrimping vessel STORMY SEAS as she sailed southward between
Haiti and Cuba, some 700 miles from the United States coast. The STEADFAST hailed
the STORMY SEAS and told her to prepare for boarding. A party of three Coast Guard
officers, an agent of the DEA and a Customs Service Agent proceeded to board and
found nothing on the ship's papers indicating travel to a foreign port. During subse-
quent questioning and a cursory search, it was discovered that on board there were
three pistols and a small amount of marijuana, which aroused the suspicion of the
Coast Guard officers. Further questioning led the defendants to producing envelopes
containing $7,000 in cash. The defendants were then advised of their Miranda rights
and that they may have violated United States currency laws. Subsequently, the of-
ficers found envelopes and a briefcase containing a total of $41,500 in cash and 46,800
Colombian pesos. The defendants were again given Miranda warnings and arrested.
34. 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing denied, 588 F.2d 100 (1979). This
case involved a Coast Guard boarding of a vessel of unknown nationality on the high
seas. The Coast Guard cutter hailed the freighter, which was sailing approximately 200
miles off the Florida coast. The freighter ignored the Coast Guard and continued to sail
away. Only after machine gun fire and a cannon volley did the freighter stop and per-
1 120 Nova Law Journal 5:19801
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in the result in Williams) wrote for a Fifth Circuit panel. The court in
Cadena held "the Coast Guard is empowered to search and seize any
vessel on the high seas that is subject to the jurisdiction or operation of
any law of the United States."35 Additionally, section 89(a) is not lim-
ited on its face to domestic vessels or domestic waters.36 In Cadena, the
panel struggled with the notion of jurisdiction over the crime as op-
posed to jurisdiction over the vessel.37 Indeed, no United States statute
expressly asserts "jurisdiction" over a foreign vessel on the high seas.38
In this restrictive light, the panel in Cadena was able to narrow the
analysis down to the fact that ". . . authority of the Coast Guard to
act upon the high seas must depend upon whether a vessel sailing there
is 'subject to . . . the operation of any law of the United States.' -9
The court then found that Congress intended the domestic conspiracy
statute" to apply extraterritorially, and therefore held that a conspir-
acy to violate a federal narcotics statute is an offense which is subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.41
United States v. Postal"2 also involved Coast Guard seizure of a
foreign vessel on the high seas. 4' The panel in Postal relied on Warren
mit boarding by the Coast Guard. The boarding party found plastic and burlap sacks
in the holds containing 54 tons of marijuana. Appellants were indicted and convicted
on charges of conspiring to import and conspiring to distribute marijuana in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 846, respectively. Appellants challenged the conviction on the
legality of the search and seizure, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, finding the attempted flight an exigent circumstance, which, coupled with
probable cause, justified the warrantless search.
35. Id. at 1256, 1257 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 1257.
37. Id. at 1257-58.
38. Id. at 1259. See generally Carmichael, supra note 27. See also 18 U.S.C. § 7
(1976) (Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the U.S.); and 19 U.S.C. §
1701 (1976) (Customs Enforcement Areas Declarable by the President).
39. 585 F.2d at 1259.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976). See also United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975
(5th Cir. 1975).
41. 585 F.2d at 1259.
42. 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
43. Judge Tjoflat, writing for the Fifth Circuit accurately described the facts as
"bizarre." The Coast Guard cutter CAPE YORK first sighted the defendant's vessel, LA
ROSA, a 51-foot sailboat, approximately 8.5 miles off the Florida Keys. Because the LA
ROSA displayed neither flag nor home port on the stern, the CAPE YORK approached to
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and Cadena to hold that the Coast Guard had the proper authority for
boarding a foreign vessel on the high seas. Postal can be distinguished
in that it involved a breach of the High Seas Convention 44 which re-
sulted from a search and seizure on the high seas. The panel held that
the applicable provision of the High Seas Convention was not self-exe-
cuting. 5 When the United States ratified the treaty, it was not incorpo-
rated into the domestic law of the United States . Through such an
analysis, the court was able to hold that a "mere violation" of interna-
tional law would not supply a defense to the court's jurisdiction.4
The Coast Guard continues to be afforded a plenary power
through section 89(a) in its continuing battle against illicit drug traf-
ficking on the high seas.48 Recent cases in the Fifth Circuit have reaf-
firmed this statutory authority of the Coast Guard.4
determine the vessel's nationality, origin and destination. Two of the defendants dis-
played a flag of the Grand Cayman Islands, while defendant Postal responded that the
crew was Australian. After contacting Coast Guard operations in Miami, the CAPE
YORK decided to board the LA ROSA. Defendant Postal resisted the boarding, but
finally agreed to allow one officer to board. Soon after the officer boarded, defendant
Postal asked, "Can you be bought?" Id. at 866. The officer assured Postal that he
could not, and, after a quick search, the officer left the boat. A second boarding took
place approximately two and one-half hours later, during which time the LA ROSA had
dramatically changed course. Upon boarding the second time, the defendants were read
their Miranda warnings, and, after a brief conversation, defendant Postal asked, "Oh,
does that mean you want to see the pot?" Id. at 867. One of the Coast Guard officers
then found numerous bales of what appeared to be marijuana. The defendants were
then arrested. One of the defendants then offered a Coast Guardsman a drink, pro-
claiming, "We're celebrating, first time we've been busted." Id. at 868.
44. Convention on the High Seas, September 30, 1962, Art. 6, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
45. Treaties may be considered self-executing so as to take effect without legisla-
tive implementation when their terms clearly convey such an intention and provide
sufficient detailed standards for executive/administrative application. Foster v. Neilsen,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
46. Cf The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (incorporation of customary
rules of international law.)
47. 589 F.2d at 884.
48. See generally High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment,
and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARV. L. REv. 725, 735 (1980).
49. See United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1980); and United
States v. D'Antigniac, No. 79-5007 (5th Cir. filed Aug. 15, 1980).
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B. Constitutional Requirements Of Search And Seizure On
The High Seas
The majority in Williams relies on the holding of United States v.
Cadena and accepts the premise that the protection of the fourth
amendment extends to foreign vessels on the high seas.50 Prior to the
first panel decision in Williams,51 the Fifth Circuit had not attempted
to define the minimum requirements of the fourth amendment in a sec-
tion 89(a) context. The first panel held that "before the government
may order a foreign vessel to stop, . . . reasonable suspicion that crimi-
nal activity (is) afloat must be shown.1 52 The en banc majority dis-
agreed with the panel in its use of such "extremely broad" language
with regard to a fourth amendment standard applied to a nautical
search and seizure. 53 The adoption of such a standard implied to the en
banc majority that the panel was of the opinion that "Section 1581 and
other sources of authority. . . providing for the seizure of vessels with-
out suspicion of criminal activity are unconstitutional."'5 In light of
such a contrary holding to past Fifth Circuit precedent, 55 the panel
found it necessary to discuss the constitutional limitations on the initial
seizure of the PHGH.5 6
1. THE SEIZURE 57
"There is by act of God, nature, the Congress, and the activities of
50. 589 F.2d at 214. "The applicability of the fourth amendment is not limited
to domestic vessels or to our citizens; once we subject foreign vessels or aliens to crimi-
nal prosecution, they are entitled to the equal protection of all our laws, including the
Fourth Amendment." 585 F.2d at 1262.
51. 589 F.2d at 210.
52. Id. at 214.
53. 617 F.2d at 1078.
54. Id. at 1079. The majority panel has been criticized for its references to sec-
tion 1581, which clearly does not apply to vessels on the high seas. 617 F.2d 1063,
1094 (concurring opinion).
55. See generally cases cited note 19 supra.
56. 617 F.2d at 1079.
57. "The Coast Guard plainly "seized" the PHGH within the meaning of the
fourth dmendment when they stopped and boarded the vessel. Even the mere stopping
of a vessel, without a boarding, is a fourth amendment "seizure" since the governmen-
tal action restrains the vessel's freedom to proceed." Id. at 1071 n.l. Seizure through-
123 11 5:1980
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man a great difference between the landlocked vehicle and the nautical
vessel .... -58The decisions of the Fifth Circuit should be included in
the above quote for their seemingly Reverian "one if by land; two if by
sea" application of the fourth amendment.5 9
Ever since this nation's first customs statute in 1789,60 the "reve-
nue cutters" (which have evolved statutorily into the modern day
United States Coast Guard Cutters) have been empowered to seize
American vessels on the high seas.61 This 1789 custom statute's provi-
sion for the search and seizure of vessels has been suggested by the
Supreme Court as being "plenary" and "reasonable. '62 In this light,
the Williams panel reiterates the Ramsey court's belief that "the first
Congress thought that the fourth amendment permitted the stopping
and searching of vessels in the absence of any suspicion of criminal
activity." 63
The Fifth Circuit reconfirmed the notion that "the fourth amend-
ment does not necessarily require any sort of suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity before a vessel may be stopped at sea . . . ."" In Williams, the
court holds that "the Coast Guard's seizure of the PHGH easily satis-
fied the fourth amendment's requirement of 'reasonableness.' "65 The
panel arrived at a "reasonableness" standard for the seizure of vessels
at sea through analogy to similar standards of international law.
A doctrine of international maritime law - the right of ap-
proach 6 - allows for visitation on the high seas. This visitation is a
out refer(s) to the stopping or the "stopping ... and boarding of nautical vessels
rather than to the expropriation of contraband or evidentiary material." Id.
58. United States v. Ingham, 502 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 911 (1975).
59. 617 F.2d at 1095.
60. Section 24 of the Act [of July 31, 1789] granted Customs officials "full
power and authority" to enter and search "any ship or vessel, in which they have rea-
son to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed
...." Id. at 1079 citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977). Act
of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29.
61. 617 F.2d at 1079. See also Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927).
62. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).
63. 617 F.2d at 1079. See note 23 supra for the text of the fourth amendment.
64. 617 F.2d at 1082.
65. Id. at 1084.
66. Id. at 1076, construing the Convention on the High Seas, September 30,
124
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss1/1
5:1980 Prepare for Boarding 125
verification right which is granted to warships67 when there is reasona-
ble ground for suspecting that a ship is engaged in piracy, engaged in
the slave trade, or of the same nationality as the warship."8 In United
States v. Cortes, 9 a Fifth Circuit panel found a boarding by the Coast
Guard reasonable for fourth amendment purposes. This right of ap-
proach was found constitutionally reasonable because
Under a well-established rule of international law, known as the Right of
Approach, the cutter had the authority to sail up to the unidentified ves-
sel to ascertain her nationality. . . . [The Coast Guard] had justifiable
suspicion that the [seized vessel] was attempting to conceal its identity
and activities. Under these circumstances, the boarding of the vessel to
search for registration papers or other identification was not unreasona-
ble for Fourth Amendment purposes.70
Thus, the en banc Williams court viewed section 89(a)'s provision per-
mitting seizure of a foreign vessel in international waters as "at least as
reasonable as the provision for seizures of vessels set out in. . . article
22 [of the High Seas Convention] ."7 This analogy is reinforced in the
court's opinion by reference to other treaties entered into by the United
States7 l2 which have permitted restricted intrusions into vessels on the
high seas.
The majority has therefore relied on standards espoused at inter-
national law to attach the reasonableness standard to seizures at sea. In
this light, what has been considered reasonable on land does not auto-
matically control what is reasonable on the high seas.73
1962, Art. 22(2), 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
67. A Coast Guard cutter is a warship under international law. See Carmichael,
supra note 27, at 52 n.6.
68. 617 F.2d at 1076.
69. 588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979). In this case, the Coast Guard had justifiable
suspicion that the vessel was attempting to conceal its identity and activities. The Coast
Guard used the "right of approach" doctrine as authority for boarding.
70. 617 F.2d at 1082.
71. Id. at 1084.
72. See, e.g., Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Li-
quors, January 23, 1924, United States-Great Britain, art. II(1), 43 Stat. 1761, cited
with approval in Williams, 617 F.2d at 1083-84.
73. 617 F.2d at 1084.
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2. THE SEARCH
In its discussion of the Coast Guards's statutory authority, the ma-
jority found that "Section 89(a) provided for searches of vessels in the
complete absence of suspicion that contraband or evidence of criminal
conduct will be found in the particular place to be searched . The
search of the PHGH, based upon all the facts in the case, was clearly
authorized. The next issue became whether any fourth amendment
rights of Williams may have been violated by the authorized search.
Once again, analogy to the international requirements of a search
under Article 22 of the High Seas Convention was employed. "[If] any
suspicion remains after the vessel's documents have been examined,' '75
the permissible procedure is to send a boarding party to examine the
vessel's main beam identification number. 0 While in the process of lo-
cating this number, the Fifth Circuit holds that "no one, not even a
person with a proprietary interest in the vessel and in the cargo, could
conceivably have any legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to
any objects that would be in the plain view (or smell) of a person con-
ducting such an identification check.177
In United States v. Freeman,78 the panel recognized that "the na-
tional frontiers of oceans are much more difficult to police than the
territorial boundaries of the land."' 79 Through dicta from Church v.
Hubbard,80 the notion of a less restrictive standard governing searches
on the high seas arose. Chief Justice Marshall noted that a nation has
the right to prohibit certain commerce. Thus, "any attempt to violate
the laws made to protect this right, is an injury to itself, which it may
prevent, and it has a right to use the means necessary for its preven-
tion. These means do not appear to be limited within any certain
marked boundaries. ... 1
The court did not find probable cause or the warrant requirement
74. Id. at 1085.
75. Id. at 1086.
76. Id. See discussion in note 6 supra.
77. 617 F.2d at 1086.
78. 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 946.
80. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
81. Id. at 235.
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characteristic of land-locked searches to be applicable on the high seas.
This conclusion was based upon the court's observations that: (1) the
frontiers of the oceans are more difficult to police than the territorial
boundaries of the land; (2) any expectation of privacy on the seas is
limited by extensive federal and international regulation .of shipping
and boating; (3) drug smuggling is a massive problem; (4) practical
problems exist if the Coast Guard were required to obtain warrants in
order to conduct a search on the high seas; and (5) the Congress that
enacted the first customs statute and proposed the fourth amendment
for ratification did not intend the fourth amendment requirement to be
applicable on the seas. 82
In this light,83 the Williams court concludes that "reasonable sus-
picion is the appropriate fourth amendment standard by which to judge
section 89(a) searches of the 'private' areas . . . of the holds of vessels
in international waters ... ."" In order to search public or plain view
areas of a vessel upon a section 89(a) boarding, however, the appropri-
ate standard is the reasonableness of the stop. 5 There is no require-
ment of suspicion that any particular evidence of contraband will be
found.
C. The Effect Of Panama's Consent
The court noted that the major ramification of a nation's violation
of international law is political.8 6 In this light, if an aggrieved nation
wishes to assert its rights under a treaty it may ask the government to
dismiss the charges.8 7
82. 617 F.2d at 1087-88.
83. It is apparent that public policy concern has been an overriding consideration
throughout the court's opinion. This is reflected in opening dicta stating that "the am-
biguity and inconsistency of the case law in this circuit has substantially impeded the
counter-smuggling activities of the Coast Guard and the Customs Service." Id. at
1072.
84. Id. at 1088 (emphasis supplied).
85. Id. at 1089. This type of "search," authorized by section 89(a), is limited to
administrative searches.
86. Id. at 1089, citing Church v. Hubbard, 6 U.S. at 239.
87. As Chief Justice Marshall intimated in 1804, the major ramification of a
nation's violation of international law is political: "If [a nation's actions in enforcing its
laws] are such as unnecessarily to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign
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The majority concluded that the consent of Panama to the board-
ing, search and seizure of the PHGH constituted a waiver by Panama
to assert its rights on behalf of its nationals. This is clearly correct
under the analyses of Postal and Cadena8 8 It is clear that although
"the sea is the common highway of all, and that no nation or ship has a
universal right to stop and search other vessels on the high seas," 9
Williams has effectively held that a nation may stop and board ships
on the high seas that it has cause to believe may be engaged in prepa-
ration for the commission of a crime within that nation's jurisdiction.
Such an exercise of jurisdiction is founded upon international law
which gives a nation the right to assert jurisdiction over crimes which
have an effect inside its territory regardless of where that crime
occurs.90
CONCLUSION
It is quite evident there is a major problem of increased drug
smuggling into the area which comprises the Fifth Circuit.9 1 Addition-
ally, there has been great public outcry for the government to put a
strangle hold on this trafficking. The Williams court has echoed the
need for the continued success of the counter-smuggling activities of
the Coast Guard and Customs Service. However, this great public need
does not negate the constitutional safeguards which characteristically
attend our nation's law enforcement activities. Perhaps the Fifth Cir-
cuit, through Williams, is applying an overreaching and unlimited in-
secure their laws from violation, they will be submitted to." 6 U.S. at 234.
88. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearing denied,
588 F.2d 100 (1979); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, - U.S. __ 100 S. Ct. 61 (1979).
89. Rayon y Celanese v. United States, 79 Am. Mar. Cases 2682, 2685 (S.D.
Ala. 1979), citing The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (1 Wheat) 1 (1826).
90. See Strasheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
91. The states comprising the Fifth Circuit have a coastline of 2,211 miles, or
approximately seven percent of the coastline of the North American continent. As a
result of the geographical susceptibility, the United States Coast Guard seized 2.15
million pounds of marijuana in 1978, which is estimated to be only 10-15% of the total
flow into the United States. May May, 470 F. Supp. at 384. U. S. DEP'T COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1979, at
207, Table 341.
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terpretation of the statute.
Section 89(a) appears, in its present application by the United
States Coast Guard, to be in direct conflict with the High Seas Con-
vention. 2 Exercise of jurisdiction over a vessel on the high seas is a
right expressly reserved in the nation under whose laws that vessel is
registered.93 Indeed such an unrestricted exercise of statutory authority
may inevitably force the United States into a significant international
incident.
The current session of Congress has reiterated its concern over in-
creased drug smuggling into the United States. 4 With laws such as
section 89(a) and the newest proposals by Congress, the United States
appears to be exercising its jurisdiction over a frontier traditionally
viewed as neutral and open to all the nations of the world.
Douglas M. McIntosh
James C. Sawran*
92. Convention on the High Seas, September 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200.
93. Id. arts. 5 & 6.
94. H.R. 2538, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), Pub. L. No. 96-350, 3 Nat'l L.J. 3,
25 (October 20, 1980) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 955 (a)). The language found in
the new law applicable to smuggling contraband into the United States is as follows:
"(d) It is unlawful for any person to possess, manufacture, or distribute, a controlled
substance -
(1) intending that it be unlawfully imported into the United States; or
(2) knowing that it will be unlawfully imported into the United States."
* The authors would like to express their gratitude to Professor Jon Sale, Nova
University Center For The Study of Law, and to the United States Coast Guard, Sev-
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Criminal Law: Exclusionary Rule
United States v. Williams
The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule recently received
explicit impetus from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Meeting en
banc,' a thirteen judge majority held in United States v. Williams2 that
evidence discovered by police officers acting in the reasonable good
faith that their action was authorized, should not be suppressed merely
because this reliance later proved to be unjustified. In coming to this
conclusion, the court looked to the purpose of the rule, its success at
achieving that purpose, and its effect on the field of criminal justice.
Based on these factors, and acknowledging the current contraction of
the exclusionary rule, the Fifth Circuit became the first federal appel-
late court to recognize such an exception.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The origin of what has become known as the "exclusionary rule"
is rooted in the fourth amendment.3 However, the modern effect of the
rule was first promulgated 110 years after the ratification of the
amendment. Until that time, the area had been a largely "unexplored
territory.' 5 Then, in 1914, the Supreme Court held that evidence
1. The case was reheard en bane on the court's own motion. The panel decision is
reported as United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 98 (5th Cir. 1979).
2. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), adopted the exclusionary rule
while disallowing evidence which the defendant was compelled to produce in violation
of the fifth amendment. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49-61 (1966).
5. LANDYNSKI, supra note 4, at 49.
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wrongfully seized by federal officials was not to be admitted in criminal
or civil trials.' In keeping with the view that the fourth amendment was
not applicable against the states, this decision was only binding on fed-
eral officials. This concept was affirmed in 19497 subject to subsequent
limitations." The exclusionary rule was enforced in state courts and
against state officials in 1961 when the Court, through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, handed down the landmark deci-
sion of Mapp v. Ohio.9
THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE
Three underlying purposes have emerged as a logical rationale for
the exclusionary rule. The initial purpose was to protect the privacy of
individuals against illegal searches and seizures. However:
[T]he Supreme Court later downgraded the protection of privacy ratio-
nale, perhaps because of the obvious defect that the rule purports to do
nothing to recompense innocent victims of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions, and the gnawing doubt as to just what right of privacy guilty indi-
viduals have in illegal firearms, contraband narcotics and policy betting
slips - the frequent objects of search and seizure. 10
As this rationale fell in disfavor, proponents of the rule turned to a
different analysis. In time, a second reasoning developed. It was be-
lieved that using illegally obtained evidence brought the court system
into disrepute and allowed the judicial system to become tainted by
working in partnership with lawbreakers (police who obtain evidence
illegally)."" This thought was succinctly stated by Justice Brandeis
6. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Supreme Court excluded
evidence that was obtained in a manner which shocked the conscience. But see Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OB-
TAINED EVIDENCE 47-50 (1977), cited in Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Sup-
press Evidence, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 220 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
11. This rationale was summarily treated by Justice Brennan in his dissent in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357-58 (1971).
1 132 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
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when he wrote that "government officials shall be subjected to the same
rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. . . . If the govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. '1 2
The modern rationale for this rule, however, is to deter the police
officer from violating the fourth amendment in the first place. "The
principle and almost sole theory today is that excluding the evidence
will punish the police officers who made the illegal search and seizure
or otherwise violated the constitutional rights of the defendant, and
thus deter policemen from committing the same violation again." 13
Those advocating a contraction of the rule point out the illogic behind
such a purpose.14 Thus, it is here that the battle lines are drawn.
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS. DAWN OF THE GOOD
FAITH EXCEPTION
In 1976, Jo Anne Williams was arrested in Ohio by DEA Special
Agent Paul Markonni for possession of narcotics. She pleaded guilty
and was released on bond pending her appeal. As a condition of her
bond, she was restricted in travel to the State of Ohio.
On September 28, 1977, Special Agent Markonni was on duty at
the Atlanta International Airport. He observed Williams deplane from
a flight arriving from Los Angeles. 5
Markonni, aware of her travel restrictions, arrested her for violat-
ing those restrictions (i.e., bail jumping). Upon this arrest, Williams'
person was searched and a packet of an opiate was discovered.
Markonni subsequently obtained a warrant to search Williams' luggage
and a large quantity of heroin was discovered.
At trial, Williams made a timely motion to suppress all evidence
12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
13. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 220. See Justice Powell's majority opinion at 414
U.S. at 347. But see Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 338, 416 (1971).
14. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 214.
15. Agent Markonni was present at this particular location as part of the DEA's
Drug Courier Interdiction Program. Flights arriving from Los Angeles were monitored
because the city had been identified as a source of illegal drugs carried by couriers. 594
F.2d at 88 n.5.
1331
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seized by government authorities. The magistrate denied this motion.
The circuit court disagreed and suppressed the evidence. 16 According to
the court's interpretation, Special Agent Markonni did not have the
authority to arrest Williams.17 This conclusion was reached despite the
fact that Markonni had a good faith belief that his actions were
proper.18 The court reasoned that this decision would serve as a deter-
rent to other police activity involving bail jumping.19
Because of the strong dichotomy of feelings on this issue, a major-
16. Id. at 91. The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976) is violated only
for "the willful failure to appear before any court or judicial officer as required. (em-
phasis in original). The mere violation of a bond condition, other than a failure to
appear as ordered, is not a criminal offense within the meaning of section 3150." (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis supplied).
17. Id. at 92. The court declared that 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1970) empowered
only a court to punish disobedience or contempt of its order by fine or imprisonment,
and that 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970) initiates only judicial authority and empowers a
court, not a DEA agent, to determine whether punitive action is warranted. Id. The
following relevant portions were cited by the court: 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) provides:
"A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at
its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other as ... (emphasis in origi-
nal). (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command." Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 provides:
(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by
death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pend-
ing trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured
appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer
determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasona-
bly assure the appearance of the person as required. When such a determination
is made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above
methods or relief, impose the first of the following conditions of release which
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no single con-
dition gives that assurance, any combination of the following conditions; ...
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the
person during the period of release . ...
(c) A judicial officer authorizing the release of a person under this section shall
issue an appropriate order containing a statement of the conditions imposed, if
any, shall inform such person of the penalties applicable to violations of the con-
ditions of his release and shall advise him that a warrant for his arrest will be
issued immediately upon any such violation.
18. 622 F.2d at 846. But see United States v. Avery, 447 F.2d 978 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972), cited at 594 F.2d at 93.
19. 594 F.2d at 96 n. 18.
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ity of the judges in active service granted their own motion to rehear
the case en bane on briefs and without oral argument.
The en banc court reversed with alternative holdings. Although all
felt the arrest was valid, ten of the twenty-four judges avoided the ex-
clusionary rule question by concluding that the search and seizure were
proper,20 and went no further. However, the majority (13) felt that evi-
dence should not be suppressed "under the exclusionary rule where it is
discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good
faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken belief, that they are au-
thorized."21 Special Agent Markonni, the court felt, had met this
standard.
In coming to this decision, the court relied on the deterrence prin-
ciple in concluding that "the exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or
flagrant actions by police, not reasonable good faith ones. Where the
reason for the rule ceases, its application must cease also."122 The court
restricted the exclusionary rule "to conform. . . to its underlying pur-
pose: to deter unreasonable or bad faith police conduct."23 This court
thus became the first to explicitly articulate a "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule.
TREND OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
Almost from the beginning, legal scholars were aware that the rule
had its shortcomings. Justice Cardozo criticized the rule pointing out
that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable had blundered
... A room is searched against the law, and the body of a man is
found. . . . The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the mur-
derer goes free." 2'
In practice, the rule produced a misguided result; protecting the
20. In Judge Politz's special concurring opinion, the ten judges felt that Williams
had willfully breached a court order by violating a condition of her release. Such viola-
tion, they reasoned, constituted criminal contempt of court, which is considered a
crime.
21. 622 F.2d at 840.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 847.
24. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926),
cited in Wilkey, supra note 10, at 221.
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guilty rather than the innocent. This sentiment was expressed by Judge
Wilkey who stated:
[A] policy of excluding incriminating evidence can never protect an in-
nocent victim of an illegal search against whom no incriminating evi-
dence is discovered. The only persons protected by the rule are the guilty
against whom the most serious reliable evidence should be offered. It
cannot be separately argued that the innocent person is protected in the
future by excluding evidence against the criminal now. 25
In view of similar feelings that the exclusionary rule was too indis-
criminatory in effect, 26 a retreat from the rule began to develop. This
retreat also reflected the thoughts of those who felt that the deterrent
rationale was no longer a plausible reason for the continued enforce-
ment of the rule. Justice White spoke of this lack of deterrent effect:
When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good
faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is
later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent effect. The officers, if
they do their duty, will act in a similar fashion in similar circumstances
in the future .... 2s
The position of those who support the good faith exception is
based on the belief that:
[T]he exclusionary rule excludes reliable, probative evidence from the
judicial fact-finding process, and thus hampers the determination of the
truth. Because exclusion is not a constitutional right, it can and should
be employed only where its underlying rationales are served. In cases
involving good faith violations, neither deterrence nor the imperative of
judicial integrity is positively affected by exclusion. Therefore, a good
faith exception should apply to all cases involving good faith mistakes or
technical violations. 29
25. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 223 (emphasis in original).
26. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
27. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L.
REv. 736, 740 (1972).
28. 428 US. at 540 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
29. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonableness" Ex-
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In light of this criticism of the exclusionary rule, the United States
Supreme Court began to respond. However, strong dissents indicated
how widely the court was divided on this issue.30 This led to a situation
where, in the view of the rule's opponents, progress was very slow.
The first step was the recognition that the exclusionary rule was
not a requirement of the Constitution, but rather "a judge-made rule
drafted to enforce constitutional requirements."3 1 This vital realization
which is sometimes overlooked caused one writer to respond that:
The mystique and misunderstanding of the rule causes not only many
citizens but also judges and lawyers to feel (not think) that the exclu-
sionary rule was enshrined in the Constitution by the Founding Fathers,
and that to abolish it would do violence to the whole sacred Bill of
Rights. They appear totally unaware that the rule was not employed in
the U.S. during the first 125 years of the Fourth Amendment, that it was
devised by the judiciary in the assumed absence of any other method of
controlling the police, and that no other country in the civilized world
has adopted such a rule.3"
The next step in the slow process of inhibiting the application of
the rule occurred in 1971 when Chief Justice Burger wrote in a dissent-
ing opinion that inadvertent or honest mistakes by the police should not
be treated the same as "deliberate or flagrant" violations of the fourth
amendment.33
Several similar dissents followed in which flagrantly abusive viola-
tions were distinguished from technical and good faith violations."
During this period, the Supreme Court was limiting the extent of the
exclusionary rule.3 5 These cases afforded the Fifth Circuit some
ception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 635, 654 (1978).
30. See notes 33 and 34 infra.
31. 622 F.2d at 841. E.g., 428 U.S. at 482; 414 U.S. at 348.
32. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 217 (footnote omitted). See 367 U.S. at 661-62
(Black, J., concurring); 428 U.S. at 482 (1976). Cf., 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
33. 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
34. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in
part), 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). See also A MODEL PENAL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § SS 290.2 (Official Draft, 1975), which states that
the evidence shall be excluded only if the violation is substantial.
35. In 441 U.S. 338 (1974), the Court held that a witness summoned to appear
5:1980 137 1-Exclusionary Rule
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analagous support. Acknowledging these criticisms, as well as the in-
creasingly strong Supreme Court support, the court explicitly recog-
nized the "good faith" exception as the law in their jurisdiction.
PARAMETERS OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
In handing down this exception, the court recognized that there
are two types of "good faith" exceptions, technical violations and good
faith mistakes, both of which occurred in this case.
A technical violation of the fourth amendment occurs where an
officer acts in reliance upon a statute which is later declared unconsti-
tutional, a warrant which is reflected as insufficient, or an interpreta-
tion of the law which is subsequently overruled.36 The officer's belief
must be both bona fide and reasonable.3 7 Since arrests made in good
faith reliance on a statute not yet declared unconstitutional are consid-
ered valid in the Fifth Circuit,3 8 evidence of other crimes obtained as a
result of searches and seizures made incidental to those arrests is ad-
missable.39 Thus, even though title 18, section 3146 of the United
States code was reconstrued by the panel, the court, en banc, felt that
the officer's reliance was in reasonable good faith and that the evidence
should not be excluded.40 He had acted under a reasonable belief "and
and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that
they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. Similarly, in
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court admitted evidence obtained as a
result of statements taken in complete good faith but without the proper Miranda
rights. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), held that the exclusionary rule
should not exclude evidence in the civil proceeding of one sovereign which was illegally
seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign. Michigan v. DeFil-
lippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), held arrests made in "good faith" reliance that an ordinance
is constitutional will not be invalidated if the ordinance is later declared unconstitu-
tional. Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1980), wherein the Court excluded evidence
as a violation of the fourth amendment because there was no probable cause.
36. Ball, supra note 29, at 641 n.69.
37. See, e.g., 443 U.S. at 38 (1979). See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531 (1975); United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 848 (1976).
38. Hamrick v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kil-
gen, 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. 465 F.2d 940; 445 F.2d 287.
40. 622 F.2d at 846.
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should not be charged with knowledge that a future panel decision
would construe § 3146 to apply only to bond jumping that involved
missing a court appearance."41
A good faith mistake occurs from an officer's reasonable but mis-
taken judgment as to probable cause. In Williams, the court held that
Special Agent Markonni acted under a reasonable, though mistaken,
belief as to the probable cause under which he arrested Williams, be-
cause he made a "reasonable factual error about an element of the
crime.' ', 2 The court acknowledged that his good faith and reasonable-
ness were not questioned here.
However, the underlying mandate of the Williams decision is
clear. Henceforth, in the Fifth Circuit:
[W]hen evidence is sought to be excluded because of police conduct
leading to its discovery, it will be open to the proponent of the evidence
to urge that the conduct in question, if mistaken or unauthorized, was
yet taken in a reasonable good faith belief that it was proper. If the
court so finds, it shall not apply the exclusionary rule to the evidence
... .We therefore. .. [go] no further than to delineate the "excep-
tion" itself explicitly and to recognize that where the proponent estab-
lishes it, [reasonable good faith] the evidence should be received if other-
wise admissible.4 3
But the court emphasized that this exception will not reward defi-
cient understandings of the law. On the contrary, the court held that
the arresting officer's belief:
[I]n addition to being held in subjective good faith, must be grounded in
an objective reasonableness. It must therefore be based upon articulate
premises sufficient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained officer
to believe that he was acting lawfully. Thus, a series of broadcast
breakins and searches carried out by a constable - no matter how pure




43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 841 n.4a.
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The Williams court was attempting to draw a fine line in deciding
when evidence should be excluded. Keeping the rule's deterrent inten-
tions in mind, the court is seeking to reward the efforts of officers who
have acted in reasonable good faith, while punishing the ignorance of
officers whose good faith fails to measure up to the objective standards
for the profession. The court thus puts a premium on a quality educa-
tion for field officers so that they will rigidly adhere to the fourth
amendment's confines. On those occasions when a mistake occurs, the
fruits of arrests based upon reasonable good-faith reliance as to proba-
ble cause will not be excluded. In this manner, the court can both deter
bad policework and admit evidence which was obtained legally.
CONCLUSION
In coming to this decision, the court has taken a bold stand on a
controversial issue. Because of the disparity of views concerning
whether to limit the extent of the rule, this issue will come up again.
Four current members of. the Supreme Court are in favor of the limita-
tion espoused in this case.45 Whether this doctrine becomes the law of
the land remains to be seen.
This dichotomy was illustrated in the manner in which the court
arrived at the decision. Because all agreed that the original arrest was
valid, ten of the twenty-four felt that the good-faith exception need not
have been addressed.4' This diversity could immunize this case from
Supreme Court review.4v
Although this doctrine is now the law in this circuit, and in view of
the Fifth Circuit splitting, its precedential value will be problematical
until the Supreme Court rules affirmatively on this issue.
Joseph R. Dawson
45. See notes 33-35, supra. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, White, and
Rehnquist have gone on record in support of the good-faith exception.
46. 622 F.2d 848 (Rubin, J., specially concurring).
47. Id. at 851.
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Criminal Law: Drug Courier Profiles, United States v.
Mendenhall
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Mendenhall' is notable not for what the Court did decide, but for what
the Court could not decide. The case's central issue, the constitutional-
ity of the use of "drug courier profiles" by narcotics agents in airports
to stop and search persons suspected of drug trafficking, was left un-
resolved by a splintered court.
The case reached the Court pursuant to a motion to suppress her-
oin allegedly acquired through an unconstitutional search and seizure 2
by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari "to consider whether any right of the respon-
dent guaranteed by the [f]ourth [a]mendmet was violated." 3
In resolving the issues presented in Mendenhall,' the Supreme
Court reviewed the use by DEA agents of the "drug courier profile,"
which is an "informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought
typical of persons carrying illicit drugs. ' 5 According to the DEA, the
following conduct is exhibited consistently by drug couriers, and indi-
cates that criminal activity is afoot. A person is suspicious when he:
(1) arrives on a flight from a source city,8
(2) is the last passenger to deplane,
(3) is very nervous,
(4) scans the whole terminal,
(5) carries or picks up no baggage,
1. - U.S. ., 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
2. Id. at 1873.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1873 n.l. The "drug courier profile" has also been
described as a "check list of recurrent characteristics." United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d
320, 326 (2d Cir. 1978).
6. The place of origin for controlled substances brought into the airport in which
the DEA agents are stationed. - U.S. at .. , 100 S. Ct. at 1873; United States v. Price,
599 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1979).
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(6) changes airlines for a flight out of the airport,
(7) uses currency in small denominations for ticket purchases,
(8) remains in the drug import centers, (or the source city) for
only a short stopover, and
(9) uses one or more alias.7
Once a DEA agent detects a suspicious person fitting this drug
courier profile, the agent approaches the suspect, identifies himself, and
asks to see the suspect's identification and ticket. It is this initial stop
and questioning which raises the issue of whether any of the suspect's
fourth amendment rights have been violated.
The Supreme Court upheld the lawfulness of the initial stop and
questioning of Ms. Mendenhall based upon the "drug courier profile.",
The majority further found that the subsequent search and seizure of
Ms. Mendenhall was lawful and not violative of any constitutionally
protected rights because she had voluntarily accompanied the DEA
agents to their airport office, and had voluntarily consented and submit-
ted to a strip search revealing the heroin.9
ISSUES PRESENTED
The majority's opinion, however, did not set forth concise guide-
7. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1873 n.1. United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d
1338 (2d Cir. 1979). United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979). United
States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978). United States v. McCaleb, 512 F.2d
717 (6th Cir. 1977). It is interesting to note that many of the characteristics of the
"drug courier profile" often used to justify an initial encounter or investigatory stop
and comprise part of the "reasonable suspicion" cannot be ascertained until after the
individual is approached and questioned. For example, the conduct of (1) using one or
more alias, (2) remaining in the drug import centers or source cities for only a short
stopover and (3) traveling under an unusual itinerary, can be ascertained only after
stopping the suspect and asking for his ticket and identification. In such situations,
these characteristics cannot contribute to the "reasonable suspicion" that criminal ac-
tivity is afoot which is necessary to lawfully intrude upon an individual's fourth amend-
ment rights. Some courts, however, have recognized that the information acquired dur-
ing the investigatory encounter cannot be used to justify it. United States v. Rico, 594
F.2d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1979). United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir.
1977). United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977).
8. - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
9. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
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lines for use in resolving future cases, nor did the Court resolve all of
the issues presented in the case. Three questions remain to be answered
by the Court. First, whether actions of a passenger, consistent with the
"drug courier profile," provide the agents with probable cause to stop,
question, and seize the suspect. Second, whether such suspicious con-
duct supplies the agents with "reasonable suspicion," something less
than probable cause, which under the fourth amendment authorizes a
minimally intrusive stop and questioning. Third, whether agents can
stop and question a suspect whose conduct falls within the purview of
the "drug courier profile" without invoking fourth amendment
protections.
Thus the question remains: Does the use of the "drug courier pro-
file" (a means of providing agents with a cloak of authority to act on
their "hunches") invest the agents with unfettered discretion to intrude
on the rights of citizens? Inherent in this issue is the recognition that
the conduct compiled in the "drug courier profile" is often logically
consistent with innocent behavior, and may result in passengers being
unnecessarily detained and their constitutional rights infringed upon to
a greater or lesser degree.
Since the majority of the Supreme Court was divided on the issues
concerning the initial contact between the federal agents and the sus-
pect, the lower courts will have to address and resolve these questions
on a case by case analysis.
FACTS
The fact pattern in Mendenhall,1" played a major role in the Su-
preme Court's decision. The incident occurred in the Detroit Metropol-
itan Airport where DEA agents were stationed to detect unlawful nar-
cotic traffic. Two agents observed Ms. Mendenhall as she arrived in the
airport and proceeded through the terminal. Ms. Mendenhall's conduct
was suspicious insofar as the agents viewed it as being consistent with
the characteristics of the "drug courier profile." '11
The agents approached Ms. Mendenhall, identified themselves,
and asked to see her identification and ticket. Ms. Mendanhall pro-
10. - U.S. , 100 S. Ct. 1870.
11. Id. at , 100 S. Ct. at 1873-74.
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duced a driver's license in the name of Sylvia Mendenhall and an air-
line ticket issued in the name of Annette Ford, triggering further in-
quiry by the federal agents. 12
In response to questioning, Ms. Mendenhall stated she had spent
only two days in California. According to the "profile," this factor is
indicative of illegal conduct since drug couriers while transporting nar-
cotics often make brief stops in diverse cities. Additionally, when Agent
Anderson specifically identified himself as a federal narcotics agent,
Ms. Mendenhall became extremely nervous and had difficulty
speaking.13
Based on Ms. Mendenhall's suspicious conduct, Agent Anderson
asked if she would accompany the agents to the airport DEA office for
further questioning.1 4 The record does not include Ms. Mendenhall's
verbal response to this question, but merely recites that she accompa-
nied the agents to the office. Once at the office, an agent asked Ms.
Mendenhall if she would permit a search of her person and handbag.
She responded, "go ahead."1 5 When a policewoman arrived to conduct
the search, she asked the agents if Ms. Mendenhall had consented to
the search, and the agents said she had. After the policewoman and
Ms. Mendenhall had entered another room, the policewoman asked
Ms. Mendenhall if she had consented to the search and she replied
affirmatively. The policewoman then told Ms. Mendenhall that she
12. Id.
13. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1874. Nervousness is one characteristic of the "drug
courier profile" which is often misleading and not indicative of criminal activity. Very
often individuals traveling through airports are nervous and confused due to the hectic
and unfamiliar surroundings. Government officials acting on their hunches can label
conduct as "extremely nervous," thereby fitting it into the profile. Thus the officers can
justify approaching almost any individual walking through an airport terminal. An ex-
ample of detectives acting merely on a hunch occurred in Berg v. State, 384 So. 2d 292
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), wherein the detectives observed Berg walking through
the terminal in an extremely nervous manner. As Berg approached the metal detector
he was shaking with an overall appearance of apprehension. Since the detectives viewed
this conduct as consistent with the "drug courier profile" they approached and asked to
speak with Berg. After receiving permission to inspect his bags, they discovered a white
powdery laxative which they proceeded to field test three or four times. In reality, Berg
was a diabetic suffering from the preliminary stages of insulin shock. The court found
that the detectives were acting upon "nothing more than mere suspicion." Id. at 293.
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would have to disrobe, and in response, Ms. Mendenhall stated that she
"had a plane to catch."16 After being assured by the policewoman that
there would be no delay if she were not carrying narcotics, Ms. Men-
denhall disrobed without further comment. As she was disrobing, Ms.
Mendenhall handed to the policewoman two packages from her cloth-
ing, one of which appeared to contain heroin. The agents then arrested
Ms. Mendenhall for possession of contraband. 17
THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
1. The Fourth Amendment's Applicability
The Supreme Court began its factual analysis by establishing that
Ms. Mendenhall, as she walked through the airport, was protected by
the fourth amendment18 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath,
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
persons and things to be seized.19
In Katz v. United States,20 the Supreme Court held that the
fourth amendment protects "people, not places,"'" and thus established
that the fourth amendment protects more than an "'area' viewed in the
abstract." 22 The fourth amendment protects what an individual "seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public."23
"[Tihis inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his
study to dispose of secret affairs." 24 Additionally, the Supreme Court
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at ., 100 S. Ct. at 1875.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 351.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
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has recognized that "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint of in-
terference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law."2 5
2. Was There a "Seizure" of Ms. Mendenhall?
After establishing that Ms. Mendenhall was clothed with constitu-
tional safeguards, the Supreme Court turned its attention to whether
the actions of the DEA agents violated her constitutional rights. In its
analysis, the majority's consensus broke down. Justice Stewart was
joined only by Justice Rehnquist in Part II-A of his opinion, which
concluded that Ms. Mendenhall was not "seized" since fourth amend-
ment safeguards were not triggered when she was approached and
questioned by the DEA agents.2 6 Justice Powell, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurred in the result, but found
that Ms. Mendenhall was seized within the meaning of the fourth
amendment."
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist stated their belief that police of-
ficers can question people in the street without the officers' conduct
falling within the parameters of the fourth amendment as long as the
individual being questioned has not been "seized." In this situation,
there is "no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would
under the constitution require some particularized and objective justifi-
cation." 28 According to Justices Stewart and Rehnquist when such en-
counters occur between officials and citizens, the citizens can ignore the
25. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
26. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1873. In United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036,
the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of when a seizure occurs in an encounter be-
tween police officers and citizens. In its step by step analysis, the court made a refined
judgment as to exactly when the seizure occurred. The court concluded that no seizure
occurred until the agent took the suspect's ticket to the airline counter to check the
suspect's story. The court arrived at this decision since the encounter involved no force,
no physical contact, and no show of authority other than when the agents identified
themselves as federal law enforcement officials. Id. at 1042.
27. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
28. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
1 146 5:19801
145
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
5:1980DrgCuirPoie14
questions addressed to them and freely walk away.19
3. Terry's Guidelines
Following this premise, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist state that
"the distinction between an intrusion amounting to a 'seizure' of the
person, and an encounter that intrudes upon no constitutionally pro-
tected interest is illustrated by the facts in Terry v. Ohio."30
In Terry, the Supreme Court was dealing with an encounter be-
tween a citizen and a policeman on patrol investigating suspicious cir-
cumstances. The plainclothes policeman observed two men standing on
a corner. One of them walked past some stores and looked specifically
into one store window. While on his return to the corner, the man again
spied into the same store window, and upon arriving at the corner, the
two men again conferred briefly with each other. The second man re-
peated this routine and peered twice into the same store window. These
two men made twelve trips: "pacing, peering, and conferring." 31 At one
point, as the two men were conversing on the corner, they were joined
by a third man. After observing these three men for twelve minutes,
the police officer was "thoroughly suspicious. '3 2 He approached them,
"identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names." 33
The Court stated that "at this point his [the policeman's] knowl-
edge was confined to what he [had] observed. He was not acquainted
with any of the three men by name or sight, and he had received no
information concerning them from any other source. '34
In response to the officer's question, the three men "mumbled
something."3 5 Instantaneously, the officer "grabbed petitioner Terry,
29. Id. However, courts have recognized that encounters between citizens and
officials often inherently involve restraints on individuals' freedom to freely walk away.
The cloak of authority surrounding a government official often results in submission on
the part of citizens, who are not free to disregard the demands of officers. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1848). State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
30. 392 U.S. 1.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 6-7.
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spun him around .... and patted down the outside of his clothing." 6
In Terry v. Ohio, the majority found that the police officer
"seized" the petitioner "when he took hold of him and patted down the
outer surfaces of his clothing." 37 However, after discussing the circum-
stances in Terry, the Court concluded that the seizure was reasonable
despite the interference with Terry's personal security. Thus, there was
no violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. 8
In Mendenhall,3" by simultaneously discussing the majority and
concurring opinions in Terry, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist suggested
that no "seizure" occurs when a police officer questions a citizen on the
street, since the Court in Terry found that no seizure occurred when
the officer stopped and questioned the three men.40
However, a careful analysis of the opinions in Terry reveals that
the majority of the Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether
a "seizure" took place before the officer physically restrained Terry.
The majority stated in a footnote:
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of
an investigative "seizure" upon less than probable cause for purposes of
"detention" and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
"seizure" has occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty upon this re-
cord whether any "seizure" took place here prior to Officer McFadden's
initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for weap-
ons. . 41
In his concurring opinion in Terry, Justice White spoke of interro-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 30-31.
39. - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
40. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
41. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d
1036, analyzed the Terry decision concluding that the Court did not discuss the propri-
ety of an investigatory seizure.
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gation during an investigatory stop.4 2 The interpretation given this con-
curring opinion by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist is that since nothing
in the constitution prevents a police officer from addressing questions to
individuals in the streets, constitutional rights are not violated if a per-
son is briefly restrained and questioned. 3
A close analysis of Justice White's separate concurring opinion
reveals that he did not state absolutely that no seizure occurs during a
brief encounter with a police officer. Rather, he set forth that the indi-
vidual's constitutional rights were "not necessarily violated. 44 The ma-
jority of the Supreme Court in Terry specifically did not decide this
issue.45
Analyzing encounters between citizens and police officers demon-
strates that these contacts involve varying degrees of coerciveness.
When a police officer on the beat approaches a citizen and asks, "Sir,
may I talk to you a moment, ' 46 the question suggests that the individ-
ual is free to leave if he so desires.47 On the other hand, when a federal
agent in an airport stops a citizen whose conduct is consistent with the
"drug courier profile," identifies himself as a DEA agent, and asks for
the suspect's identification and ticket, the situation strongly suggests
that the individual is not free to leave, and that any attempt to do so
would be met with opposition.4
In Mendenhall,49 the record clearly showed that Ms. Mendenhall
was not free to ignore the federal agents and walk away. Footnote six
of Justices Stewart and Rehnquist's opinion states that the DEA agents
would have detained Ms. Mendenhall had she attempted to leave.50
The federal agent's subjective intention to restrain the respondent was
relevant insofar as it was conveyed to Ms. Mendenhall.5 1 Unfortu-
42. 392 U.S. at 34.
43. - U.S. at ._., 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
44. 392 U.S. at 35. In fact, Justice White's analysis recognized that the circum-
stances of an encounter were critical. In Terry he agreed that proper circumstances
existed to approach and detain the suspect.
45. Id. at 19 n.16.
46. United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
47. Id.
48. - U.S. , 100 S. Ct. 1870.
49. Id.
50. Id. at ., 100 S. Ct. at 1877 n.6.
51. Id.
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nately, the record before the Supreme Court did not contain the specif-
ics of the intention conveyed to Ms. Mendenhall. Certainly, the
thoughts, beliefs, and motivations of the participants set the atmo-
sphere of any encounter and may affect their actions during it. Thus, if
the record had been more complete, perhaps it would have shown that
a seizure had occurred. Possibly, a better solution, in a situation where
the record is insufficient in cases involving fourth amendment rights, is
to remand for further evidentiary hearings on the issue 52 rather than to
assume that no seizure occurred. 53
In discussing whether a seizure had occurred during the initial en-
counter in Mendenhall, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist broadly de-
fined "seizure" as "when by means of physical force or a show of au-
thority an [individual's] freedom of movement is restrained."" This
definition encompasses circumstances where no physical force or touch-
ing occurs and where the suspect makes no attempt to leave. Two ex-
amples set forth in Stewart and Rehnquist's opinion include: (1) when
the presence of several officers is threatening; and (2) when the lan-
guage or voice of the officers indicates that the suspect will not be al-
lowed to leave.55 In ascertaining whether a "seizure" occurs in such
circumstances, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist would consider whether
"in view of all the circumstances. . . , a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave." 56
In Mendenhall, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist found that no
seizure had occurred during the initial approach since (1) the record
did not contain any evidence that Ms. Mendenhall's actions were re-
strained in any way;57 and (2) the record did not indicate that she had
any objective reason to believe she was not free to end the conversation
and proceed on her way.58 Such evidence was absent from the record
since the parties had argued the case in the lower courts on the as-
sumption that Ms. Mendenhall had been "seized" when she was ap-
52. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1886 (dissenting opinion). Obviously police can talk to
citizens without violating their constitutional rights.
53. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
54. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1878.
58. Id.
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proached in the concourse. 9
To the concurring justices, the question of whether Ms. Menden-
hall had been seized was not resolved easily in light of conflicting pre-
cedent.6 0 There is case law supporting a finding that Ms. Mendenhall
was seized by the agents. For example, in Terry v. Ohio,6" the Court
emphasized that "[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person."' 62 The Court expanded on this thought, and stated
that when a citizen is "stopped" by police he is "seized" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, and some "specific and articulable"
justification must be shown to "reasonably warrant" the intrusion."
In Brown v. Texas," a case which involved the seizure of an indi-
vidual in circumstances analogous to Mendenhall, the Supreme Court
noted that when the officers approached Brown and asked him to iden-
tify himself, "they performed a seizure of his person subject to the re-
quirements of the [f]ourth [a]mendment." 65 However, "seizures" of in-
dividuals have been found in situations involving less of an intrustion
than that which occurred in Terry. In United States v. Coleman,"6 the
59. Id. at -. , 100 S. Ct. at 1875 n.5, 1885 (dissenting opinion).
60. Id. at -_, 100 S. Ct. at 1880 n.1.
61. 392 U.S. 1.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id. at 21.
64. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). In Brown, while cruising in a patrol car, two police
officers observed Brown and another man walking away from each other in an alley.
Believing that the two men either had been together or were about to meet until the
patrol car appeared, one officer approached Brown and asked him to identify himself
and to explain what he was doing. When Brown refused to identify himself, the officer
replied that he was in a "high drug problem area." Id. at 48-49. The second officer
then frisked Brown and found nothing.
65. Id. at 50.
66. 450 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1978). In Coleman, a DEA agent observed
Coleman as he deplaned at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, from a flight arriving
from Los Angeles, "the most significant distribution point for heroin in the country."
Id. at 439. Coleman carried no hand luggage and walked directly through the terminal
without stopping to claim any baggage. A woman met Coleman outside the terminal
and they both proceeded toward the parking lot. The federal agent approached them,
identified himself, and asked Coleman to produce some identification and his airline
ticket.
The court found from the moment that the DEA agent identified himself and began
151 1
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District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan stated that police
officers can subject an individual to a "seizure" during an investigatory
stop by taking advantage of "social pressures which inhibit the suspect
from declining to deal with him [the police officer] . '67 In other words,
the suspect is seized because he is not free to ignore the police officer
and walk away. 8
4. The Concurring Justices Apply a Balancing Approach
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun, concurred in part and joined in the judgment. Justice Powell as-
sumed that the initial stop constituted a seizure and analyzed the situa-
tion accordingly. The concurring justices stated that they would have
held "the federal agents had reasonable suspicion that the respondent
was engaging in criminal activity and, therefore, that they did not vio-
late the [ffourth [a]mendment by stopping the respondent for routine
questioning." 69
In Mendenhall, since the stop constituted a seizure it had to be
justified in order to satisfy the fourth amendment requirements. The
categories of police conduct into which this encounter could fall were
limited to (1) an investigatory stop which requires reasonable suspicion;
or (2) an arrest or its equivalent which requires probable cause. 0
to ask Coleman questions, a "Terry stop had been effected." Therefore, the stop had to
be based on reasonable suspicion to meet the requirements of the fourth amendment.
The court held that the stop of Coleman was not based on reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and was not constitutionally valid.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
70. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). The bulk of the lower court
cases have found that investigatory stops merely based on conduct consistent with the
"drug courier profile" cannot be justified on either probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion grounds. United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320. United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d
913. United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1977). State v. Battleman, 347 So.
2d 637 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). State v. Frost, 347 So. 2d 593. However, there
are a few cases that state that there may arise a set of facts in which the existence of
profile characteristics constitute reasonable suspicion to warrant the intrusion of an
investigatory stop. United States v. McCaleb, 522 F.2d 717, 720. State v. Mitchell,
377 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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In Terry v. Ohio,71 the Court established that reasonable investi-
gatory stops satisfy the fourth amendment's proscription against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. The Court concluded that the warrant
clause could not apply, as a practical matter, to police conduct which is
"necessarily swift action predicated upon the on the spot observations
of the officer."'72 However, the Court emphasized that police must ob-
tain warrants for searches and seizures whenever practicable.73
In assessing the reasonableness of seizures which are less intrusive
than traditional arrests, courts have used a "balancing test" to assure
that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not arbitrarily
intruded upon by police officers7' "engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime." 5 Whether a stop constitutes a seizure
turns on the circumstances of each case. Some of the factors considered
by courts when determining the reasonableness of a "seizure" include:
"(1) the public interest served by the seizure, (2) the nature and scope
of the intrusion, (3) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement
officer relied in light of his knowledge and expertise, '76 and the individ-
ual's right to personal security and privacy.77
The balancing test applied to fourth amendment issues originated
in Camara v. Municipal Court."8 In that case, the Court was dealing
with the warrant provision of the fourth amendment and the quantum
of evidence necessary to secure a warrant on less than probable cause.
The Court proceeded to apply a "reasonableness" test to this fourth
amendment activity by balancing the "need to search against the inva-
sion which the search entails. 7 9
This balancing test to determine reasonableness of warrants under
the fourth amendment was subsequently applied in Terry v. Ohio8" to a
71. 392 U.S. 1.
72. Id. at 20.
73. Id.
74. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignon-Prince,
422 U.S. 873 (1975).
75. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
76. - U.S. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1881.
77. 443 U.S. at 50-51; 440 U.S. at 654-55; 422 U.S. at 879-83; 392 U.S. at 20-
22.
78. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
79. Id. at 536-37.
80. 392 U.S. 1.
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"confrontation on the street between [a] citizen and [a] policeman in-
vestigating suspicious circumstances," '81 involving less than probable
cause. As the majority in Terry read the fourth amendment, it prohib-
ited "not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and
seizures."82 The Supreme Court went on to state that "the central in-
quiry under the fourth amendment is reasonableness in all the circum-
stances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security."' 3 The Supreme Court then applied the "balancing test" to
determine the reasonableness of the policeman's conduct in stopping
and frisking the suspect and found that the officer was acting upon
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, thus justifying
the intrusion into the individual's constitutionally protected rights."
The concurring justices in Mendenhall,85 applied this balancing
test. First, the justices found a great public interest in detecting indi-
viduals involved in drug trafficking, a great problem "affecting the
health and welfare of our population." 86
Second, the Court considered the DEA's "nationwide program to
intercept drug couriers transporting narcotics between major drug
sources and distribution centers in the United States"87 and found it to
be a well-planned and effective federal law enforcement program." 88
The justices stated that the special training, experience and expertise of
law enforcement officials are factors to be weighed in determining the
reasonableness of the stop.89 The agents' "expertise" considered impor-
tant by the concurring justices, included the use by the agents of the
"drug courier profile . . . [describing] characteristics generally associ-
ated with narcotics traffickers" 90 compiled through the DEA's highly
specialized operation.9 1 The justices stated that an agent's "knowledge
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id. at 19.
84. Id. at 30.
85. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
86. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
87. Id.
88. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1883.
89. Id.
90. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1881.
91. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1881, 1883.
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of the methods used in recent criminal activity and the characteristics
of persons engaged in such illegal practices" 92 are among the circum-
stances that can give rise to reasonable suspicion.93 "Law enforcement
officers may rely on the 'characteristics of the area,' and the behavior
of a suspect who appears to be evading police contact." 94 Further, "a
trained law enforcement agent may be 'able to perceive and articulate
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the un-
trained observer." 95
Third, the justices reviewed the factors which led to the stop and
questioning of Ms. Mendenhall, including that she:
(1) appeared very nervous,
(2) attempted to evade detection,
(3) deplaned after all the other passengers,
(4) scanned the terminal,
(5) walked "'very, very slowly'"96
(6) claimed no baggage, and
(7) changed airlines for the flight out of Detroit.
The district court held that this conduct, observed by the DEA agents
before stopping and questioning Ms. Mendenhall, provided reasonable
suspicion to make the investigatory stop. The concurring justices
agreed with this conclusion.97
The conduct observed by the DEA agents was consistent with the
"drug courier profile." In this case, reliance on this profile demon-
strated reasonable suspicion. However, the justices pointed out that
each case must be "judged on its own facts." 98
Finally, the Court evaluated the intrusion upon Ms. Mendenhall's
rights and found it to be minimal considering that: (1) two plainclothes
agents approached the respondent in a public area; (2) the agents iden-
tified themselves; (3) the agents asked the respondent to produce some
identification and her airline ticket; and (4) the agents asked a few





97. Id. at , 100 S. Ct. at 1883.
98. Id. n.6.
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brief questions. 9
In summary, on the issue of the initial encounter between the
agents and Ms. Mendenhall, the members of the Court only agreed
that the stop was lawful. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist found that
there was no seizure, while Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun as-
sumed there was a seizure but found that it was based- on reasonable
suspicion.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE
What does this decision offer to the lower courts as precedent?
How does the Supreme Court answer the following questions con-
fronting the lower courts?
(1) Is a suspect who is approached by federal agents in an airport
for questioning because his conduct is consistent with the "drug courier
profile" seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment? Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist said "no;" Justices Powell, Burger and Black-
mun did not discuss the question.
(2) Is an initial stop lawful? The majority of the Court said "yes."
(3) Why is the initial stop lawful? Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
found that the fourth amendment provides no protection to individuals
who have not been "seized." Therefore, since Ms. Mendenhall was not
"seized," the stop was outside the parameters of the fourth amend-
ment, and legal. Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun found that the
seizure was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the fourth amend-
ment. Thus, the Court's decision on these issues supplies the lower
courts with no more guidance than they had previously. Subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court have not addressed these unresolved
issues, nor provided the lower courts with any additional guidance.
99. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1882. However, the opinion did not state whether the
DEA agents returned to Ms. Mendenhall her identification and airline ticket before
asking if she would accompany them to the airport DEA office. The Fifth Circuit has
held that a seizure occurs when the agents take the suspect's ticket. 592 F.2d 1036.
Logically, an individual is not free to proceed on his own way when he has no ticket
and no identification. If the facts were to establish that the agents kept the documents,
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist should have found a seizure of Ms. Mendenhall at that
instant.
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In a per curiam opinion in Reid v. Georgia,100 the Supreme Court
did not consider whether an investigatory stop based on the "drug cou-
rier profile" constituted a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The state court had not analyzed the issue but had as-
sumed that a routine identification stop and questioning constituted a
,,seizure.,,lol1
The Supreme Court disposed of the case on its facts, concluding
that "the agent could not as a matter of law, have reasonably suspected
the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of [the] observed circum-
stances," 102 which were "too slender a reed to support a seizure."103
Therefore, the DEA agent did not lawfully seize Mr. Reid.0
MS. MENDENHALL'S "CONSENT" TO BE SEARCHED
In Mendenhall, °5 after the majority found that the initial stop
and questioning of Ms. Mendenhall was lawful, it still had to determine
whether she had consented to accompany the federal agents to the air-
port DEA office, and whether she subsequently had consented to a
search of her person. If voluntary consent is found to have been given
by an individual capable of consenting, then such a search, limited to
the scope of the consent, is reasonable under the fourth amendment. 106
Voluntary consent eliminates the necessity for justifying the search
with a warrant or probable cause. In a situation where the prosecution
relies upon "consent" to justify a search, the prosecution has the bur-
den of proving that the consent was voluntary,107 and voluntariness
must be determined by the totality of the circumstances.10 8
The district court had found that Ms. Mendenhall had voluntarily
accompanied the agents to the DEA office in the airport, and her vol-
100. - U.S. ., 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980).
101. Id.
102. Id. at ., 100 S. Ct. at 2754.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. - U.S. _, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
106. Scheneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
107. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
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untary action thereby eliminated the need for probable cause. 109
The majority of the Court, in reviewing the evidence before the
trial court which included no show of force or threats, found that "the
totality of the evidence . . . was plainly adequate to support the Dis-
trict Court's finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to ac-
company the officers . . . . 11
Finally, the Court considered whether the respondent's consent to
the search was "valid." The majority found ample evidence to support
a finding that the consent was voluntary and valid, including: (1) the
respondent was twenty-two years old with an eleventh grade education;
(2) she was expressly told twice she was free to refuse consent; and (3)
she twice "unequivocally" consented to the search.,
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's objective in granting certiorari was to con-
sider "whether any right of the respondent guaranteed by the [f]ourth
[a]mendment was violated.' ' 2 Since the majority found that the initial
stop was lawful, and not violative of any of Ms. Mendenhall's rights
under the fourth amendment, the Court accomplished its goal. How-
ever, the lower courts must still deal with conflicting analyses and ra-
tionales upon which to base future decisions involving investigatory
stops based on less than probable cause such as that supplied by the
"drug courier profile."
Mary Ann Duggan
109. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1879.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 100 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
112. Id. at_, 100S. Ct. at 1873.
157
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
